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Displaying: 1-4 of 4 documents

1. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 114 > Issue: 3
Ivan Hu The Epistemology of Immunity to Error through Misidentification
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This paper offers several new insights into the epistemology of immunity to error through misidentification, by refining James Pryor’s distinction between de re misidentification and wh-misidentification. This is crucial for identifying exactly what is at issue in debates over the Immunity thesis that, roughly, all introspection-based beliefs about one’s own occurrent psychological states are immune to error through misidentification. I contend that the debate between John Campbell and Annalisa Coliva over whether the phenomenon of thought insertion provides empirical evidence against claims like Immunity has wrongly focused on de re misidentification and largely overlooked the role of wh-misidentification. I argue that, once we properly distinguish the two notions, subjects of thought insertion can be seen to make an error of wh-misidentification in their judgments. I argue that this disproves the Immunity thesis, properly understood, and show what broader implications this has for our understanding of IEM and the first person.
2. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 114 > Issue: 3
Boyd Millar Thinking with Sensations
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If we acknowledge that a perceptual experience’s sensory phenomenology is not inherently representational, we face a puzzle. On the one hand, sensory phenomenology must play an intimate role in the perception of ordinary physical objects; but on the other hand, our experiences’ purely sensory element rarely captures our attention. I maintain that neither indirect realism nor the dual component theory provides a satisfactory solution to this puzzle: indirect realism is inconsistent with the fact that sensory phenomenology typically goes unnoticed by perceivers; while, the dual component theory cannot do justice to the important role that sensory phenomenology plays in our perceptual awareness of physical objects. I argue that in order to avoid the difficulties with each of the standard alternatives, we must characterize sensory phenomenology as functioning in the way that linguistic symbols function in thought.
book reviews
3. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 114 > Issue: 3
Billy Dunaway The Meaning of ‘Ought’: Beyond Descriptivism and Expressivism in Metaethics
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4. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 114 > Issue: 3
Thomas Blanchard How Physics Makes Us Free
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