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Philo

Volume 12, Issue 2, Fall/Winter 2009
Theism and Naturalism

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Displaying: 1-9 of 9 documents


1. Philo: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Paul Pistone Introduction
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2. Philo: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Peter Byrne Is Morality Undercut by Evolutionary Naturalism
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This paper surveys the argument that a secular world-view that is committed to a neo-Darwinian account of human origins generates a vicious form of moral skepticism. The argument turns around the claim that Darwinism entails the unreliability of moral sense or conscience. This argument is analyzed and found wanting. It rests on a major error about the scope of evolutionary biology in explaining human thought.
3. Philo: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Paul Churchland Is Evolutionary Naturalism Epistemologically Self-Defeating
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Alvin Plantinga argues that our cognitive mechanisms have been selected for their ability to sustain reproductively successful behaviors, not for their ability to track truth. This aspect of our cognitive mechanisms is said to pose a problem for the biological theory of evolution by natural selection in the following way. If our cognitive mechanisms do not provide any assurances that the theories generated by them are true, then the fact that evolutionary theory has been generated by them, and even accepted by them, provides no assurance whatever that evolutionary theory is true. Plantinga’s argument, I argue, innocently assumes that the (problematic) “truth-tracking character” of our native cognitive mechanisms is the only possible or available source of rational warrant or justification for evolutionary theory. But it isn’t. Plantinga is ignoring the artificial mechanisms for theorycreation and theory-evaluation embodied in the complex institutions andprocedures of modern science.
4. Philo: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Robin Collins God and the Laws of Nature
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This paper argues that theism and related axiarchic hypotheses provide the only promising solution to the problems of cosmic coincidence and induction raised by necessitarians against the regularity view of the laws of nature. Hence, it is argued, the fundamental order of the world provides significant support for theism and these related hypotheses.
5. Philo: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
John Leslie A Cosmos Existing Through Ethical Necessity
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The paper develops a Platonic and Spinozistic metaphysics. With an unprovable yet absolute necessity, the cosmos exists just because of the ethical need for it. We, and all the intricate structures of our universe, exist as intricately structured thoughts in a divine mind. This mind could contain infinitely many other universes as well, and minds of the same kind could exist in infinite number. Evidence for this is supplied by the finely tuned orderliness of our universe, and by the sheer fact that any universe exists.
6. Philo: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Andrew Melnyk Naturalism as a Philosophical Paradigm
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I develop the conjecture that “naturalism” in philosophy names not a thesis but a paradigm in something like Thomas Kuhn’s sense, i.e., a set of commitments, shared by a group of investigators, whose acceptance by the members of the group powerfully influences their day-to-day investigative practice. I take a stab at spelling out the shared commitments that make up naturalism, and the logical and evidential relations among them.
7. Philo: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Graham Oppy Craig’s Kalam Cosmology
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Hypotheses about the shape of causal reality admit of both theistic and non-theistic interpretations. I argue that, on the simplest hypotheses about the causal shape of reality—infinite regress, contingent initial boundary, necessary initial boundary—there is good reason to suppose that non-theism is always either preferable to, or at least the equal of, theism, at least insofar as we restrict our attention merely to the domain of explanation of existence. Moreover, I suggest that it is perfectly proper for naturalists to be undecided between these simple hypotheses about the causal shape of reality: contrary to the proponents of cosmological arguments, there are no decisive objections to any of these simple hypotheses. (I argue this case in detail in connection with objections offered by William Lane Craig; however, I believe that the case holds quite generally.)
8. Philo: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Peter van Inwagen Some Remarks on the Modal Ontological Argument
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This paper examines the so-called modal ontological argument. It pays special attention to the role that the symmetry and transitivity of the accessibility relation play in the argument, and examines various approaches to a defense of the “possibility premise,” the premise of the argument that states that the existence of a perfect being is metaphysically possible. It contains an analysis of Gödel’s attempt to show that this premise is true, and of a recent formulation by David Johnson of Gödel’s argument.
9. Philo: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
William Wainwright Two (or Maybe One and a Half) Cheers for Perfect Being Theology
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In a series of influential articles published in the 1980s, Thomas Morris argued that the most promising approach to many issues in the philosophy of religion is “perfect being theology.” A philosopher who adopts it begins by construing God as a maximally perfect being and then fills the conception in by using his or her modal intuitions and intuitions concerning what properties are and are not perfections. While I am sympathetic with Morris’s program, two aspects seem problematic. More justification is needed for construing God as a maximally perfect being, and the appeal to intuitions needs more support than Morris provides for it. I will comment on both difficulties.