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NTU Philosophical Review:
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2018 >
Issue: 56
劉滄龍
Tsang-Long Liu
論尼采的美學自由
On Nietzsche’s Aesthetic Freedom
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尼采承繼赫爾德對「美學」(Ästhetik)的理解,進一步開展美學與自由的關聯,藉由美學的進路實現「自然人」(Naturmensch),呼應盧梭「回到自然」的宣言。富含美學意義的「自然」以超善惡的非道德主義,要解放基督教式的禁欲身體。尼采頌揚文藝復興式的教養(virtù),並以歌德的「高尚教養」與「體態靈巧」為例,將「善惡對立的道德」從美學的角度轉化為超善惡的「好壞」。高貴的人就像藝術天才一樣,善於調動身體的多元力量,不把壞的排除,而是肯定命運中的偶然性,在趨於毀滅的現代性生活中,開發矛盾力量的動能,讓足以裂解生命的衝突性力量成為創新生活風格的泉源。自由遊戲的力量是藝術活動的主要形式,也是生命活力的表徵。本文將從力量、自然與自由之間的關係作為討論線索探究以下課題:藝術的解放力量是主體權能的展現還是去主體化的過程?若藝術活動涉及個體解放的自由,是否也有政治自由的向度?尼采美學思想與啟蒙批判的關係為何?
Nietzsche ascribes to Herder’s views on aesthetics and further develops the connection between aesthetics and freedom. He advocates an aesthetic realization of a “human of nature” (Naturmensch) echoing Rousseau’s call for getting “back to nature.” The concept of nature in Nietzsche’s aesthetics leads us towards a non-moralism beyond good and evil, its purpose being to liberate the body from Christian asceticism. Nietzsche celebrates the virtuosity of the Renaissance and takes Goethe’s combination of “noble upbringing” and “bodily dexterity” as an example of aesthetically transforming the “binary opposition of good and evil” into the “non-moralism of good and bad.” Cultivated individuals, like artistic geniuses, are good at mobilizing the multiple forces intrinsic and extrinsic to the body, without excluding the bad; yet, they still recognize the contingency in their destinies. In modernity, which is essentially self-destructive, conflicting forces, capable of destroying life, in effect become the source of innovative lifestyles. Free play is the main form of artistic activity and a sign of life’s vitality. This paper takes the relationship between power, nature and freedom as a lens through which to explore the following questions: Does the power of artistic liberation manifest and reinforce subjectivity or is it actually a process of desubjectification? If artistic activities involve individual liberation, is there any dimension of political freedom involved therein as well? What is the relationship between Nietzsche’s aesthetic ideas and critiques of the Enlightenment?
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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2018 >
Issue: 56
黃崇修
Chung-Hsiu Huang
《太極圖說》「中正」概念之工夫實踐還原:
以《管子》中靜形正言說為核心
The Concept of Moderation in Zhou Dun-Yi’s Annotations to Taijitu from Perspectives on Dingjing Thought in the Guanzi
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一般認為周敦頤《太極圖說》或《通書》受到《中庸》及《易傳》影響,因此周敦頤定靜功夫思維自然而然也就被認定為來自《中庸》或《易傳》。不過筆者透過先前研究〈《管子》定靜思維對周敦頤定靜工夫之影響─以朱丹溪三重鬱說思維結構維視點〉之分析結果,發現《管子》之「中靜,形正,天仁地義」實踐論述系統,的確可以對應於「定之以中正仁義而主靜」言說。如此一來,《太極圖說》之中正概念便可以援用《管子•內業》「中靜形正」之觀點,而從另一個角度予以慎重地看待。所以筆者首先根據劉蕺山與牟宗三之詮釋觀點作一爬梳,之後再就日本學者荻原擴、岡田武彥之幾種觀點以為對照,從而發現《管子•內業》之「中靜形正」所開展之解釋格局,其不僅在概念上可以邏輯涵蓋荻原擴將中正解為「至公」;另一方面就哲學公案上又可滿足朱子所謂「中正仁義之外別無主靜一事」的形式要求。因為在「中靜形正」模式下,我們的確可以將周敦頤主靜說擺入中正概念之中,並且透過「內靜外敬」實踐模式擴展了周敦頤之工夫論述張力。同時在此思維結構下,由於「中靜」之無欲概念具有指涉本體義之可能,從而保全了周敦頤宇宙本體論的形上高度。
In general, people think Annotations to Taijitu or Tongshu (Penetrating the Scripture of Change) were influenced by Zhongyong and Commentary to The Book of Changes. Therefore, the dingjing skill and thought of Zhou Dun-Yi were also considered to be originated from Zhongyong or Commentary to The Book of Changes. However, based on my previous research “Influence of the Guanzi’s Dingjing Thought upon Zhou Dun-Yi’s dingjing Skill: From Perspectives of Thought and Structure of Zhu Dan-Xi’s Triad Melancholy Theory,” it showed that the implementation and discourse system of “with tranquility in mind and integrity in appearance, the world can enjoy benevolence and righteousness” in the Guanzi could certainly correspond to the argument of “one settles himself in moderation, benevolence and justice.” As a result, the concept of moderation in Annotations to Taijitu could interpret from the viewpoint of “tranquility in mind and