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1. The Owl of Minerva: Volume > 40 > Issue: 2
Ioannis Trisokkas The Speculative Logical Theory of Universalit y
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Speculative logical theory, as provided in Hegel’s Science of Logic, consists of three main parts: the logic of being, the logic of essence, and the logic of the concept. The peculiar character of each logic’s starting point determines the most general character of each logic’s development. The present paper aims at making explicit the character of the starting-point of the third logic, the logic of the concept. This starting-point is exemplified by the category of universality. It is shown (a) that the fundamental determination of this category is the harmonious unit y of self-identity and full determinacy and (b) that this unity has necessarily the logical structure of “double shining.” The latter is described in detail and justification is provided as to why it is preferred from “single shining.” I conclude the paper by defending the structure of “double shining” against certain objections raised against it by Friedrike Schick and Christian Iber.
2. The Owl of Minerva: Volume > 40 > Issue: 2
Rev. Daniel P. Jamros, S. J. Jesus and Hercules: Hegel Reflects on the Resurrection
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Hegel’s early essay called “The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate” contains his longest analysis of the resurrection of Jesus, which he attributes to the spirit of the early Christian communit y. To represent its practice of the love he taught, the community made him into a god. Furthermore, because it withdrew from life in the world, the communit y knew its love as deficient, and portrayed this defect by adding the separate human individuality of its teacher to his divinity. The risen Christ (both human and divine) lives only in the subjective mind of the communit y, as an expression of its feeling. However, Hegel does recognize divine objectivity in the “one” source of theuniverse, the Father of Jesus.
3. The Owl of Minerva: Volume > 40 > Issue: 2
George di Giovanni Jewish and Post-Christian Interpretations of Hegel: Emil Fackenheim and Henry S. Harris
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Despite the radically different interests that motivate Emil Fackenheim’s and Henry Harris’s respective interpretations of Hegel, the two have significant points of commonality. They in fact come the closest precisely at points where they seem to differ most. The need and the possibility of ‘reconciliation’ is the theme that animates both interpretations, and both also agree in their assessment of Hegel’s treatment of ‘evil.’ There are nevertheless crucial differences separating the two, which the essay details. The essay concludes wondering, on the one hand, how seriously Harris recognizes that, in a post-Holocaust world, ‘reconciliation’ calls for existential conditions such as Hegel could never have imagined; and on the other hand, how much Fackenheim would be willing to admit that his immersion into history will necessarily bring violent consequences in train for which there will have to be an accounting.
book reviews
4. The Owl of Minerva: Volume > 40 > Issue: 2
Benjamin Levey Hegel’s Theory of the Imagination
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5. The Owl of Minerva: Volume > 40 > Issue: 2
Michael Morris Hegel and the Freedom of Moderns
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6. The Owl of Minerva: Volume > 40 > Issue: 2
Zane Yi Hegel’s Idea of Freedom
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7. The Owl of Minerva: Volume > 40 > Issue: 2
New Books
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8. The Owl of Minerva: Volume > 40 > Issue: 2
Recent Dissertations
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9. The Owl of Minerva: Volume > 40 > Issue: 2
Call for Papers
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10. The Owl of Minerva: Volume > 40 > Issue: 2
Information for Contributors and Users
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11. The Owl of Minerva: Volume > 40 > Issue: 1
Wendell Kisner A Species-Based Environmental Ethic in Hegel’s Logic of Life
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In this paper I will argue that Hegel’s account of the category of life in the Science of Logic provides ontological grounds for the recognition of living species along with their various ecosystems as the proper objects of ethical regard for environmental ethics. I will begin by enumerating some of the salient problems that have arisen in the more well known theoretical attempts to articulate human duties to nonhuman beings. Then after a brief discussion of Hegel’s methodology and the justification for turning to his ontological account, I will explicate Hegel’s ontology of life with a view toward these problems and issues, presenting my argument as to why that account is relevant to environmental ethics and deriving from it a normative framework that implies a duty to preserve species, habitats, and biological diversity. Finally, I will suggest how the Hegelian account presented here might circumvent the shortcomings of the previously discussed theories while accommodating some of their concerns and provide solutions for some of the problems to which they call attention.
12. The Owl of Minerva: Volume > 40 > Issue: 1
Alison Stone On Alienation from Life: A Response to Wendell Kisner’s “A Species-Based Environmental Ethic in Hegel’s Logic of Life”
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In this article I respond to Wendell Kisner’s Hegelian environmental ethic. Kisner argues that because life is ontologically irreducible to mechanism it is rational to treat life not merely as a means to human purposes but as an end in itself. I argue that had Hegel consistently adhered to this position, he would have had to argue that the modern social world objectively alienates human beings from their rational selves. But Hegel in fact sees this social world as a home for rational humanity. This is because Hegel believes life is ontologically higher than mechanism but ontologically lower than human mind. For Hegel therefore, minded beings may use life for their own self-objectification and self-realisation.
13. The Owl of Minerva: Volume > 40 > Issue: 1
Chong-Fuk Lau The Aristotelian-Kantian and Hegelian Approaches to Categories
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This paper analyzes and compares the doctrines of categories of Aristotle, Kant and Hegel, each of which is first discussed separately. The paper explains the essential double perspective of the problem, showing how a logico-linguistic analysis of the form of rational discourse serves for them as an important clue to ontological problems. Although Aristotle and Kant’s doctrines differ significantly, they both endorse a kind of isomorphism between language/thought and reality. By contrast, Hegel, who takes a critical attitude toward the capability of human language and discursive thinking, rejects the possibility of deriving the structure of reality from the forms of predication or judgment. Nevertheless, the forms of judgment do play an equally crucial role in Hegel’s doctrine, though in a very different way from his predecessors. It is the structural “deficiency” of the judgmental form that turns out to be the driving force for the dialectical movement of the Concept. By shifting the primary concern from the categories themselves to the transitions between them, Hegel opens up the possibility of a dynamic system of categories.
14. The Owl of Minerva: Volume > 40 > Issue: 1
John Burbidge Contingent Categories: A Response to Prof. Lau
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By comparing the argument in the first edition of Hegel’s Science of Logic with that of the second we find that he not only introduces significant changes but indicates why he found the changes necessary. As over time he rethought his method in the course of his annual lectures he realised that pure thought should not anticipate results but follow from the inherent sense of each term. The details of his logical method suggest how the novelties that emerge in history can require the introduction of new modified categories.
15. The Owl of Minerva: Volume > 40 > Issue: 1
Call for Papers
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16. The Owl of Minerva: Volume > 40 > Issue: 1
New Books
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17. The Owl of Minerva: Volume > 40 > Issue: 1
Recent Dissertations
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18. The Owl of Minerva: Volume > 40 > Issue: 1
Information for Contributors and Users
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