There are three possible situations regarding createable possible worlds: (1) there is a best possible world of that sort; (2) there are two or more unsurpassably good worlds of that sort; (3) there is an infinite series of significantly and increasingly better possible createable worlds. Rowe argues that if (1) is true then, if God exists, he does not deserve our praise or gratitude for doing what he could not fail to do, namely, create the best possible world. With this I agree. He argues that if (2) is true, then God does not deserve our praise or gratitude either, because it did not matter which of these worlds he created. I disagree with Rowe here arguing that we can be grateful for being alive even if there is an equally good possible world where we do not exist. Rowe also argues that if (3) were true, God could not exist, for (3) would allow that there is some being greater than God, which is impossible. I also disagree with Rowe about what follows from (3): God could not create the worst of the best worlds in the infinite series of increasingly better worlds, but he could create some extremely good world in that series without that possibility implying that there could be some being greater than God.

Rowe argues that if for every good world there is a better, then God is not morally perfect since no matter what world God were to create he could have done better than he did. I contend that Rowe’s argument doesn’t do justice to the role grace plays in the theist’s doctrine of creation, and respond to five new criticisms of my position that Rowe offers in Can God be Free?

William Rowe argues that an essentially perfectly good being could not actualize a world unless there is no better world it could actualize instead. According to Rowe’s Argument from Improvability, if there is an infinite series of ever-improving and actualizable worlds then a perfect being could actualize exactly none of them. I argue that there is no reason to believe Rowe’s argument is sound. It therefore presents no important objection to theism.

In this paper I respond to criticisms of the book Can God Be Free? set forth by Bruce Russell, William Wainwright, Klaas Kraay, and Michael Almeida.

David Truncellito provides an analysis of Anselm’s ontological argument according to which Anselm’s use of the term “God” equivocates between purported reference to a being and reference to the idea of that being. I argue that this interpretation does not capture Anselm’s intent, and offer another analysis of the argument that charges Anselm with a different equivocation.