integrity in appearance” in Neiye (Internal Work) of the Guanzi and be understood more concisely from another perspective.Therefore, the author first organized the interpretations of Liu Ji-Shan and Mo Zong-San, compared with several viewpoints of Japanese scholars Hiroshi Ogiwara and Takehiko Okada and achieve a possible explanation of “tranquility in mind and integrity in appearance” in Neiye. On the one hand, the concept could logically cover the argument of Ogiwara who interpreted moderation as “utmost righteousness.” On the other hand, it could satisfy the form of the so-called “no tranquility existing without moderation, benevolence and justice” of Zhuzi in philosophical documents. As in the mode of “tranquility in mind and integrity in appearance,” we could place the doctrine of emphasizing tranquility of Zhou Dun-Yi in the moderation concept and expand the strength of Zhou Dun-Yi’s theory of self-cultivation through the implementation mode of “inner tranquility and outer respect.” Thus, the concepts of “tranquility in mind” and “without desire” contain ontological significance, and are comparable to the cosmological discussion of Zhou Dun-yi.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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2018 >
Issue: 56
吳澤玫
Tse-Mei Wu
論羅爾斯的穩定性論證
On Rawls’s Arguments of Stability
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羅爾斯在前後期的正義理論裡,系統地探討並嘗試解決穩定性問題,即在當代社會存在合理多元的事實下,如何促使公民自願接受並遵守社會制度的相關規範,以維繫正義且秩序良好的社會?在《政治自由主義》裡,羅爾斯提出重疊共識的論證。他主張持不同合理全面性學說的公民都會同意「作為公平的正義」這種政治正義觀,以之規範社會主要制度。公民將基於這樣的共識,自願遵守相關規範,因而能在多元價值之中確保社會的穩定。本文的目的在於探討重疊共識的論證能否成功解決多元社會的穩定性問題。首先說明羅爾斯關切的穩定性問題為何,其次說明他為什麼放棄《正義論》裡的穩定性論證,改採重疊共識的論證。第三,本文將分析羅爾斯如何證成重疊共識,主張這樣的共識可以解決穩定性問題。第四,本文檢視並批評重疊共識的論證。筆者將指出,這個論證是失敗的,任何採取社會正義原則層次的論證都無法成功解決穩定性問題。最後,本文將提出一種奠基於道德心理的穩定性論證之初步形式。這樣的論證取向不但相容於羅爾斯的觀點,且是理論上可以成立的。
John Rawls systematically explored and tried to solve the problem of stability; that is, given the fact of reasonable pluralism, how can citizens be motivated so that they will accept and comply with social institutions voluntarily to maintain a just and well-ordered society? In Political Liberalism, Rawls proposed the argument of overlapping consensus. He argued that citizens who affirm different reasonable comprehensive doctrines would agree to “justice as fairness” and use this political conception of justice to regulate major social institutions. Based on this consensus, citizens will voluntarily comply with relevant norms and ensure social stability.This essay shall explore whether the argument of overlapping consensus can successfully solve the problem of stability in a pluralistic society. First, I shall explain the problem of stability with which Rawls was concerned. Second, I shall explain why Rawls gave up the argument for stability in A Theory of Justice and why he proposed the argument of overlapping consensus. Third, I shall analyze how Rawls argued that such a consensus can solve the problem of stability. Fourth, I shall examine and criticize the argument of overlapping consensus. By exploring how this argument fails, I shall point out how any argument appealing to principles of social justice fails to solve the stability problem successfully. Finally, I shall propose a preliminary form of the argument for stability based on moral psychology. This argument is not only compatible with Rawls’s claims but is also theoretically defensible.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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2018 >
Issue: 56
王介成
Chieh-Cheng Wang
《墨子》身體觀探研─以「修身」為核心
On the Concept of Body in the Mozi
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本文旨在從「修身」概念出發對《墨子》的身體觀進行探研。首先本文指出,《墨子》的身體乃由「形─心─氣」構成,此合於先秦諸子對人身體之理解。形即形軀;心則首重其認識義,同時也和「善」、「愛」、「志」、「性」有所關聯;氣在《墨子》中雖未具理論規模,但氣會隨志而現亦是我們了解〈所染〉的關鍵。基於這樣的身體形構我們可看出,《墨子》所修之身並非僅是生理形軀之身,而是一身心合一之身,透過修養(做工夫)學者的身心形態得以發生轉化。本文以為,所謂工夫不單限於內在的心性修養,只要能使人的思想、行為有所改變,無論是由內而外或由外而內的方法皆可稱為工夫。據此本文從《墨子》中析理出「去」、「反之身」、「立志」、「力事」、「學」、「辯」六種工夫。最後本文發現,《墨子》修身的目的與理想是成就墨家式的人才為天下興利除害,這樣的身體則內含「知無欲惡之身」、「力勇之身」與「交利之身」三種身體向度,此三種身體共構成《墨子》身體觀的最高理想。
