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Displaying: 1-10 of 10 documents


research articles
1. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 11 > Issue: 2
Aaran Burns Scepticism without Knowledge-Attributions
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The sceptic says things like “nobody knows anything at all,” “nobody knows that they have hands,” and “nobody knows that the table exists when they aren't looking at it.” According to many recent anti-sceptics, the sceptic means to deny ordinary knowledge attributions. Understood this way, the sceptic is open to the charge, made often by Contextualists and Externalists, that he doesn't understand the way that the word “knowledge” is ordinarily used. In this paper, I distinguish a form of Scepticism that is compatible with the truth of ordinary knowledge attributions and therefore avoids these criticisms. I also defend that kind of Scepticism against the suggestion that it is philosophically uninteresting or insignificant.
2. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 11 > Issue: 2
Olga Ramírez Calle Numbers, Empiricism and the A Priori
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The present paper deals with the ontological status of numbers and considers Frege´s proposal in Grundlagen upon the background of the Post-Kantian semantic turn in analytical philosophy. Through a more systematic study of his philosophical premises, it comes to unearth a first level paradox that would unset earlier still than it was exposed by Russell. It then studies an alternative path that, departing from Frege’s initial premises, drives to a conception of numbers as synthetic a priori in a more Kantian sense. On this basis, it tentatively explores a possible derivation of basic logical rules on their behalf, suggesting a more rudimentary basis to inferential thinking, which supports reconsidering the difference between logical thinking and AI. Finally, it reflects upon the contributions of this approach to the problem of the a priori.
3. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 11 > Issue: 2
R.M. Farley Casullo on Experiential Justification
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In A Priori Justification, Albert Casullo argues that extant attempts to explicate experiential justification—by stipulation, introspection, conceptual analysis, thought experimentation, and/or appeal to intuitions about hypothetical cases—are unsuccessful. He draws the following conclusion: “armchair methods” such as these are inadequate to the task. Instead, empirical methods should be used to investigate the distinction between experiential and non-experiential justification and to address questions concerning the nature, extent, and existence of the a priori. In this essay, I show that Casullo has not refuted armchair explications of experiential justification, in particular those that appeal to introspectively accessible phenomenology. I do this by presenting a phenomenal theory of experiential justification that (a) has a significant degree of initial plausibility and (b) survives Casullo’s general attack on such theories. As a result, a premise in the central argument for Casullo’s signature proposal concerning the a priori is undermined.
4. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 11 > Issue: 2
Andrei Mărășoiu Justified by Thought Alone
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The new rationalists – BonJour and Bealer – have characterized one type of a priori justification as based on intellectual intuitions or seemings. I argue that they are mistaken in thinking that intellectual intuitions can provide a priori justification. Suppose that the proposition that a surface cannot be red and green all over strikes you as true. When you carefully consider it, you couldn't but realize that no surface could be both red and green all over. Ascertaining the truth of what you believe (when you believe that a surface cannot be red and green all over) requires conscious experiences of thinking. The character of such experiences (propositions’ striking you as true, and the sense of incoherence you would experience were they to be false) is what justifies your belief. It should follow that the justification for such propositions (and your believing them) is a posteriori, i.e., based on conscious experience. Your cognitive phenomenology plays a constitutive role in justifying your belief. Hence your belief is not a priori justified, contra the new rationalists.
5. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 11 > Issue: 2
Daniel Rönnedal The Aporia of Omniscience
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This paper introduces a new aporia, the aporia of omniscience. The puzzle consists of three propositions: (1) It is possible that there is someone who is necessarily omniscient and infallible, (2) It is necessary that all beliefs are historically settled, and (3) It is possible that the future is open. Every sentence in this set is intuitively reasonable and there are prima facie plausible arguments for each of them. However, the whole set {(1), (2), (3)} is inconsistent. Therefore, it seems to be that case that at least one of the propositions in this set must be false. I discuss some possible solutions to the problem and consider some arguments for and against these solutions.
discussion notes/debate
6. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 11 > Issue: 2
Frederik J. Andersen, Klemens Kappel Process Reliabilism, Prime Numbers and the Generality Problem
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This paper aims to show that Selim Berker’s widely discussed prime number case is merely an instance of the well-known generality problem for process reliabilism and thus arguably not as interesting a case as one might have thought. Initially, Berker’s case is introduced and interpreted. Then the most recent response to the case from the literature is presented. Eventually, it is argued that Berker’s case is nothing but a straightforward consequence of the generality problem, i.e., the problematic aspect of the case for process reliabilism (if any) is already captured by the generality problem.
7. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 11 > Issue: 2
Jeffrey Hoops Knowledge, Certainty, and Factivity: A Possible Rapprochement
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In recent discussions in this journal, Moti Mizrahi defends the claim that knowledge equals epistemic certainty. Howard Sankey finds Mizrahi’s argument to be problematic, since, as he reads it, this would entail that justification must guarantee truth. In this article, I suggest that an account of the normativity of justification is able to bridge the gap between Mizrahi’s proposal and Sankey’s objections.
8. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 11 > Issue: 2
Notes on the Contributors
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9. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 11 > Issue: 2
Logos and Episteme. Aims and Scope
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10. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 11 > Issue: 2
Notes to Contributors
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