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articles
1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 86 > Issue: 3
John Bengson Experimental Attacks on Intuitions and Answers
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2. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 86 > Issue: 3
Matthew McGrath Dogmatism, Underminers and Skepticism
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3. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 86 > Issue: 3
Aaron J. Cotnoir Validity for Strong Pluralists
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4. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 86 > Issue: 3
Andrew Sepielli Moral Uncertainty and the Principle of Equity among Moral Theories
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5. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 86 > Issue: 3
Liam P. Dempsey, Itay Shani Stressing the Flesh: In Defense of Strong Embodied Cognition
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In a recent paper, Andy Clark (2008) has argued that the literature on embodied cognition reveals a tension between two prominent strands within this movement. On the one hand, there are those who endorse what Clark refers to as body-centrism, a view which emphasizes the special contribution made by the body to a creature's mental life. Among other things, body centrism implies that significant differences in embodiment translate into significant differences in cognition and consciousness. On the other hand, there are those who endorse what Clark calls extended functionalism, a view which sees the mind as the joint product of the computational resources presented by (i) intracranial processing, (ii) bodily input, and (iii) environmental scaffolding. As such, extended functionalism allows for the possibility that any contribution of the body to cognition and consciousness can be compensated for by the other two contributing factors. While Clark's sympathies lie with the latter approach, we argue in favour of the former. In particular, we focus on consciousness and argue that the unique contribution the body makes to a creature's manifold of phenomenal experience cannot be compensated for, in the manner, and on the scale, that Clark envisages.
6. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 86 > Issue: 3
Edouard Machery, Ron Mallon, Shaun Nichols, Stephen P. Stich If Folk Intuitions Vary, Then What?
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We have recently presented evidence for cross-cultural variation in semantic intuitions and explored the implications of such variation for philosophical arguments that appeal to some theory of reference as a premise. Devitt (2011) and Ichikawa and colleagues (forthcoming) offer critical discussions of the experiment and the conclusions that can be drawn from it. In this response, we reiterate and clarify what we are really arguing for, and we show that most of Devitt's and Ichikawa and colleagues' criticisms fail to address our concerns.
7. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 86 > Issue: 3
Yitzhak Y. Melamed Spinoza's Metaphysics of Thought: Parallelisms and the Multifaceted Structure of Ideas
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special symposium
8. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 86 > Issue: 3
Kirk Ludwig The Argument for Subject-Body Dualism from Transtemporal Identity
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9. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 86 > Issue: 3
Martine Nida-Rümelin The Argument for Subject Body Dualism from Transtemporal Identity Defended
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In my argument for subject body dualism criticized by Ludwig I use the locution of a genuine and factual difference between two possibilities. Ludwig distinguishes three interpretations of this locution. According to his analysis the argument does not go through on any of these interpretations. In my response I agree that the argument is unsuccessful if 'factual difference' is understood in the first way. The second reading—according to a plausible understanding—cannotbe used for the argument either. The discussion of this reading raises fundamental issues about different notions of propositional content. I disagree with Ludwig's diagnosis with respect to the third reading. Contrary to Ludwig's claim, there is no modal error involved if 'factual difference' is understood in the third way. Ludwig's objection to the argument according to its third reading can be answered by pointing out that every individual has its identity conditions necessarily.At this point fundamental and general metaphysical issues (concerning the link between identity conditions and the nature of ontological categories and between transworld and transtemporal identity) prove relevant. Finally, I make more explicit how Tactual difference' should be understood in the context of the argument (this is a fourth reading not considered by Ludwig) and explain how this reading strengthens the argument (compared to the third reading) by weakening its central premise. I conclude that Ludwig's attempt at undermining the argument from transtemporal identity for subject body dualism is unsuccessful.
book symposium
10. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 86 > Issue: 3
Derk Pereboom Précis of Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism
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11. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 86 > Issue: 3
Robert Merrihew Adams Consciousness, Physicalism, and Panpsychism
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12. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 86 > Issue: 3
Lynne Rudder Baker Pereboom's Robust Nonreductive Physicalism
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13. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 86 > Issue: 3
Daniel Stoljar Qualitative Inaccuracy and Unconceived Alternatives
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14. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 86 > Issue: 3
Derk Pereboom Replies to Daniel Stoljar, Robert Adams, and Lynne Baker
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15. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 86 > Issue: 3
Recent Publications
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articles
16. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 86 > Issue: 2
Jessica Brown Experimental Philosophy, Contextualism and SSI
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17. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 86 > Issue: 2
Storrs McCall Does the Brain Lead the Mind?
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18. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 86 > Issue: 2
Joseph Shieber Toward a Truly Social Epistemology: Babbage, the Division of Mental Labor, and the Possibility of Socially Distributed Warrant
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In what follows, I appeal to Charles Babbage's discussion of the division of mental labor to provide evidence that—at least with respect to the social acquisition, storage, retrieval, and transmission of knowledge—epistemologists have, for a broad range of phenomena of crucial importance to actual knowers in their epistemic practices in everyday life, failed adequately to appreciate the significance of socially distributed cognition. If the discussion here is successful, I will have demonstrated that a particular presumption widely held within the contemporary discussion of the epistemology of testimony—a presumption that I will term thepersonalist requirement—fails to account for those very practices of knowers that I detail here. I will then conclude by suggesting that an alternate account of testimonial warrant, one that has heretofore been underappreciated, ought to be given more serious consideration—in particular because it is well suited to account for those actual practices of knowers that the personahst requirement leaves unrecognized.
19. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 86 > Issue: 2
Thor Grünbaum Seeing what I am Doing
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20. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 86 > Issue: 2
Stephen Puryear Leibniz on the Metaphysics of Color
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Drawing on remarks scattered through his writings, I argue that Leibniz has a highly distinctive and interesting theory of color. The central feature of the theory is the way in which it combines a nuanced subjectivism about color with a reductive approach of a sort usually associated with objectivist theories of color. After reconstructing Leibniz's theory and calling attention to some of its most notable attractions, I turn to the apparent incompatibility of its subjective and reductive components. I argue that this apparent tension vanishes in light of his rejection of a widely accepted doctrine concerning the nature of bodies and their geometrical qualities.