This essay aims to discuss the concept of body in the Mozi through the investigation on self-cultivation. First of all, this essay tries to indicate that the body in the Mozi is constructed by‘xing (形, “body”) ─xin (心, “heart”) ─ qi ( 氣, “energy”)’which is in accord with the Pre-Qin thinkers’ understanding to the body. While xing refers to the flesh-bloody part of human being, the concept of xin focuses on the aspect of cognition and is closely related to the concept of shan (善, “goodness”), ai (愛, “love”), zhi (志, “will”) and xing. Despite the concept of qi has not been fully developed in the Mozi, it remains significant in understanding On Dyeing (〈所染〉). Based on this framework on the body, we could assert that the cultivated body which implied in the Mozi is not merely a physical body constituted by flesh and blood, but an integration of mind and body. Through the cultivation (gong-fu 工夫), the physical-mental state of the practitioners will then begin to transform. This essay reveals that the domain of gong-fu should not be restricted in the immanent cultivation of xin-xing ( 心性, “mental disposition”). Regardless of using the approaches of inside-out or outside-in, any practice could change one’s thought and behavior could be regarded as “gong-fu”. Thus, this essay generalizes six kinds of gong-fu from the Mozi, namely qu (去, “removing”), fan-zhi-shen (反之身, “self-reflecting and self-justificating”), li-zhi (立志, “determining”), li-shi (力事, “performing one’s duty”), xue (學, “learning”) and bian (辯, “debating”). This essay concludes that the purpose of self-cultivation on the Mozi is to establish an ideal model of Mohism, so as to promote benefits and eliminate harms for the society. This interpretation of body complies with three dimensions, which are zhi-wu-yu-e-zhi-shen (知無欲惡之身, “the body with intelligence neither desiring nor disliking anything”), li-yong-zhi-shen (力勇之身, “the body with power and bravery”) and jiao-li-zhi-shen (交利之身, “the body with mutual aid”).
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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2018 >
Issue: 56
曾怡嘉
Yi-Jia Zeng
評Alexander Broadie, A History of Scottish Philosophy
A Review of Alexander Broadie’s A History of Scottish Philosophy
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蘇格蘭哲學與思想史近年為英語學界之新興研究領域。身為該領域之先驅、蘇格蘭啟蒙研究首屈一指的學者,亞歷山大•布洛迪有鑑於此趨勢,以本書叩問「何謂蘇格蘭哲學」之根本問題,並提供讀者一部十分全面的哲學史著。布洛迪成功地在書中兼顧歷史與哲學的深度,闡明蘇格蘭哲學的本質與重要性。他主張蘇格蘭哲學必須放入歷史脈絡之中研究,因為它並不僅是一項哲學的志業,更是數世紀以來凝聚蘇格蘭民族的文化傳統。若缺少過去思想家們齊力建構此一智識文化,近代以降的科學、文學、政治與文化發展恐怕舉步維艱。本文旨在評論《蘇格蘭哲學史》;同時概覽布洛迪任教於格拉斯哥大學時從哲學到歷史的學術轉向。他對蘇格蘭哲學文化的投入值得當代歷史學家與哲學家關注,其作品開啟了思想史與哲學史對話的契機;文末將透過本書探討目前英語學界思想史與哲學史之互動關係。
Scottish philosophy and intellectual history have become the increasingly fashionable fields of academic studies. Alexander Broadie, one of the pioneers and an accomplished scholar of the Scottish Enlightenment, returns to the basic question, namely, “what is Scottish philosophy?”, and presents a comprehensive work on the history of Scottish philosophy. Broadie successfully elucidates the nature and significance of Scottish philosophy both historically and philosophically. He argues that Scottish philosophy must be studied in its historical context, for it is not only a philosophical enterprise but also a persistent tradition which has united the Scottish nation for centuries. The advancements in science, literature, politics, and culture in Scotland would be extremely unlikely, if not impossible, without such an intellectual culture established by thinkers in that tradition. This article is intended as a review of Broadie’s A History of Scottish Philosophy in the background of his shifting academic interests from philosophy to history while he holds the professorship in University of Glasgow. His commitment to Scottish philosophical culture deserves the attention of contemporary historians and philosophers, for his work opens up a space for
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