Cover of The Journal of Philosophy
Already a subscriber? - Login here
Not yet a subscriber? - Subscribe here

Browse by:

Displaying: 1-3 of 3 documents

1. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 118 > Issue: 10
Ayelet Shavit, Aaron M. Ellison Diverse Populations are Conflated with Heterogeneous Collectives
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The concept of difference has a long and important research tradition. We identify and explicate a heretofore overlooked distinction in the meaning and measurement of two different meanings of 'difference': 'diversity' and 'heterogeneity'. We argue that ‘diversity’ can describe a population well enough but does not describe a collective well. In contrast, ‘heterogeneity’ describes a collective better than a population and therefore ought to describe a collective. We argue that ignoring these distinctions can lead to a surprising and disturbing conflict between diversity and heterogeneity. In particular, focusing on the 'diversity' of human communities can be self-defeating for those who truly care about the importance of diversity, inclusion, and belonging.
2. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 118 > Issue: 10
Giorgio Sbardolini Aboutness Paradox
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The present work outlines a logical and philosophical conception of propositions in relation to a group of puzzles that arise by quantifying over them: the Russell-Myhill paradox, the Prior-Kaplan paradox, and Prior's Theorem. I begin by motivating an interpretation of Russell-Myhill as depending on aboutness, which constrains the notion of propositional identity. I discuss two formalizations of of the paradox, showing that it does not depend on the syntax of propositional variables. I then extend to propositions a modal predicative response to the paradoxes articulated by an abstraction principle for propositions. On this conception, propositions are “shadows” of the sentences that express them. Modal operators are used to uncover the implicit relation of dependence that characterizes propositions that are about propositions. The benefits of this approach are shown by application to other intensional puzzles. The resulting view is an alternative to the plenitudinous metaphysics of impredicative comprehension principles.
comments and criticism
3. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 118 > Issue: 10
Paiman Karimi Is Relaxed Realism a Genuinely Novel View?
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In this paper I argue that relaxed realism can answer questions about normative language and thought without collapsing into one of the familiar views in the literature or becoming implausible. More specifically, contrary to Michael Ridge, I argue that relaxed realists can use an inferentialist approach to metasemantics without their view collapsing into naturalism or quasi-realism. The inferentialist account that I propose is that the role of normative expressions involves language-entry transitions construed as rational intuitions and language-exit transitions explained in terms of rational agency. I argue that this account fits with relaxed realism and keeps the view distinct from naturalism, quasi-realism, and other familiar views in the literature.