Phenomenology 2005

Selected Essays from Latin America Part 2
2007, ISBN 978-973-88633-1-6
Editors: Zeljko Loparic, Roberto Walton

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Displaying: 1-16 of 16 documents


1. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 2 > Issue: Part 2
Rosana Déborah Motta The Time of Socialization in Alfred Schutz’s Work
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The purpose of this paper will be the elucidation of the basic structure of socialization. Socialization is temporarily constituted by a first original moment, which as such is also generative; this offers the possibility of a systematic analysis of the different degrees of the pure form of social phenomena. This work will actually focus on the exegesis of time as the basic structure of socialization, beginning at the pure We-relation in order to found the possibility of creating ontology of social phenomena, which we think has always been present in Alfred Schutz’s work.
2. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 2 > Issue: Part 2
Marcos Lutz Muller Sartre e a Crise do Fundamento. A propósito de Sartre. Metafísica e Existencialismo de Gerd Bornheim: Em Homenagem a Gerd Bornheim
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3. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 2 > Issue: Part 2
Nythamar de Oliveira Adeus: A epifania do Outro segundo Levinas
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The paper seeks to revisit Levinas’s conception of à-Dieu as a plausible account of a new way of saying (dire) the name of God (Dieu) without reducing its radical alterity to a mere dictum (dit). The Portuguese word adeus is perhaps the most felicitous way of doing justice to Levinas’s radical subversion of onto-theology, as the hyphenated term (a-deus) also allows for an important ambiguity, beyond its own polysemy and plays on words, that not only one may think of the equivalent function of addressing the Other (à Dieu) and its negation by way of a privative alpha (a-Dieu) but also a tacit il y a.
4. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 2 > Issue: Part 2
Pepi Patrón Arendt and Gadamer: Attempt at a Dialogue
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Th e paper seeks to establish a dialogue between two 20th century philosophers for whom language, or more specifically dialogue, is the founding element of their understanding of human beings and the human world. As they both refer their work back to the phenomenological tradition and anchor many of their proposals in the Aristotelian practical philosophy, the lack of dialogue between them is somewhat surprising. Th e purpose of this brief communication is to set the grounds for what the author hopes will be a fruitful exchange. Th e paper will examine it on the basis of the concepts of plurality, language and the importance of judgment, the latter understood in the Kantian sense.
5. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 2 > Issue: Part 2
Luis Román Rabanaque Why The Noema?
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After almost forty years of debate, the question is asked again: Why the Noema? We will try to advance an answer on the basis of: 1) Th e historical background of Husserl’s attempt to overcome Cartesianism; 2) The structure of the noema’s transcendence and ideality, which in turn leads to focus anew on the controversy between “traditional” and “analytic” interpretations; 3) Noematic constitution understood not as yielding “entities” but as a “network” of levels and strata, which include the role of the living body and the genetic dimension, both concerning primary passivity in the living present and secondary passivity or habituality.
6. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 2 > Issue: Part 2
Róbson Ramos dos Reis Contenção e aprisionamento humanos: a sublimidade da natureza em Os Conceitos Fundamentais da Metafísica
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The present contribution examines the notion of sublime within the reconstruction of the phenomenological interpretation of the alive nature and animal organisms in the book “The Basic Concepts of Metaphysics” (Heidegger, 1929/30). It is intended to show that the appropriate ontology for the proper behavior with the alive nature implies the recognition of a sublimity predicated of the nature itself. Having presented the ontological identity of the organisms with the two concepts of captivation (Bennomenheit) and interpenetration of the disinhibiting rings, Heidegger identifies in the adaptative dynamics of the organisms a movement of construction and overcoming of the nature by the nature itself. In these terms, the sublime is not only the proportionate feeling for the meeting with the nature. It does not give place to the game between the finitude human being and the autonomy of the reason, but it is characteristic of the nature qua nature. The sublimity of nature is relative to a dynamics that is not internal to the subjectivity, but points out the dimension of manifestation of ontological structures. In face of this dynamics it appears a attunement that Heidegger calls restraint (Verhaltenheit). In fact, the restraint is asserted as the condition for any kind of relation with living creatures that observes the adequate ontological categorization of nature.
7. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 2 > Issue: Part 2
Caroline Vasconcelos Ribeiro A ontologia Fundamental de Heidegger e a crítica à metapsicologia freudiana: o homem enquanto Dasein
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Unlike the absolutification of the mode of thinking that reduces man to a mind, which represents, and the world to a physical-mathematical structure available just through objectification, Heidegger requests philosophy to return to the question of the being making it a task of the thinking. During the course of this task he constructs the possibility of a thinking about man unbending to the objectifying discourse. Taking the treatise of 1927 and the Zollikon Seminars as a reference, we would like to ask if the Freudian psychoanalysis – as a science of psychic phenomenon – is able to think the human existence as outside of the enclosure of the modern subjectivity and objectivity. In other words: if the freudian meta-psychology breaks with or adjusts to the imperatives of the metaphysics of subjectivity.Contra a absolutização do modo de pensar que reduz o homem a uma mente que representa e o mundo a uma estrutura fisico-matemática disponível apenas pela via da objetificação, Heidegger convoca a filosofi a retomar a questão do ser, fazendo-a tarefa do pensamento. No caminho desta tarefa, constrói a possibilidade de um pensar sobre homem irredutível ao discurso objetifi cante. Tomando como referência o tratado de 1927 e os Seminarios de Zollikon, visamos perguntar se a psicanálise freudiana – enquanto ciência dos fenômenos psíquicos – dá conta de pensar o existir humano fora da clausura da subjetividade e objetividade modernas. Em outros termos: se a metapsicologia freudiana rompe ou afi na-se, com os imperativos da metafísica da subjetividade.
8. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 2 > Issue: Part 2
