Recently, scholars have turned to probability analysis to assess the rationality of belief in God, partly due to the emphasis of probability calculations in assessing the evidential problem of evil. William Rowe concludes that it is more probable that God does not exist than that he does, given the existence of horrendous evils and the fact that no know goods justify God in permitting any of these evils. The strength of his argument is that we do not need to determine whether there are, in fact, any justifying conditions in order to see the implications of the existence of horrendous evils for the probability of the existence of God. Rowe give an analogy to demonstrate that the mere discovery that no known reasons justify these evils shows it is probable that God does not exist. However, as it turns out, many of our intuitions conflict with probability calculus. Furthermore it is difficult to set up problems that can be effectively dealt with using probability calculus, even when it is used correctly. I illustrate this using the argument that Rowe presents and the analogy he offers to support it. First, I show how our intuitions can go astray, then I explain how Rowe’s argument is supposed to operate, and finally, I argue that it is actually of little or no help in guiding us in our beliefs.

In this paper we respond to criticisms by Michael Bergmann and Michael Rea in their “In Defense of Sceptical Theism: A Reply to Almeida and Oppy,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2005).

In this paper I argue that Robert Kane’s defense of event-causal libertarianism, as presented in Responsibility, Luck, and Chance: Reflections on Free Will and Indeterminism, fails because his event-causal reconstruction is incoherent. I focus on the notions of efforts and self-forming actions essential to his defense.

Bruce Russell has classified evidential arguments from evil into four types, one of which is the type-4 argument. Rather than begin with observations of evils that appear to be gratuitous, type-4 arguments simply begin with observations of evils. The next step, and the heart of a type-4 argument, is an abductive inference (inference to the best explanation) from those observations, to the conclusion that there is gratuitous evil. Reflection upon the consequential complexity of history, however, reveals that we have no objective grounds for making the key, abductive inference, thus, all type-4 arguments from evil fail.

This paper is a reply to Graham Oppy’s “Maydole’s 2QS5 Argument,” published in Philo 7, 2 (2004). I argue that he fails to refute myModal Perfection Argument for the existence of a Supreme Being, and that it remains arguably sound in the face of his alleged counterexamples and parodies.

Robert Maydole has recently presented a sophisticated ontological argument that he calls the Modal Perfection Argument for the existence of a supreme being. While this ontological argument is probably better than most of its peers, it is nonetheless open to at least one decisive objection. The purpose of this brief comment is to develop that objection. I claim that this objection indicates an important further point about the concept of entailment and its role in ontological arguments at large, the recognition of which helps to refute other conceivable ontological arguments.

This paper is a reply to Thomas Metcalf ’s “Entailment and ontological arguments: Reply to Maydole,” published in Philo 8, 2 (2005). Iargue that he fails to refute my Modal Perfection Argument for the existence of a Supreme Being, and that it remains arguably sound in the face of his alleged counterexamples and parody.

The title question is approached by distinguishing two senses of “God” and two senses of “cognitive” (or “cognitively meaningful”), producing four separate questions. Each is given an affirmative or negative answer, which is defended against possible objections. At the end, the debate between atheism and theological non-cognitivism is addressed, with the atheist side argued to have the preferable outlook.

In his book Nonbelief & Evil, Theodore Drange argues that theists are likely to deploy the “unknown purpose defense” in the face of the existence of apparently gratuitous evils. That is, they will assert that God has morally sufficient reasons for permitting apparently gratuitous evil, but that humans do not know those reasons. Drange argues that by deploying the unknown purpose defense, and by challenging atheologians to prove that God does not have such unknown morally sufficient reasons, theists can achieve a stalemate with atheological challengers. I argue, however, that the epistemic burden of ascertaining whether God probably does or does not possess morally sufficient reasons for permitting evil falls asymmetrically on theists and atheists. Further, I argue that, given the failure of theodicies, the condition of nescience, the admission that we are in no position to assess whether God probably does or does not possess morally sufficient reasons for permitting ostensibly gratuitous evil, entails agnosticism about God’s existence. To escape agnosticism, theists will probably claim to have a warranted and properly basic belief in the existence and goodness of God. While I concede that theists may be doing their “epistemic best” in claiming such assurance, I argue that theists must concede that the existence of apparently gratuitous evil equally legitimizes nonbelief.

In this essay I respond to comments on my work by Stephen T. Davis and Keith Parsons.

There are three possible situations regarding createable possible worlds: (1) there is a best possible world of that sort; (2) there are two or more unsurpassably good worlds of that sort; (3) there is an infinite series of significantly and increasingly better possible createable worlds. Rowe argues that if (1) is true then, if God exists, he does not deserve our praise or gratitude for doing what he could not fail to do, namely, create the best possible world. With this I agree. He argues that if (2) is true, then God does not deserve our praise or gratitude either, because it did not matter which of these worlds he created. I disagree with Rowe here arguing that we can be grateful for being alive even if there is an equally good possible world where we do not exist. Rowe also argues that if (3) were true, God could not exist, for (3) would allow that there is some being greater than God, which is impossible. I also disagree with Rowe about what follows from (3): God could not create the worst of the best worlds in the infinite series of increasingly better worlds, but he could create some extremely good world in that series without that possibility implying that there could be some being greater than God.

Rowe argues that if for every good world there is a better, then God is not morally perfect since no matter what world God were to create he could have done better than he did. I contend that Rowe’s argument doesn’t do justice to the role grace plays in the theist’s doctrine of creation, and respond to five new criticisms of my position that Rowe offers in Can God be Free?

William Rowe argues that an essentially perfectly good being could not actualize a world unless there is no better world it could actualize instead. According to Rowe’s Argument from Improvability, if there is an infinite series of ever-improving and actualizable worlds then a perfect being could actualize exactly none of them. I argue that there is no reason to believe Rowe’s argument is sound. It therefore presents no important objection to theism.

In this paper I respond to criticisms of the book Can God Be Free? set forth by Bruce Russell, William Wainwright, Klaas Kraay, and Michael Almeida.

David Truncellito provides an analysis of Anselm’s ontological argument according to which Anselm’s use of the term “God” equivocates between purported reference to a being and reference to the idea of that being. I argue that this interpretation does not capture Anselm’s intent, and offer another analysis of the argument that charges Anselm with a different equivocation.