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Displaying: 1-20 of 39 documents


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1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 84 > Issue: 3
Sinan Dogramaci Reverse Engineering Epistemic Evaluations
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2. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 84 > Issue: 3
Ross P. Cameron Composition as Identity Doesn't Settle the Special Composition Question
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Orthodoxy says that the thesis that composition is identity (CAI) entails universalism: the claim that any collection of entities has a sum. If this is true it counts infavour of CAI, since a thesis about the nature of composition that setdes the otherwise intractable special composition question (SCQ) is desirable. But I arguethat it is false: CAI is compatible with the many forms of restricted composition, and SCQ is no easier to answer given CAI than otherwise. Furthermore, in seeingwhy this is the case we reveal an objection to CAI: that it allows for the facts concerning what there is to be settled whilst leaving open the question about what isidentical to what.
3. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 84 > Issue: 3
Sergio Tenenbaum The Idea of Freedom and Moral Cognition in Groundwork III
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4. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 84 > Issue: 3
Iris Einheuser Relativized Propositions and the Fregean Orthodoxy
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This paper answer the question how propositions whose truth is relativized to times, places, asserters or assessers can, despite their relativity, be used to represent the world.
5. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 84 > Issue: 3
Kevin Zaragoza Forgiveness and Standing
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Despite broad agreement that forgiveness involves overcoming resentment, the small philosophical hterature on this topic has made litde progress in determining which of the many ways of overcoming resentment is forgiveness. In a recent paper, however, Pamela Hieronymi proposed a way forward by requiring that accounts of forgiveness be "articulate" and "uncompromising." I argue for these requirements, but also claim that Hieronymi's proposed articulate and uncompromising account must be rejected because it cannot accommodate the fact that only some agents have the standing to forgive. I end by sketching an alternative account which, I claim, explains the phenomenon of standing.
6. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 84 > Issue: 3
Gabriele Contessa Do Extrinsic Dispositions Need Extrinsic Causal Bases?
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In this paper, I distinguish two often-conflated theses—the thesis that all dispositions are intrinsic properties and the thesis that the causal bases of all dispositions are intrinsic properties—and argue that the falsity of the former does not entail the falsity of the latter. In particular, I argue that extrinsic dispositions are a counterexample to first thesis but not necessarily to the second thesis, because an extrinsic disposition does not need to include any extrinsic property in its causal basis. I conclude by drawing some general lessons about the nature of dispositions and their relation to their causal bases.
7. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 84 > Issue: 3
Fabrice Correia On the Reduction of Necessity to Essence
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In his influential paper "Essence and Modality", Kit Fine argues that no account of essence framed in terms of metaphysical necessity is possible, and that it israther metaphysical necessity which is to be understood in terms of essence. On his account, the concept of essence is primitive, and for a proposition to be metaphysically necessary is for it to be true in virtue of the nature of all things. Fine also proposes a reducdon of conceptual and logical necessity in the same vein: a conceptual necessity is a proposition true in virtue of the nature of all concepts, and a logical necessity a proposidon true in virtue of the nature of all logical concepts. I argue that the plausibility of Fine's view crucially requires that certain apparent explanatory links between essentialist facts be admitted and accountedfor, and I make a suggestion about how this can be done. I then argue against the reductions of conceptual and logical necessity proposed by Fine and suggest alternative reductions, which remain nevertheless Finean in spirit.
8. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 84 > Issue: 3
Paul Audi Properties, Powers, and the Subset Account of Realization
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According to the subset account of realization, a property, F, is realized by another property, G, whenever F is individuated by a non-empty proper subset of the causal powers by which G is individuated (and F is not a conjunctive property of which G is a conjunct). This account is especially attractive because it seems bothto explain the way in which realized properties are nothing over and above their realizers, and to provide for the causal efficacy of realized properties. It thereforeseems to provide a way around the causal exclusion problem. There is reason to doubt, however, that the subset account can achieve both tasks. The problemarises when we look closely at the relation between properties and causal powers, specifically, at the idea that properties confer powers on the things that have them. If realizers are to be ontically prior to what they realize, then we must regard the conferral of powers by properties as a substantive relation of determination. This relation of conferral is at the heart of a kind of exclusion problem, analogous to the familar causal exclusion problem. I argue that the subset account cannotadequately answer this new exclusion problem, and is for that reason ill-suited to be the backbone of a non-reductive physicalism.
book symposium
9. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 84 > Issue: 3
Keith Derose Precis of The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, Vol. 1
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10. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 84 > Issue: 3
Jennifer Nagel The Attitude of Knowledge
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11. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 84 > Issue: 3
Peter Ludlow Contextualism, Multi-Tasking, and Third-Person Knowledge Reports: A Note on Keith DeRose's The Case for Contextualism
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12. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 84 > Issue: 3
Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath Contextualism and Subject-Sensitivity
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13. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 84 > Issue: 3
Keith Derose Replies to Nagel, Ludlow, and Fantl and McGrath
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14. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 84 > Issue: 3
Recent Publications
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articles
15. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 84 > Issue: 2
Miranda Fricker Group Testimony? The Making of A Collective Good Informant
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16. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 84 > Issue: 2
Tyler Doggett, Andy Egan How We Feel About Terrible, Non-existent Mafiosi
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17. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 84 > Issue: 2
Nicholas Shea Methodological Encounters with the Phenomenal Kind
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Block's well-known distinction between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness has generated a large philosophical literature about putative conceptual connections between the two. The scientific literature about whether they come apart in any actual cases is rather smaller. Empirical evidence gathered to date has not settled the issue. Some put this down to a fundamental methodological obstacle to the empirical study of the relation between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness. Block (2007) has drawn attention to the methodological puzzle and attempted to answer it. While the evidence Block points to is relevant and important, this paper puts forward a more systematic framework for addressing the puzzle. To give it a label, the approach is to study phenomenal consciousness as a natural kind. The approach allows consciousness studies to move beyond initial means of identifying instances of the kind like verbal report, and to find its underlying nature. It is well-recognised that facts about an underlying kind may allow identification of instances of the kind that do not match the initial means of identification (cp. non-liquid samples of water). This paper shows that the same method can be deployed to investigate phenomenal consciousness independently of access consciousness.
18. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 84 > Issue: 2
Antti Kauppinen Meaningfulness and Time
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19. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 84 > Issue: 2
Lionel Shapiro Objective Being and "Ofness" in Descartes
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It is generally assumed that Descartes invokes "objective being in the intellect" in order to explain or describe an idea's status as being "of something." I argue that this assumption is mistaken. As emerges in his discussion of "materially false ideas" in the Fourth Replies, Descartes recognizes two senses of 'idea of'. One, a theoretical sense, is itself introduced in terms of objective being. Hence Descartes can't be introducing objective being to explain or describe "ofness" understood in this sense. Descartes also appeals to a pretheoretical sense of 'idea of'. I will argue that the notion of objective being can't serve to explain or describe this "ofness" either. I conclude by proposing an alternative explanation of the role of objective being, according to which Descartes introduces this notion to explain the mind's ability to attain clear and distinct ideas.
20. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 84 > Issue: 2
Earl Conee Self-Support
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