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1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 84 > Issue: 1
Katalin Balog In Defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy
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2. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 84 > Issue: 1
Fiona MacPherson Cognitive Penetration of Colour Experience: Rethinking the Issue in Light of an Indirect Mechanism
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Can the phenomenal character of perceptual experience be altered by the states of one's cognitive system, for example, one's thoughts or beliefs? If one thinks that this can happen (at least in certain ways that are identified in the paper) then one thinks that there can be cognitive penetration of perceptual experience; otherwise, one thinks that perceptual experience is cognitively impenetrable. I claim that there is one alleged case of cognitive penetration that cannot be explained away by the standard strategies one can typically use to explain away alleged cases. The case is one in which it seems subjects' behefs about the typical colour of objects affects their colour experience. I propose a two-step mechanism of indirect cognitive penetration that explains how cognitive penetration may occur. I show that there is independent evidence that each step in this process can occur. I suspect that people who are opposed to the idea that perceptual experience is cognitively penetrable will be less opposed to the idea when they come to consider this indirect mechanism and that those who are generally sympathetic to the idea of cognitive penetrability will welcome the elucidation of this plausible mechanism.
3. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 84 > Issue: 1
Carolina Sartorio Resultant Luck
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4. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 84 > Issue: 1
Caj Strandberg A Dual Aspect Account of Moral Language
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It is often observed in metaethics that moral language displays a certain duality in as much as it seems to concern both objective facts in the world and subjective attitudes that move to action. In this paper, I defend The Dual Aspect Account which is intended to capture this duality: A person's utterance of a sentence according to which øing has a moral characteristic, such as "øing is wrong," conveys two things: The sentence expresses, in virtue of its conventional meaning, the belief that øing has a moral property, and the utterance of the sentence carries a generalized conversational implicature to the effect that the person in question has an action-guiding attitude in relation to øing. This account has significant advantages over competing views: (i) As it is purely cognitivist, it does not have the difficulties of expressivism and various ecumenical positions, (ii) Yet, in spite of this, it can explain the close, "meaning-like," connection between moral language and attitudes, (iii) In contrast to other pragmatic accounts, it is compatible with any relevant cognitivist view, (iv) It does not rest on a contentious pragmatic notion, such as conventional implicature. (v) It does not imply that utterances of complex moral sentences, such as conditionals, convey attitudes. In addition, the generalized implicature in question is fully calculable and cancellable.
5. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 84 > Issue: 1
Jessica Brown Assertion and Practical Reasoning: Common or Divergent Epistemic Standards?
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6. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 84 > Issue: 1
Seth Shabo Compatibilism and Moral Claimancy: An Intermediate Path to Appropriate Blame
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book symposium
7. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 84 > Issue: 1
Michael Tye Precis of Consciousness Revisited: Materialism without Phenomenal Concepts
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8. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 84 > Issue: 1
Tim Crane Tye on Acquaintance and the Problem of Consciousness
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9. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 84 > Issue: 1
Frank Jackson Michael Tye on Perceptual Content
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10. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 84 > Issue: 1
Brian P. McLaughlin Phenomenal Concepts and the Defense of Materiahsm
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11. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 84 > Issue: 1
Michael Tye Reply to Crane, Jackson and McLaughlin
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review essay
12. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 84 > Issue: 1
Ben Bradley Goodness and Justice
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In Goodness and Justice, Joseph Mendola defends three related views in normative ethics: a novel form of consequentialism, a Bentham-style hedonism about "basic" value, and a maximin principle about the value of a world. In defending these views he draws on his views in metaethics, action theory, and the philosophy of mind. It is an ambitious and wide-ranging book. I begin with a quick explanation of Mendola's views, and then raise some problems.
13. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 84 > Issue: 1
Recent Publications
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