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Displaying: 1-12 of 12 documents


research articles
1. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 11 > Issue: 4
Hamid Alaeinejad, Morteza Hajhosseini The Collapse Argument Reconsidered
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According to Beall and Restall’s logical pluralism, classical logic, relevant logic, and intuitionistic logic are all correct. On this version of logical pluralism, logic is considered to be normative, in the sense that someone who accepts the truth of the premises of a valid argument, is bound to accept the conclusion. So-called collapse arguments are designed to show the incompatibility of the simultaneous acceptance of logical pluralism and the normativity of logic. Caret, however, by proposing logical contextualism, and Blake-Turner and Russell by proposing telic pluralism, have sought to nullify the collapse problem. In the present article, after setting out these two approaches to the collapse problem, we argue that by using the concept of the ‘rationality of beliefs’ in order to frame the canonical purpose of logic, it can be demonstrated that if logical contextualism and telic pluralism are considered as philosophically significant logical pluralisms, a refined version of the collapse argument is still a threat for both of these kinds of logical pluralism.
2. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 11 > Issue: 4
Nicholas Danne Inferential Internalism and the Causal Status Effect
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To justify inductive inference and vanquish classical skepticisms about human memory, external world realism, etc., Richard Fumerton proposes his “inferential internalism,” an epistemology whereby humans ‘see’ by Russellian acquaintance Keynesian probable relations (PRs) between propositions. PRs are a priori necessary relations of logical probability, akin to but not reducible to logical entailments, such that perceiving a PR between one’s evidence E and proposition P of unknown truth value justifies rational belief in P to an objective degree. A recent critic of inferential internalism is Alan Rhoda, who questions its psychological plausibility. Rhoda argues that in order to see necessary relations between propositions E and P, one would need acquaintance with too many propositions at once, since our evidence E is often complex. In this paper, I criticize Rhoda’s implausibility objection as too quick. Referencing the causal status effect (CSE) from psychology, I argue that some of the complex features of evidence E contribute to our type-categorizing it as E-type, and thus we do not need to ‘see’ all of the complex features when we see the PR between E and P. My argument leaves unchanged Fumerton’s justificatory role for the PR, but enhances its psychological plausibility.
3. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 11 > Issue: 4
Jonathan Egeland The Problem with Trusting Unfamiliar Faculties: Accessibilism Defended
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According to accessibilism, there is an accessibility condition on justification. More specifically, accessibilism claims that facts about justification are a priori accessible—where a priori is used in the traditional sense that a condition is a priori just in case it doesn’t depend on any of the sense modalities. The most prominent argument for accessibilism draws on BonJour and Lehrer's unfamiliar faculty scenarios. Recently, however, several objections have been raised against it. In this article, I defend the argument against three prominent objections from the recent literature.
discussion notes/debate
4. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 11 > Issue: 4
John Turri A Non-puzzle about Assertion and Truth
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It was recently argued that non-factive accounts of assertoric norms gain an advantage from “a puzzle about assertion and truth.” In this paper, I show that this is a puzzle in name only. The puzzle is based on allegedly inconsistent linguistic data that are not actually inconsistent. The demonstration’s key points are that something can be (a) improper yet permissible, and (b) reproachable yet un-reproached. Assertion still has a factive norm.
book symposium
5. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 11 > Issue: 4
Nuno Venturinha Context-Sensitive Objectivism: Going Deeper into Description of Situations
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This paper outlines the major topics addressed in my book Description of Situations: An Essay in Contextualist Epistemology (Springer, 2018), anticipates some possible misunderstandings and discusses issues that warrant further investigation.
6. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 11 > Issue: 4
Modesto Gómez-Alonso Original Facticity and the Incompleteness of Knowledge
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This article critically explores Nuno Venturinha’s project of capturing how we are situated in reality, a project grounded in the conviction that the closure of knowledge and the openness of experience are compatible. To this end, I will explore how an approach complementary to Venturinha’s method—one which regards the passive and the active in knowledge as rooted in a single, underlying original form of consciousness—would deal with the issue of justifying contingency without falling into either scepticism or empiricism.
7. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 11 > Issue: 4
Anna Boncompagni On Contexts, Hinges, and Impossible Mistakes
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In this commentary on Nuno Venturinha’s Description of Situations, after highlighting what in my view are the most significant and innovative features of his work, I focus on Venturinha’s infallibilist approach to knowledge. This topic allows for a wider discussion concerning the pragmatist aspects of the later Wittgenstein’s philosophy. I discuss this in three steps: first, by describing the general similarity between Wittgenstein and the pragmatists with respect to the emphasis on contexts; second, by focusing on the kind of fallibilism endorsed by the pragmatists and its compatibility with Charles S. Peirce’s concept of the “indubitables,” which I take as a precursor of Wittgenstein’s concept of hinges; and, finally, by advancing the hypothesis that it is possible to find a form of fallibilism in the later Wittgenstein too, notwithstanding his insistence on the impossibility of mistakes. My conclusion is that while Venturinha’s contextualism finds support in the later Wittgenstein’s writings, his infallibilism does not.
8. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 11 > Issue: 4
Marcin Lewiński Social Situations and Which Descriptions: On Venturinha’s Description of Situations
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In this paper, I approach Venturinha’s ideas on contextual epistemology from the perspective of linguistic practices of argumentation. I point to the “thick” descriptions of social situations as a common context in which our epistemic language-games take place. In this way, I explore promising connections of Venturinha’s work to key concepts in recent speech act theory, social ontology and social epistemology.
9. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 11 > Issue: 4
Nuno Venturinha Replies to Critics
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This text brings together replies to three commentaries on my Description of Situations: An Essay in Contextualist Epistemology (Springer, 2018) written by Modesto Gómez-Alonso, Anna Boncompagni and Marcin Lewiński.
10. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 11 > Issue: 4
Notes on the Contributors
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11. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 11 > Issue: 4
Logos and Episteme. Aims and Scope
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12. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 11 > Issue: 4
Notes to Contributors
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