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The Monist

Volume 95
Dilemmas of Multiculturalism

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Displaying: 1-20 of 37 documents


articles
1. The Monist: Volume > 95 > Issue: 4
Stephen Davies On Defining Music
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2. The Monist: Volume > 95 > Issue: 4
Michael Morris The Meaning of Music
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3. The Monist: Volume > 95 > Issue: 4
James O. Young Resemblance, Convention, and Musical Expressiveness
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4. The Monist: Volume > 95 > Issue: 4
Bence Nanay Musical Twofoldness
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5. The Monist: Volume > 95 > Issue: 4
Stefano Predelli When Music Makes Sounds
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6. The Monist: Volume > 95 > Issue: 4
David Davies Enigmatic Variations
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7. The Monist: Volume > 95 > Issue: 4
Aaron Ridley Musical Ontology, Musical Reasons
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8. The Monist: Volume > 95 > Issue: 4
Robert Kraut Ontology: Music and Art
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9. The Monist: Volume > 95 > Issue: 4
Scope of Forthcoming Issues
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10. The Monist: Volume > 95 > Issue: 4
Books Received
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11. The Monist: Volume > 95 > Issue: 4
Contents of Volume 95
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articles
12. The Monist: Volume > 95 > Issue: 3
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Thalia Wheatley The Disunity of Morality and Why it Matters to Philosophy
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13. The Monist: Volume > 95 > Issue: 3
Walter Glannon Neuropsychological Aspects of Enhancing the Will
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14. The Monist: Volume > 95 > Issue: 3
Julian Savulescu, Ingmar Persson Moral Enhancement, Freedom, and the God Machine
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15. The Monist: Volume > 95 > Issue: 3
Alfred Mele Another Scientific Threat to Free Will?
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16. The Monist: Volume > 95 > Issue: 3
Robyn Repko Waller Beyond Button Presses: The Neuroscience of Free and Morally Appraisable Actions
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17. The Monist: Volume > 95 > Issue: 3
Andrew Fenton Neuroscience and the Problem of Other Animal Minds: Why It May Not Matter So Much for Neuroethics
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A recent argument in the neuroethics literature has suggested that brain-mental-state identities (one popular expression of what is commonly known as neuroreductionism) promise to settle epistemological uncertainties about nonhuman animal minds. What’s more, these brain-mental-state identities offer the further promise of dismantling the deadlock over the moral status of nonhuman animals, to positive affect in such areas as agriculture and laboratory animal science. I will argue that neuroscientific claims assuming brain-mental-state identities do not so much resolve the problem of other animal minds as mark its resolution. In the meantime, we must rely on the tools available to us, including those provided by such behavioral sciences as cognitive ethology, comparativepsychology, and ethology as well as the neurosciences. Focusing on captive animal research, I will also argue that humane experimentalists do not doubt that many of their research subjects have minds (in some substantive sense of that term). In that light, to suggest that the resolution of the problem of other animal minds would change the scientific use of animals misses the point at issue. Instead, what is required is a ‘sea change’ in the perceived grounds for human moral obligations to nonhumans. It is difficult to see how brain-mental-state identities could be the deciding factor in this continuing issue in applied ethics.
18. The Monist: Volume > 95 > Issue: 3
Andy Lamey Primitive Self-Consciousness and Avian Cognition
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19. The Monist: Volume > 95 > Issue: 3
Juha Räikkä, Saul Smilansky The Ethics of Alien Attitudes
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20. The Monist: Volume > 95 > Issue: 2
Amie L. Thomasson Experimental Philosophy and the Methods of Ontology
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Those working in experimental philosophy have raised a number of arguments against the use of conceptual analysis in philosophical inquiries. But they have typically focused on a model that pursues conceptual analysis by taking intuitions as a kind of (defeasible) evidence for philosophical hypotheses. Little attention has been given to the constitutivist alternative, which sees metaphysical modal facts as reflections of constitutive semantic rules. I begin with a brief overviewof the constitutivist approach and argue that we can defend a role for conceptual analysis, so understood, in ontological disputes against both the general skepticism about the relevance of intuitions, and against the specific worries raised by experimental results. Finally, I argue that even if the constitutivist view is adopted, experimental philosophy may still have quite a useful role to play, though purely empirical inquiries cannot in principle do the ontological work alone.