The following paper is a modified version of Ihe Edward S. O’Donnell, S.J., Distinguished Lecture, delivered at Marquette University in November of 1986, The original title of the lecture was, “The Fare of Theology 1986, or the Painful Process of Doctrinal Development.” Following a historical exegesis of the notion of responsibility for theologians. I offer a summary of dominant factors underlying the issue of doctrinal development in theology, and conclude with some recommendations relating to the present tasks facing theologians.

After distinguishing three kinds of pluralism, an individualist pluralism at one pole, a communalist pluralism at the other, and a third more complex concept ofpluralism, I address the meaning of commitment in America as iIIuminated by these distinctions. This continues a line opened up in Habits of the Heart. An earlierversion of this paper was presented at Marquette University in the Edward J. O’Donnell, S.J., Distinguished Lecture Series.

Following a brief examination of some remarks by Paul Ricoeur on the notion of testimony. I provide the outline or an analysis of revelation based upon certain key concepts of process philosophy. This is followed by a more specific interpretation within the context of Whitehead’s philosophy of process.

Following two introductory sections which deal with the search for meaning and the model of film as a form of probing, I argue that Bergman deals with a number of important philosophical issues within his film corpus. A summary account of the vision which emerges from this corpus is sketched, followed by an analysis of the central role of the artist in society as Bergman conceives it.

Following a general sketch of my paradigm of the opening chapter of Genesis as a presentation and analysis of the human predicament, I offer an analysis of the Adam and Eve story and the story of Babel as paradigms of the Genesis authors’ understanding of human transcendence. A brief summary of the primary elements within this notion of transcendence precedes my applicalion of it to a contemporary social issue.

I defend my earlier nonessenlialist analysis of romantic love as involving concern, the passion for union, the desire for reciprocation, admiration, and idealizalion. No central element unifies the analysis. Though not parts of romantic love, sexual desire and exclusivity enhance and generally accompany it. I argue that my analysis is superior to one with a unifying central element. For by allowing variation and conflict among the elements of romantic love, my analysis better explains its turbulence and voIatility and accommodates both realism and idealism.