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論 著 / articles
1. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 2017 > Issue: 53
黃文宏 Wen-Hong Huang
On Hung Yao-Shun’s Conception of “Absolute Dialectics of Alethiology”

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2. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 2017 > Issue: 53
Hsiu-Lin Ku 古秀鈴
On the Very Idea of a Minimal Proposition

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Can the idea of a minimal proposition be successfully held? I will first formulate what the minimal proposition is in the minimalist’s mind, taking Emma Borg as the representative. What a minimalist seeks for a minimal proposition is the abstract and skeletal core meaning of a sentence, and this faith is founded on the notion of minimal word meaning—an atomic, code-like, conceptual thing. I show that the problem of this notion of minimal proposition lies in the three features, intuitive read-off, invariantness, and truth-evaluability, that Borg ascribes to it. I shall argue, first, that positing a conceptual-like thing as the invariant minimal content of word cannot support the invariantness of the minimal proposition of a sentence, and second, that the skeletal content, as the minimal proposition of a sentence, is a grammatically analyzed product and thus is hardly truth evaluable. According to the analyses, the idea of a minimal proposition with these three features identified by minimalists cannot be maintained.
3. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 2017 > Issue: 53
Wim De Reu 魏家豪
On Goblet Words: Coexistence and Writing in the Zhuangzi

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This article attempts to reframe the state of research on the notion of goblet words (zhiyan) in the Zhuangzi. Recent studies predominantly view the notion of zhiyan as referring to peculiar stylistic forms exhibited in the Zhuangzi—forms such as dilemmatic questions and paradoxes. In this article, I question the quick identification of these forms as zhiyan. I argue that zhiyan are essentially definite yet provisional simple-form utterances located on the level of everyday interaction and coexistence. On this level, the peculiar stylistic forms do not play their part. However, such stylistic forms do become indispensable in discussing and recommending zhiyan. It is on this meta-level—for the Zhuangzi, the level of writing—that we find these forms employed. Based on structural similarities, we may stretch the label ‘zhiyan’ to include such forms but should keep in mind that any such extension is secondary to the use of language in coexisting with others.
4. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 2017 > Issue: 53
廖育正 Yu-Zheng Liao
Can Zhu Xi’s Theory of Mind Respond to Moral Responsibility?

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在談論道德責任(moral responsibility)歸屬時,一種常被接受的看法是:某人對某事具有道德責任,若且唯若某人在自由意志下,促使了某事的發生。換句話說,若是人無從避免去做一件道德上應受譴責的事情,則不被歸屬道德責任。而朱熹(1130-1200)以心統性情的義理架構,作為其倫理思想的心性論基礎,這樣的系統究竟能否歸屬道德責任?當代學人對此有許多歧見。他們的意見為何產生衝突?朱子心性論可以回應道德責任歸屬嗎?這是本文意欲探究的重點。本文的結論是:當代學人各條研究進路之糾結,大致可以視為相容論與不相容論之爭的中國式展開;對此大哉問,形上學一日不得解,便一日沒有答案。然而在上述糾結之外,若還有回應問題的空間,或許在於以本體工夫論,兼及體驗論的視野,將心詮釋為性情的突現(emergence),去照應涵養省察、格物致知、克己主敬等思想─進而能將Peter van Inwagen 的話改寫為一種中國式的言說:心性情之間,別有一種神秘的工夫。