This paper considers the philosophical links between remembrance, apology, and reconciliation, as they pertain to Senate Resolution 39, which apologizes to the victims of lynching and their descendants. Although S. Res. 39 is admirable in its attempts to remember the senate’s role in supporting lynching by its failure to enact legislation, the resolution fails as an apology because it does not adequately support reconciliation. An adequate apology would require acts to ameliorate the harms that the past failures created, but S. Res. 39 is written in such a way that no action is required of the senate. This paper concludes by considering Congressman John Conyers, Jr.’s bill, H.R. 40: Commission to Study Reparation Proposals for African Americans Act. This bill takes the necessary steps to normalize American race relations, and if considered alongside of S. Res. 39, these two bills could lead to a more adequate understanding of the connection between remembrance, apology, and reconciliation.

Societies emerging from severe internal bloodshed along ethnic, racial or religious lines face significant problems of reconciliation. A particularly “deep” form of recognition between former victims and offenders is necessary to end enmity and achieve solidarity. Yet it appears that deep reconciliation is logically incoherent as it requires that forgiveness be asked and be given for acts that are inexcusable and unforgivable. I argue, however, that toleration, understood as moral attitudes and dispositions, helps us understand why deep reconciliation is logically coherent. Dispelling the apparent paradox lies in understanding the role of toleration in forming what I call relationships of “acknowledgment and forbearance.” Relationships of acknowledgement and forbearance overcome elements of enmity and estrangement, and such relationships are necessary, in turn, for deep reconciliation.

In a democracy, disadvantaged group members may experience emotions dissimilar to those of dominant group members. Alison Jaggar calls emotions such as these, outlaw emotions. Interestingly, recent emotion research findings actually accord with Jaggar’s conclusions. In this paper, I argue that members of marginalized, subordinated groups in a democracy, with their enhanced sense of the difference between the promise of equality and the reality of inequality, tend to have more knowledge than dominant group members in political situations, and therefore should be considered even more valuable as leaders than members of dominant groups.

How do laypeople sitting on a jury make determinations of expertise? How, if at all, can laypersons epistemically assess the expertise of an expert or rival experts? Given that the domains of expertise are quite technical, if laypersons are to adjudicate the various proposed and often conflicting claims of experts, they must be able to determine the reliability of the experts as well as the truth of their claims. One way to address these concems is to say that the layperson needs to be in a position to make the determination herself. This view I will call individualism. Individualism maintains the burden of epistemic assessment is on the layperson, not on the expert. One such version of individualism is Jason Borenstein’s proposal as to what is needed for laypersons to make such an assessment. Borenstein’s proposal turns on the laypersons’ ability to understand the domain of expertise as well as the putative expert’s ability to satisfy a proficiency test. What I hope to show is that this proposal fails for two reasons. I argue that the nlove to proficiency tests does not warrant any layperson’s determination of truth or reliability and that given the limited epistemic abilities of laypersons they are not able to satisfy Borenstein’s proposed conditions for determination.

Philosophers of literature direct their studies to the moral, cognitive, and emotional aspects of our involvement with fiction. In spite of this, they rarely engage works of popular fiction. In this paper I use The Da Vinci Code as a case study of the impact of popular fiction on readers in terms of these three areas. Although this book will never be considered good literature, its impact is far reaching. l address concerns dealing with the fiction/non-fiction distinction as weIl as issues with history, accuracy, and falsehoods. I flesh out the issues The Da Vinci Code brings up and argue that it, along with other works of popular fiction (Oprah’s book club for example), might be taken more seriously by philosophers of literature.

Struggle with self identity is a life-Iong moral undertaking, an essential dimension of which is connecting one’s past and future in a way that preserves integrity and wholeness. The argument of this paper is that one reading of Sartre’s understanding of bad faith and authenticity can illuminate this project. More specifically, the essay provides an interpretation of Sartre’s claim that “I am not what I am and I am what Iam not” that avoids understanding the self as an ontological nothingness poised between past and future. Rather, Sartre’s phrase is interpreted as recognizing that we experience ourselves as a rich, complex continuum that connects past and future. This understanding of the self acknowledges the tension between past and future, but sees that tension as the matrix out of which a responsible self emerges.