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Displaying: 1-20 of 47 documents


articles
1. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 4
Adrian Costache From Historical Change to Historical Knowledge: Directions of a New Epistemology of the Human Sciences
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The present paper endeavors to trace the sketch of a possible epistemology of the human sciences. In this sense it begins with the determination of the object ofknowledge in the human sciences through a careful examination of the reality of history and of the human world. Then, considering the peculiarity of the domain of the human sciences the paper proceeds to show that their object of knowledge is best understood as “event” in the sense of Gilles Deleuze and Alain Badiou. And, in the end, it circumscribes two modes of knowledge of this object of the human sciences understood as event.
2. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 4
Simon D'Alfonso Explicating a Standard Externalist Argument Against the KK Principle
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The KK principle is typically rejected in externalist accounts of knowledge. However, a standard general argument for this rejection is in need of a supportiveexplication. In a recent paper, Samir Okasha argues that the standard externalist argument in question is fallacious. In this paper I start off with some critical discussion of Okasha’s analysis before suggesting an alternative way in which an externalist might successfully present such a case. I then further explore this issue via a look at how Fred Dretske’s externalist epistemology, one of the exemplifying accounts, can explain failure of the KK principle.
3. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 4
Andrew McFarland Misfired Slingshots: A Case Study on the Confusion of Metaphysical and Semantic Considerations
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Most philosophers today will acknowledge the pitfalls of confusing metaphysical and semantic issues. Many are also familiar with the classic semi-formalargument that has come to be known as ‘the Slingshot’ and the various philosophical ends to which this argument has been deployed. The combination of the argument’s relatively simple theoretical machinery and its wide range of applications make it ripe for abuse. The slingshot was originally conceived as a semantic argument about designation; what it suggests, but does not prove, is that the closest analogue to singular term reference for any expression is that expression’s semantic extension. In order to derive more metaphysically robust conclusions, however, many classical deployments of the argument make use of several methodologically suspicious tactics. By cataloguing the more frequent abuses of the argument, we may remind ourselves of a valuable philosophical lesson.
4. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 4
Teodor Negru Self: A Dynamic Approach
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According to the classical approach, the self was regarded as a pure unchanging spiritual entity, with a cognitive content which is the consequence of self-awareness that characterises human being. Against this classical conception, the convergence approaches of phenomenology, developmental psychology or neuroscience highlighted the fact that the self is the result of the ongoing dynamics of experiences we have as embodied agents, e.g. the dynamic coupling between the embodied agent and the world, the dynamics of the primal emotions and feelings, as well as the dynamics of neural processes. Hence, the self appears as an embodied self, embedded in a certain context having a pre-reflective character, resulting from the direct coupling of the person with the natural or social environment. In conclusion, according to the contemporary approaches, the self is a multifaceted phenomenon, which should be understood from the perspective of the various dynamic relationships mediated among body, brain, and environment.
debate
5. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 4
Thomas Kroedel Why Epistemic Permissions Don’t Agglomerate – Another Reply to Littlejohn
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Clayton Littlejohn claims that the permissibility solution to the lottery paradox requires an implausible principle in order to explain why epistemic permissionsdon’t agglomerate. This paper argues that an uncontentious principle suffices to explain this. It also discusses another objection of Littlejohn’s, according to which we’re not permitted to believe lottery propositions because we know that we’re not in a position to know them.
6. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 4
Robin McKenna Why Assertion and Practical Reasoning Are Possibly Not Governed by the Same Epistemic Norm
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This paper focuses on Martin Montminy’s recent attempt to show that assertion and practical reasoning are necessarily governed by the same epistemic norm(“Why Assertion and Practical Reasoning Must be Governed By the Same Epistemic Norm,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2013). I show that the attempt fails. I finish by considering the upshot for the recent debate concerning the connection between the epistemic norms of assertion and practical reasoning.
reviews
7. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 4
Eugen Huzum David Christensen and Jennifer Lackey, eds., The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays
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8. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 4
Ciprian Jeler Philippe Huneman, ed., Functions: Selection and Mechanism
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9. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 4
Cătălina-Daniela Răducu Stephen Hetherington, ed., Epistemology: The Key Thinkers
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10. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 4
Notes on the Contributors
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11. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 4
Logos and Episteme. Aim and Scope
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12. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 4
Notes to Contributors
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articles
13. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 3
Patrick Bondy How to Understand and Solve the Lottery Paradox
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It has been claimed that there is a lottery paradox for justification and an analogous paradox for knowledge, and that these two paradoxes should have a common solution. I argue that there is in fact no lottery paradox for knowledge, since that version of the paradox has a demonstrably false premise. The solution to the justification paradox is to deny closure of justification under conjunction. I present a principle which allows us to deny closure of justification under conjunction in certain kinds of cases, but which still allows that belief in a conjunction on the basis of justified belief in its conjuncts can often be justified.
14. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 3
William A. Brant Levelling the Analysis of Knowledge via Methodological Scepticism
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In this essay I provide one methodology that yields the level of analysis of an alleged knowledge-claim under investigation via its relations to varying gradations of scepticism. Each proposed knowledge-claim possesses a specified relationship with: (i) a globally sceptical argument; (ii) the least sceptical but successful argument that casts it into doubt; and (iii) the most sceptical yet unsuccessful argument, which is conceivably hypothesized to repudiate it but fails to do so. Yielding this specified set of relations, by means of proceeding from global scepticism to (ii) and (iii), increases the chances of identifying the highest evaluative relevancy of the levels of analysis and observation of an alleged knowledge-claim. I argue that the failure to analyse and derive a difference between (i) and (ii) with respect to an alleged knowledge-claim signifies that the claim is grounded within the theoretical framework itself, that the claim lacks specification with regard to content that is analysable via that framework, and the claim is dubious insofar as alternative theoretic frameworks may present greater relevancy to levels of observation.
15. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 3
Caroline Alexandra Mathieu The Confrontation Between Qualitative and Quantitative Researchers: A Different Article, a Daring Publication
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After reading chapter two of Russell’s In Praise of Idleness , which discusses the history of the concept of knowledge, and the article by Ranjay Gulati whocommented the wars of tribes (“Tent poles, tribalism, and boundary spanning: The rigor-relevant debate in management research”), this inspired me an image of gladiator battles between different groups in the scientific world. Inspired by Feyerabend’s concept of fairy tales, I illustrate the struggle between quantitative and qualitative researchers that I witnessed in my research career...
16. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 3
Peter Murphy Another Blow to Knowledge from Knowledge
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A novel argument is offered against the following popular condition on inferential knowledge: a person inferentially knows a conclusion only if they know each of the claims from which they essentially inferred that conclusion. The epistemology of conditional proof reveals that we sometimes come to know conditionals by inferring them from assumptions rather than beliefs. Since knowledge requires belief, cases of knowing via conditional proof refute the popular knowledge from knowledge condition. It also suggests more radical cases against the condition and it brings to light the underrecognized category of inferential basic knowledge.
17. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 3
Anguel S. Stefanov Zeno’s Paradoxes Revisited
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My aim in this paper is to suggest a new outlook concerning the nature of Zeno’s paradoxes. The attention is directed towards the three famous paradoxes known as “Dichotomy,” “Achilles and the Tortoise,” and “The Arrow.” An analysis of the paradigmatic proposals for a solution shows that an adequate solution has not yet been reached. An answer is provided instead to the question “How Zeno’s paradoxes emerge in their quality of aporiae?,” that is to say in their quality of impasses, of problem situations without an exit, what is the original meaning of the Greek word “aporia.” It is my claim that this is the correct rational approach for solving these conceptual puzzles. In other words, I am not proposing formal solutions by criticizing and/or altering their premises assuming the continuous or discrete nature of space and time, but I try to draw the philosophical attention to the way we possess the phenomenon of motion as a result of the perception of space-time in human experience.
debate
18. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 3
Jimmy Alfonso Licon Dissecting the Suicide Machine Argument: Insights from the Hales – Licon Debate
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I assess the debate over the Suicide Machine Argument. There are several lessons to be learned from this debate. First, there is a fruitful distinction to be made,between tensed and tenseless versions of presentism, despite the temptation to suppose that presentism is a tensed theory of time. Second, once we’ve made the distinction between different kinds of presentism, it is clear that Licon’s objection protects the tenseless version of presentism from the Suicide Machine Argument; however, the argument is still effective against the tensed version. Finally, I argue that if the presentist wants to remain a card carrying presentist, in the face of the challenge posed by Hales, then she must abandon her commitment to tense.
19. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 3
Clayton Littlejohn Are Epistemic Reasons Ever Reasons to Promote?
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In trying to distinguish the right kinds of reasons from the wrong, epistemologists often appeal to the connection to truth to explain why practical considerations cannot constitute reasons. The view they typically opt for is one on which only evidence can constitute a reason to believe. Brian Talbot has shown that these approaches don’t exclude the possibility that there are non-evidential reasons for belief that can justify a belief without being evidence for that belief. He thinks thatthere are indeed such reasons and that they are the right kind of reasons to justify belief. The existence of such truth promoting non-epistemic reasons is said to follow from the fact that we have an epistemic end that involves the attainment of true belief. I shall argue that there are no such reasons precisely because there is an epistemic end that has normative authority.
20. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 3
Nicolás Lo Guercio Reply to Palmira
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In “Philosophical Peer Disagreement” I argued that in order to properly account for the phenomenon of philosophical peer disagreement it is necessary to dropthe ‘same evidence’ condition from the definition of epistemic peerage. The reason is the following: different philosophical perspectives might come with different commitments concerning the evidential role of the same piece of data, and it would be wrong to deny the status of epistemic peer to someone that is acquainted with the same data, even if he does not consider it plays an evidential role. However, on “On the Necessity of the Evidential Equality Condition For Epistemic Peerage,” Michele Palmira has developed some criticisms to these ideas. Here I defend my view from Palmira’s objections.