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articles
1. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 52 > Issue: 2
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2. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 52 > Issue: 2
Alejandro Bárcenas Xunzi and Han Fei on Human Nature
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It is commonly accepted that Han Fei studied under Xunzi sometime during the late third century BCE. However, there is surprisingly little dedicated to the in-depth study of the relationship between Xunzi’s ideas and one of his best-known followers. In this essay I argue that Han Fei’s notion of xing, commonly translated as human nature, was not only influenced by Xunzi but also that it is an important feature of his political philosophy.
3. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 52 > Issue: 2
Antonio Malo The Limits of Marion’s and Derrida’s Philosophy of the Gift
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Is it possible to think of the gift philosophically? How should we think of the gift in a world that seems to be regulated only with economic rules? These are two of the main questions that are treated in this essay. In order to deal with them, the author analyzes Jacques Derrida’s deconstruction of the gift and Jean-Luc Marion’s notion of givenness. Derrida and Marion are in agreement in refusing intentionality as an essential element of the logic of gift because for them intentionality is always connected with economy. But they conceive economics in different ways and, as a consequence, their conceptions of gift are different. For Derrida, economics means credit and debit, while for Marion it means causality. This difference is the reason why Derrida thinks of the gift as either impossible or a moment of madness that overcomes credit and debit, while Marion thinks of it as a pure decision that comes from its givenness. As a result, for neither author does the gift have any element of need, motivation, or cause. The author argues that excess and decision cannot be the essence of the gift, but only reciprocity. This reciprocity is not an economic relation of giving and receiving but an asymmetrical reciprocity.
4. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 52 > Issue: 2
Adam Wood Incorporeal Nous and the Science of the Soul in Aristotle’s De anima
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In this essay I argue first that De anima 3.4–5 shows Aristotle answering affirmatively a question that he raises near the beginning of the work, namely, whether any of the soul’s affections are proper to it alone. Second, I argue that this initial conclusion reveals something important about the very first question that Aristotle broaches in the work, viz., the method and starting-points employed in the science of the soul. Aristotle’s position, I claim, shows that investigating the human soul is not merely an empirical concern discharged by natural science but also a rational concern discharged by logic, epistemology, and possibly even metaphysics. I defend these views against two rival interpretations of the passage, the “transcendental interpretation,” on which it does not describe a faculty immanent to human beings at all, and the “bad science interpretation,” on which it does but only as the result of Aristotle’s faulty physiology of cognition.
5. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 52 > Issue: 2
Katherin A. Rogers Anselm on the Ontological Status of Choice
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If God is the cause of everything that has any sort of existence at all, where is there room in the universe for rational creatures to have freedom of will? Isn’t a choice made by a created agent a sort of thing, and hence made by God? But if God causes our choices, how are we responsible such that we can be appropriately praised and blamed? Call this the dilemma of created freedom and divine omnipotence. Anselm solves the dilemma by proposing a description of free choice in which what is contributed by the created agent is not any new thing at all. In addition to the historical case, I argue that this move is a philosophically viable solution to the puzzle. I end by noting that this move has important implications for current philosophical work on the question of freedom of the will.
6. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 52 > Issue: 2
Mark J. Barker Aquinas on Internal Sensory Intentions: Nature and Classification
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This paper suggests several summa genera for the various meanings of intentio in Aquinas and briefly outlines the genera of cognitive intentiones. It presents the referential and existential nature of intentions of harm or usefulness as distinguished from external sensory or imaginary forms in light of Avicenna’s threefold sensory abstraction. The paper offers a terminological clarification regarding the quasi-immaterial existential status of intentions. Internal sensory intentions account for a way in which one perceives something, as is best seen in light of the distinction between formal and material objects. Against the imagist account of intentions that denies the memorative power an immanent object, it shows that the memorative’s proper and immediate object is the intention of the past, while its extrinsic mediate object is the imaginary phantasm.
7. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 52 > Issue: 2
Sean Drysdale Walsh Kant’s Theory of Right as Aristotelian Phronesis
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Many philosophers believe that a moral theory, given all the relevant facts, should be able to determine what is morally right and wrong. It is commonly argued that Aristotle’s ethical theory suffers from a fatal flaw: it places responsibility for determining right and wrong with the virtuous agent who has phronesis rather than with the theory itself. It is also commonly argued that Immanuel Kant’s ethical theory does provide a concept of right that is capable of determining right and wrong in specific cases. I argue, however, that Kant never gives a determinate moral theory of right. Rather, I argue that Kant’s moral theory is similar in many ways to that of Aristotle, in that it still holds that a moral agent with phronesis, rather than the theory, determines what is right. Kant’s practical philosophy was not so much meant to tell us right and wrong as to prevent bad moral theory from corrupting our moral common sense, and it is our moral common sense that determines right and wrong naturally.
book reviews
8. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 52 > Issue: 2
Ann V. Murphy Continental Philosophy: An Introduction. Second Edition. By David West
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9. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 52 > Issue: 2
Jasper Doomen Human Dignity. By George Kateb
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10. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 52 > Issue: 2
Giorgio Pini Logic, Theology, and Poetry in Boethius, Abelard, and Alain of Lille: Words in the Absence of Things. By Eileen C. Sweeney
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