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NTU Philosophical Review:
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2019 >
Issue: 57
黃崇修
Chung-Hsiu Huang
張載「中正」概念研究─定靜工夫視點下之嘗試性解讀
A Study of the Concept of Moderation in Zhang Zai’s Philosophy
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本文以先前研究周敦頤「聖人定之以中正仁義而主靜」之定靜工夫成果為切入點,試圖對張載《正蒙•中正》之義理結構進行工夫論式之分析研究。而筆者透過文本文獻分析及相關研究之佐證,發現到〈中正〉宏大之哲學思維中的確具有與周敦頤「中正仁義而主靜」相呼應之思維結構存在。其中筆者所持之論證要點在於〈中正〉文脈論述中事實上具有「中道」→「體正」→「四毋說」→「誠」→「安仁、好仁、惡不仁」之論述命題存在。而這些命題所涵蘊之義理及論述邏輯確實可與周敦頤「中正仁義而主靜」之實踐邏輯相通,並且于深層之義理透視下,張載中正概念可還原為「中靜形正」之根本形式。尤有甚者,張載在此實踐思維基礎下,更進一步透過《孟子•盡心》內容,巧妙地將儒學「仁義禮智信」概念帶入,從而讓我們可以在文本之抽絲剝繭中,看到張載論述「仁義」概念之後,繼而提出「篤信」→「好學」→「禮智」命題以推演「仁→義→信→禮→智」實踐結構之用心。由此我們可以知道,張載不僅呼應了周敦頤定靜工夫之論述內容,他在此架構下所連結開展出之儒學義理,更是〈中正〉重要之學術貢獻所在。
Based on the author’s previous research on the dingjing skill in Zhou Dun-Yi’s “a saint settles himself to moderation, benevolence and justice”. This paper attempts to investigate the argumentation and structures of Zhang Zai’s On Moderation. With the evidence of textual analysis and related research, I found that the magnificent philosophical thought of On Moderation certainly has thinking and structures corresponding with Zhou Dun-Yi’s “one settles himself to moderation, benevolence and justice.”The main idea of this paper is that the context of On Moderation in fact has the theses of “moderation”→ “etiquette”→ “four nos”→ “sincerity”→ “implementing benevolence at ease, being fond of benevolence and disliking cruelty.” The argumentation and logic of these theses truly interlinked with the practical logic of Zhou Dun-Yi’s “one settles himself to moderation, benevolence and justice.” Additionally, to take a look at its profound argumentation, the “moderation” concept of Zhang Zai could be restored to the original form of “tranquility in mind and integrity in appearance.” Furthermore, on the basis of the practical thought, Zhang Zai further skillfully introduced the concept of “benevolence, justice, courtesy, wisdom and sincerity” through Mencius Jinxin. Upon making a thorough investigation, we conclude Zhang Zai’s dedication of deducing the practical structure of “benevolence → justice → sincerity → courtesy → wisdom” from the theses of “sincere belief”→ “being studious”→ “courtesy and wisdom”. We can thus know that Zhang Zai not only responded to the content of the dingjing skill of Zhou Dun-Yi, but also made important academic contributions in elucidating the Confucian Philosophy.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2019 >
Issue: 57
蕭銘源
Ming-Yuan Hsiao
新傾向論與內在遮蓋者難題
New Dispositionalism and Intrinsic Fink Problems
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史密斯(2003)建議,我們可以用傾向來理解其他可能性,並以此解消法蘭克福(1969)對其他可能性原則提出的挑戰,文獻上稱此進路為新傾向論。根據史密斯,在法蘭克福的案例中,行動者的其他可能性只是被干預者遮蓋,而不是被干預者消除。而這就顯示出,行動者仍舊保有其他可能性,法蘭克福的案例並不是其他可能性原則的反例。科恩與韓福德(2007)反對史密斯的論點,他們指出,在不承認內在遮蓋者的情況下,史密斯的新傾向論將無法解消某些法蘭克福式案例,對其他可能性原則的辯護並不全面,所以並不令人滿意。在這篇文章中,筆者將論證,科恩與韓福德對史密斯的批評並不完全成立,因為他們的批評預設了有爭議的傾向的條件句分析理論。
Smith (2003) proposes a dispositional account of alternative possibilities, called New Dispositionalism, to resist Frankfurt’s claim that moral responsibility does not require alternative possibilities (or the ability to do otherwise). He argues that, in Frankfurt’s case (1969), the agent’s alternative possibility is masked by the intervener, but it is nevertheless a present alternative possibility. Frankfurt’s case, hence, is not a genuine counterexample to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities at all. However, according to Cohen and Handfield (2007), Smith’s account is shown to be untenable for the reason that it does not work for all Frankfurt-type examples unless it is implausibly committed to intrinsic finks. In this paper, I argue that Cohen and Handfield’s criticism is not conclusive since it presupposes the debatable conditional analysis of dispositions.
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