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The Owl of Minerva

Volume 41, Issue 1/2, Fall/Spring 2009

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Displaying: 1-16 of 16 documents


1. The Owl of Minerva: Volume > 41 > Issue: 1/2
Philip T. Grier In Memoriam: Errol E. Harris
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2. The Owl of Minerva: Volume > 41 > Issue: 1/2
Scott Kim Remembering Errol Harris
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3. The Owl of Minerva: Volume > 41 > Issue: 1/2
An invitation to join THE HEGEL SOCIETY OF AMERICA
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houlgate and mcdowell: mastery, servitude, and absolute knowing
4. The Owl of Minerva: Volume > 41 > Issue: 1/2
Stephen Houlgate McDowell, Hegel and the Phenomenology of Spirit
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In this essay I challenge John McDowell’s controversial claim that “the real topic” of Hegel’s master/slave dialectic is the relation between “two aspects of the consciousness of a single individual.” I first consider McDowell’s interpretation of Kant, and then, by analysing briefly Hegel’s account of self-consciousness prior to the master/slave dialectic, I defend the more traditional view that that dialectic describes the relation between two separate individuals. I also criticize McDowell’s conception of absolute knowing, which, as I understand it, underlies his contention that the master/slave dialectic examines the relation between apperceptive spontaneit y and empirical consciousness within a single self.
5. The Owl of Minerva: Volume > 41 > Issue: 1/2
John McDowell Response to Stephen Houlgate
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I argue that Stephen Houlgate misstates an element in the Kantian background to my reading of “Lordship and Bondage” (§2). He misreads my remarks about the need to see Hegel’s moves there in the context of the progression towards absolute knowing (§3), and, partly consequently, he fails to engage with the motivation for my reading (§4). And he does not understand the way my reading exploits the concept of allegory (§5).
6. The Owl of Minerva: Volume > 41 > Issue: 1/2
Stephen Houlgate Response to John McDowell
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In this response, I accept some of McDowell’s criticisms of my presentation of his views in my essay, but argue that his understanding of Hegel (and of Kant) remains problematic. In particular, I claim (a) that he fails to see that, for Kant, intuitional unit y is inseparable from judging; (b) that his understanding of Hegelian absolute knowing is wrong as it stands (though more plausible, if suitably qualified); (c) that he fails to see that self-consciousness aims, not to overcome the specific antithesis between self-consciousness and the empirical world, but to achieve explicit consciousness of itself in its relation to what is other, and that this requires it to relate to another self-consciousness; and (d) that the implications of his idea that Hegel’s account of the life and death struggle and the master/slave relation is “allegorical” remain unclear.
7. The Owl of Minerva: Volume > 41 > Issue: 1/2
John McDowell Response to Stephen Houlgate’s Response
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I offer an interpretation of the connection between judging and intuiting in Kant (§2). Next I try to clarify how the movement in the self-consciousness chapter, as I read it, fits in the Phenomenology’s progression towards absolute knowing (§3). In some detailed responses to Stephen Houlgate, I reiterate how my reading is motivated by the wish not to discard, or ignore, Hegel’s first formulation of what is to be achieved by the movement in the self-consciousness chapter, and I object to Houlgate’s equation of thinking consciousness with Stoicism (§4). Finally, I try to clarify the point of my invocation of allegory (§5).
8. The Owl of Minerva: Volume > 41 > Issue: 1/2
Douglas Moggach The Subject as Substance: Bruno Bauer’s Critique of Stirner
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Bruno Bauer’s response to Max Stirner’s Der Einzige und sein Eigentum (1845) is here examined closely, for the first time. In working out their concepts of freedom and self-determination, the Hegelian Left stressed different elements in the synthesis which Hegel himself had effected. Options appear that can be described as generally Fichtean or Spinozistic; each has distinct political and ethical implications. Bauer’s claim is that Stirner “Unique One” is to be understood as a version of Spinozist substance, which fails to rise to the Fichtean-Hegelian standpoint of rational subjectivit y which his own thought represents. The paper endorses Bauer’s conclusion that essential differences between his republicanism and universalism, as opposed to Stirner’s anarchism and particularism, can be traced to divergent receptions of Fichte and Spinoza, as mediated through Hegel. With references to Hegel’s critiques of Spinoza, the paper reconstructs Bauer’s argumentation on the inadequacies of a merely substantial view of freedom.
9. The Owl of Minerva: Volume > 41 > Issue: 1/2
Lawrence S. Stepelevich At the End of the Path of Doubt: Max Stirner
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Max Stirner (1806–1856) has been named as “The Last Hegelian,” which is usually taken to mean only that he was the final major figure among the so-called “Young Hegelians.” However, an argument can be made that he was not only the last in a historical sense, but that he was also the logical heir of Hegel’s philosophy. In short, Stirner concluded what Hegel had proposed as the “task” of philosophy: to supersede “fixed and determinate thoughts.” This lead Stirner to express a distinctive form of egoism in which the indefinable individual, der Einziger, could neither be comprehended under any general idea, nor would need to act in accord with any ideals whatsoever. This set him in radical opposition to all of the other Young Hegelians, such as Karl Marx, Ludwig Feuerbach, or Bruno Bauer—all of whom sought to revise Hegel’s philosophy to accord with their own humanistic ideals.
10. The Owl of Minerva: Volume > 41 > Issue: 1/2
Aaron M. Mead Hegel and Externalism About Intentions
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My aim in this paper is to suggest that intentions are, as G. E. M. Anscombe puts it, not exclusively “private and interior” act-descriptions that agents alone determine. Rather, I argue that the true intention of an action is frequently constrained, and sometimes even determined, by the intersubjective and retrospective view of an action. I begin by offering an interpretation of Hegel’s account of intention in The Philosophy of Right—an interpretation that fits well with work by Charles Taylor and Michael Quante, but not with a recent paper by Arto Laitinen. Next I offer examples that support the view—consistent with my reading of Hegel—that sometimes the intersubjective and retrospective account of an action trumps the agent’s prior subjective act-description. Finally, I suggest that the Hegelian view I sketch might be taken as a kind of externalism about intentions, on the order of externalism about epistemic justification.
book review
11. The Owl of Minerva: Volume > 41 > Issue: 1/2
Ann V. Murphy Bearing Witness to Epiphany: Persons, Things, and the Nature of Erotic Life
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12. The Owl of Minerva: Volume > 41 > Issue: 1/2
New Books
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13. The Owl of Minerva: Volume > 41 > Issue: 1/2
Recent Dissertations
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14. The Owl of Minerva: Volume > 41 > Issue: 1/2
HSA 2010 Conference Program
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15. The Owl of Minerva: Volume > 41 > Issue: 1/2
HSA 2010 Conference Information
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16. The Owl of Minerva: Volume > 41 > Issue: 1/2
HSA 2010 Conference Registration Form
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