Cover of The Journal of Philosophy
Already a subscriber? - Login here
Not yet a subscriber? - Subscribe here

Browse by:

Displaying: 1-5 of 5 documents

1. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 118 > Issue: 1
Jessica Keiser On Meaning without Use
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
This paper defends the use-based metasemantic project against the problem of meaning without use, which allegedly shows the predictions of use-based metasemantic accounts to be indeterminate with respect to unusably long or complex expressions. This criticism is commonly taken to be decisive, prompting various retreats and contributing to the project’s eventual decline. Using metasemantic conventionalism as a case study, I argue the following: either such expressions do not belong to used languages or their meanings are uniquely determined by use. Thus, the alleged problem of meaning without use offers no challenge to the use-based metasemantic project generally, nor to conventionalism in particular.
2. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 118 > Issue: 1
Peter W. Evans A Sideways Look at Faithfulness for Quantum Correlations
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Despite attempts to apply causal modeling techniques to quantum systems, Wood and Spekkens argue that any causal model purporting to explain quantum correlations must be fine tuned; it must violate the assumption of faithfulness. This paper is an attempt to undermine the reasonableness of the assumption of faithfulness in the quantum context. Employing a symmetry relation between an entangled quantum system and a “sideways” quantum system consisting of a single photon passing sequentially through two polarizers, I argue that Wood and Spekkens’s analysis applies equally to this sideways system also. As a result, we must either reject a causal explanation in this single photon system, or the sideways system must be fine tuned. If the latter, a violation of faithfulness in the ordinary entangled system may be more tolerable than first thought. Thus, extending the classical “no fine-tuning” principle of parsimony to the quantum realm may be too hasty.
comments and criticism
3. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 118 > Issue: 1
Matthew Jope On the Alleged Instability of Externalist Anti-skepticism
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
A certain brand of skeptical argument appeals to the thought that our inability to subjectively discriminate between competing hypotheses means that we are unwarranted in believing in either. Externalists respond by pointing out that such arguments depend on an internalist conception of warrant that we would do well to reject. This strategy has been criticized by Crispin Wright, who argues that if we pursue the implications of externalism sufficiently far we find that it is ultimately unstable or incoherent. I first rehearse the simple externalist anti-skeptical position. I then present Wright’s argument for the externalist instability, offering a clearer way of understanding its central claim. Finally, I show that the instability in fact arises due to hidden internalist assumptions about evidence and that rid of these assumptions the externalist position is stable after all.
book reviews
4. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 118 > Issue: 1
Mark Jago Theodore Sider: The Tools of Metaphysics and the Metaphysics of Science
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
5. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 118 > Issue: 1
Call for Submissions: The Isaac Levi Prize
view |  rights & permissions | cited by