Already a subscriber? - Login here
Not yet a subscriber? - Subscribe here

Browse by:



Displaying: 1-10 of 53 documents


articles
1. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 52 > Issue: 4
About Our Contributors
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
2. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 52 > Issue: 4
Chris Bessemans Universalizability in Moral Judgments: Winch’s Ambiguity
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Peter Winch once objected to Sidgwick’s universalizability thesis in that an agent’s nature would be of no interest to his judgment or the judgment about the agent’s action. While agreeing upon the relevance of the agent-as-person in moral judgments, I disagree with Winch’s conclusions. The ambiguity in Winch’s text reveals that Winch’s moral judgment is inconsistent, and this indicates that there is something wrong in Winch’s account. My claim, for which I am indebted to Aurel Kolnai, is that inserting the relevance of the circumstantially relevant features of the agent-as-person does not imply that one has to deny the universalizability of moral judgments. Differences in agents, if relevant to the situation, can cause differentiations in judgments and can allow bystanders to say that the agent did right or wrong although they themselves would have acted differently. But this possibility does not mean that the universalizability of moral judgments should be denied.
3. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 52 > Issue: 4
Joseph Palencik Kant and the Limitations of Legitimized Historical Knowledge
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Kant’s emphasis on the individual knower often overshadows the social dimension in his thought. In particular, it is infrequently recognized that he has a coherent and well-developed theory of testimony. In this paper I develop Kant’s view of testimony and argue for the important distinction that he holds between historical belief derived from testimony and what I shall call mere belief. While beliefs of the former type can be justified and often amount to instances of knowledge, beliefs of the second type are not justified, cannot lead to knowledge, and yet may still be legitimately held.
4. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 52 > Issue: 4
Stephen R. Palmquist Could Kant’s Jesus Be God?
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Although Kant had a high regard for Jesus as a moral teacher, interpreters typically assume that his philosophy disallows belief in Jesus as God. Those who regard Kant as a moral reductionist are especially likely to offer a negative construal of the densely-argued subsection of his 1793 Religion that relates directly to this issue. The recent “affirmative” trend in Kant-scholarship provides the basis for an alternative reading. First, theologians must regard Jesus as human so that belief in Jesus can empower believers to become good. Second, theologians may refer to Jesus as divine by identifying his disposition as exemplifying the “archetype of perfect humanity.” Third, Judeo-Christian history poses an empirical problem that theologians can solve by interpreting Jesus’s divinity according to the schematism of analogy. While this does not constitute a robust (identifiably Christian) doctrine of Jesus’s divinity, it does provide clear guidelines for formulating such a tenet of historical faith.
5. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 52 > Issue: 4
Yu Zhenhua Polanyi and Wittgenstein on Doubt
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
There is an interesting convergence between Michael Polanyi and Wittgenstein with respect to the problem of doubt. Polanyi carries out his “critique of doubt” on the basis of the distinction between explicit knowledge and tacit knowledge and examines explicit doubt and tacit doubt. On the level of explicit doubt, Polanyi debunks the paradoxical nature of the principle of universal doubt and illuminates the fiduciary character of doubt. The introduction of the tacit dimension into the discussion of the problem of human knowledge leads Polanyi to discover tacit doubt. Polanyi’s critique of doubt finds strong echoes in Wittgenstein, especially in his On Certainty. Nevertheless, there are important differences between two thinkers. Wittgenstein’s emphasis on the practical aspect of a world-picture and Polanyi’s sensitivity to tacit doubt are among the most prominent items that set them apart.
6. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 52 > Issue: 4
Siobhan Nash-Marshall Saint Anselm and the Problem of Evil, or On Freeing Evil From the “Problem of Evil”
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
This article addresses one of the crucial metaphysical presuppositions of the contemporary problem of evil: the belief that evil is that which a good thing must eliminate, or to be more precise, that evil is that which God must eliminate. The first part analyzes J. L. Mackie’s atheological argument in “Evil and Omnipotence.” The second part analyzes the reasons why Saint Anselm rejected the claim that God must eliminate evil in his De Casu Diaboli. The article’s goal is not just raise crucial questions with respect to contemporary approaches to evil. It is also to reflect with Saint Anselm upon one of the genuine aporiai posed by existing evils: how does one remove them?
7. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 52 > Issue: 4
Mark A. Tietjen Antitheory and Edification: Williams and Kierkegaard on Some Possibilities for Philosophy
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
This paper shows the remarkable compatibility of the thought of Bernard Williams and Søren Kierkegaard regarding what Williams would call the “limits” of philosophical ethics and practice. In different ways both Williams and Kierkegaard critique a reductionist conception of the ethical life, its obligations, and the prescriptions that ethical theories make based upon such conceptions. Additionally, the high level of reflectiveness in their respective societies worries both. For Williams the concern is an epistemological one, whereas for Kierkegaard the issue is moral. Upon juxtaposing their thought in these areas, I show how Kierkegaard extends the concerns that he shares with Williams by demonstrating a wider vision of what philosophical ethics can and should do.
book reviews
8. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 52 > Issue: 4
Victor M. Salas The Science of Being as Being: Metaphysical Investigations—Ed. Gregory T. Doolan
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
9. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 52 > Issue: 4
Curtis L Hancock Poetry, Beauty, & Contemplation: The Complete Aesthetics of Jacques Maritain—John G. Trapani
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
10. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 52 > Issue: 4
Brian Gregor Discourses at the Communion on Fridays—Søren Kierkegaard
view |  rights & permissions | cited by