María Lucrecia Rovaletti The Constitution of the Object in Phobic Experience
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Phobia constitutes an anguishing fear, unrestrained by the presence of an object, a situation or a person that do not have an objectively dangerous character. Rather than interpreting the choice of something as a phobic-like object as psychoanalysis does, phenomenology sets aside all theories and tries to reach the structure of the ego so as to point out the dimension of existence there. Anguish permeates existence and exposes it to a threat that alters the relationship with the world, i.e., a world that one believes potentially hostile, does not let one live in a banal way, and leads one to the lack of mundane aspect.
9. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 2 > Issue: Part 2
Eder Soares Santos D. W. Winnicott: instigações a uma fenomenologia existencial
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The aim of the present article is to show that it is possible to perceive that certain discussions suggested by D. W. Winnicott’s psychoanalytic theory instigate and clear inquiries that are still pending in Heidegger’s Existential Analysis, such as the question of natality, of the physicality of the Dasein, and of the reaching of the potentiality-for-being of the Dasein. Consequently, it can be said that some Winnicottian ideas on being and going-on-being touch the essential theme of Heidegger’s theory found in Being and Time, i.e.: human existence is, fundamentally, a timely and finite experience.Este trabalho tem por objetivo mostrar que é possível perceber que certas discussões avançadas pela teoria psicanalítica de D. W. Winnicott instigam e aclaram indagações ainda pendentes na analítica do ser-o-aí (Dasein) de Heidegger, tais como a questão da nascencialidade, da corporeidade do ser-o-ai e do chegar ao poder-ser do ser-o-aí. Por conseqüência, poder-se-á indicar que algumas idéias winnicottianas sobre ser e continuara-ser tocam o tema essencial da teoria heideggeriana presente em Ser e Tempo, a saber: o existir humano é, no seu fundamento, um acontecer temporal e finito.
10. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 2 > Issue: Part 2
Ricardo Timm de Souza Da metamorfose da intencionalidade à metamorfose do sentido: Uma leitura de Levinas
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The article seeks to show how Levinas’s work, taken as a whole, brings about a reversal of sense of phenomenological intentionality by the introduction of the notion of “passive” or “nonintentional” consciousness, so as to operate a deeper, significant metamorphosis of philosophical activity as such, starting from the inquiry into the human question, as it is undertaken in his text “Humanism and An-archy.”O artigo pretende evidenciar como, na obra levinasiana considerada em seu todo, ocorre, a partir da inversão do sentido da intencionalidade fenomenológica pela introdução da noção de consciencia “passiva” ou “não-intencional”, uma metamorfose mais profunda e significativa da atividade filosófica como tal, a partir do exame da questão do humano, tal como esta investigação se dá no texto levinasiano “Humanismo e An-arquia”.
11. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 2 > Issue: Part 2
Dario Teixeira Significado Enquanto Atributo de Intenções nas Logische Untersuchungen de Husserl
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I intend to reconstruct Husserl’s conception of meaning, expounded in the Logische Untersuchungen, and to defend his central thesis according to which the meaning of an expression should be explained as the intentional content in specie of the speaker’s intention and thus as an ideal attribute (i.e. an universal) instantiated in the intentional content of the meaning intention that the expression intimates. I discuss some theoretical advantages of this conception, especially concerning the account of our ordinary consciousness of meanings.
12. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 2 > Issue: Part 2
Germán Vargas Gullén Phenomenological Description of Pain: On the Intropathic Experience of Pain
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This brief research turns on two questions: 1) What does the Husserlian renovation of monadology consist in; 2) Is it possible to feel another’s pain? In its two different formulations, as I understand it, the problem is only one: Is it possible to get an access to another’s experiences? This question, which appears over and over again, has an affirmative answer within itself: the possible achievement of human communication and, beyond it, the foundation of the social sciences. With a negative answer we find instead the definitive entrenchment in solipsism.
13. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 2 > Issue: Part 2
Roberto J. Walton Sense-Transmission and the Problem of Analytic Verification
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Sense-transmission has been highlighted as one of the main lines of inquiry to be followed after the breakthrough into transcendental life. In this paper, I first examine sense-transmission both in the natural and transcendental attitudes, and its role in the self-overstepping of egology. Second, I consider its relevance in overcoming the limitation to present others and problems linked to the sense-origin of the notion. Third, I analyze particularization and wholeness in the transmission of sense. Finally, I discuss the “analytic verification” of a transcendental intersubjective zone of absence with the aim of disclosing a fourfold structure, the moments of which reflect four dimensions of the intersubjective horizon. Th e guidelines are afforded by Eugen Fink’s projects for Edmund Husserl’s systematic work and the reworking of the Cartesian Meditations, published in the supplement volume to the Sixth Cartesian Meditation.
14. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 2 > Issue: Part 2
Antonio Zirón Quijano About the Notion of Phenomenology, One More Time
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Given the well-known fact of the ambiguity of the very term “phenomenology” and the lack of a unique notion of phenomenology, the paper invites the Organization of Phenomenological Organizations to an attempt at a dialogue among phenomenologists about the very notion that supposedly unites the members of those organizations or the organizations among themselves. In this trend, the paper prolongs reflections of the author concerning a first negative condition for the notion of phenomenology - namely, the rejection of the identification of the idea of phenomenology with the call “Back to the thing themselves” and the “Principle of all principles” - and discusses this identification in works by Jean-Francois Lavigne (Husserl et la naissance de la phenomenologie (1900-1913)) and Michel Henry (Quatre principes de la phenomenologie).
15. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 2 > Issue: Part 2
Notes on Contributors
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16. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 2 > Issue: Part 2
The Chronicle of Latin American Phenomenological Organizations
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