Already a subscriber? - Login here
Not yet a subscriber? - Subscribe here

Browse by:



Displaying: 1-20 of 412 documents


1. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 28
Dedication
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
articles
2. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 28
Massimo Mugnai An Appreciation of Richard Arthur
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
This is an appreciation of Richard Arthur, assessing his contributions to Leibniz studies and recounting the nature of our friendship over the past 30 years.
3. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 28
Richard T. W. Arthur The Hegelian Roots of Russell's Critique of Leibniz
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
At the turn of the century (1899-1903) Bertrand Russell advocated an absolutist theory of space and time, and scornfully rejected Leibniz’s relational theory in his Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz (1900). But by the time of the second edition (1937), he had proposed highly influential relational theories of space and time that had much in common with Leibniz’s own views. Ironically, he never acknowledges this. In trying to get to the bottom of this enigma, I looked further at contemporary texts by Russell, and also those he might have relied on, especially that of Robert Latta. I found that, like Latta’s, Russell’s interpretation of Leibniz was heavily conditioned by his immersion in neo-Hegelian and neo-Kantian philosophy prior to 1898, and that the doctrine of internal relations he attributes to Leibniz was more nearly the view of Lotze.
4. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 28
Jen Nguyen Leibniz on Place
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Although scholars have given much attention to Leibniz’s view of space, they have given far less attention to his view of place. This neglect is regrettable because Leibniz holds that place is more fundamental than space. What is more, I argue that Leibniz’s view of place is novel, strange and yet, appealing. To have a Leibnizian place is to have a point of view. And nothing more. Because this reading is likely to sound counterintuitive, the first half of the paper motivates my reading by arguing that point of view plays a foundational role for Leibniz. Consequently, it would be reasonable for Leibniz to identify place with something so foundational. Having provided Leibnizian reasons for identifying place with point of view, I then argue that Leibniz identifies place with point of view by analyzing some neglected texts. I close by considering a worry from the Clarke Correspondence.
5. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 28
Tamar Levanon Organism and Harmony: Leibniz's Thought at the Turn of the Twentieth Century
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
This paper examines the role that Leibniz’s philosophy played in the debate between the Idealists and their opponents at the turn of the twentieth century. While it is Russell’s The Philosophy of Leibniz (1900) which is most frequently referred to in this context, this paper focuses on John Dewey’s Leibniz’s New Essays which was written twelve years earlier, during the Hegelian phase of Dewey’s career. It is important to shift our attention to Dewey’s commentary not only because it has been almost entirely neglected, but also because it provides a broader perspective on the role of the Leibnizian system in one of the leading debates in the history of philosophy, namely the debate over the intelligibility of the idea of internal relations. In particular, Dewey’s book reveals Leibniz’s involvement in the emergence of the notion of organism which was at the heart of the debate.
book reviews
6. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 28
Samuel Levey Monads, Composition, and Force: Ariadnean Threads through Leibniz’s Labyrinth
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
7. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 28
Richard T. W. Arthur On the Non-Idealist Leibniz: A Reply to Samuel Levey
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
8. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 28
Russell Wahl Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies (37, 1: 2017): Special Issue on Russell and Leibniz
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
9. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 28
Christopher Johns The New Method of Learning and Teaching Jurisprudence, According to the Principles of the Didactic Art Premised in the General Part and in the Light of Experience
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
10. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 28
Nabeel Hamid Kant on Reality, Cause, and Force: From the Early Modern Tradition to the Critical Philosophy
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
11. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 28
Paul Rateau The Bulletin Leibnizien IV 2018: A Critical Notice
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
news and recent works
12. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 28
Recent Works on Leibniz – 2018
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
13. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 28
Nora Gädeke News from the Leibniz Gesellschaft
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
14. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 28
Acknowledgments, Subscription Information, Abbreviations
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
articles
15. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 27
Marco Messeri Remarks on the Lucky Proof Problem
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Several scholars have argued that Leibniz’s infinite analysis theory of contingency faces the Problem of Lucky Proof. This problem will be discussed here and a solution offered, trying to show that Leibniz’s proof-theory does not generate the alleged paradox. It will be stressed that only the opportunity to be proved by God, and not by us, is relevant to the issue of modality. At the heart of our proposal lies the claim that, on the one hand, Leibniz’s individual concepts are saturated conceptual conjunctions, i.e., infinite conjunctions that contain either the concept itself or its privation for every primitive concept; and that, on the other hand, also certain universal concepts of states and acts are infinite conjunctions of primitive concepts and privations, even if insaturated ones. This will suffice to allow that some truths regarding individuals can’t be demonstrated, although they are included in the concept of their subject.
16. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 27
Stephen Steward Messeri on the Lucky Proof
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Marco Messeri (2017) offers a new solution to the problem of lucky proof (an influen­tial objection to Leibniz’s infinite-analysis theory of contingency. Messeri claims that contingent truths like “Peter denies Jesus” cannot be proved by a finite analysis because predicates like “denies Jesus” are infinitely complex. I argue that infinitely complex predicates appear in some necessary truths, and that some contingent truths have finitely complex predicates. Messeri’s official account is disjunctive: a truth is contingent just in case either it contains an infinitely complex predicate or it concerns existence. I argue against Messeri’s official account and suggest that some other disjunctive account might be appropriate.
17. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 27
Giovanni Merlo Leibniz and the Problem of Temporary Truths
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Not unlike many contemporary philosophers, Leibniz admitted the existence of temporary truths, true propositions that have not always been or will not always be true. In contrast with contemporary philosophers, though, Leibniz conceived of truth in terms of analytic containment: on his view, the truth of a predicative sentence consists in the analytic containment of the concept expressed by the predicate in the concept expressed by the subject. Given that analytic relations among concepts are eternal and unchanging, the problem arises of explaining how Leibniz reconciled one commitment with the other: how can truth be temporary, if concept-containment is not? This paper presents a new approach to this problem, based on the idea that a concept can be consistent at one time and inconsistent at another. It is argued that, given a proper understanding of what it is for a concept to be consistent, this idea is not as problematic as it may seem at first, and is in fact implied by Leibniz’s general views about propositions, in conjunction with the thesis that some propositions are only temporarily true.
18. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 27
Christopher P. Noble Self-Moving Machines and the Soul: Leibniz Contra Spinoza on the Spiritual Automaton
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The young Spinoza and the mature Leibniz both characterize the soul as a self-moving spiritual automaton. Though it is unclear if Leibniz’s use of the term was suggested to him from his reading of Spinoza, Leibniz was aware of its presence in Spinoza’s Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect. Considering Leibniz’s staunch opposition to Spinozism, the question arises as to why he was willing to adopt this term. I propose an answer to this question by comparing the spiritual automaton in both philosophers. For Spinoza, the soul acts as a spiritual automaton when it overcomes imaginative ideas and produces true ideas. For Leibniz, the soul acts as a spiritual automaton when it spontaneously produces its perceptions according to the universal harmony preestablished by God. Thus, for Leibniz contra Spinoza, the spiritual automaton is a means to render intelligible a providential order in which everything happens for the best.
texts
19. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 27
Mogens Lærke Leibniz: On the Cartesian Philosophy (English Translation)
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
book reviews
20. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 27
Massimo Mugnai The Logic of Leibniz’s Generales inquisitiones de analysi notionum et veritatum
view |  rights & permissions | cited by