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The Journal of Philosophy:
Volume >
121 >
Issue: 5
Peter Hawke
Relevant Alternatives and Missed Clues: Redux
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I construe Relevant Alternatives Theory (RAT) as an abstract combination of anti-skepticism and epistemic modesty, then re-evaluate the challenge posed to it by the missed clue counterexamples of Schaffer. The import of this challenge has been underestimated, as Schaffer’s specific argument invites distracting objections. I offer a novel formalization of RAT, accommodating a suitably wide class of concrete theories of knowledge. Then, I introduce ‘abstract missed clue cases’ and prove that every RA theory, as formalized, admits such a case. This yields an argument—in Schaffer’s spirit—that resists easy dismissal.
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