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1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 83 > Issue: 2
Jeff Speaks Frege's Puzzle and Descriptive Enrichment
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2. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 83 > Issue: 2
Stephen Biggs Abduction and Modality
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This paper introduces a modal epistemology that centers on inference to the best explanation (i.e. abduction). In introducing this abduction-centered modal epistemology, the paper has two main goals. First, it seeks to provide reasons for pursuing an abduction-centered modal epistemology by showing that this epistemology aids a popular stance on the mind-body problem and allows an appealing approach to modality. Second, the paper seeks to show that an abduction-centered modal epistemology can work by showing that abduction can estabhsh claims about necessity/possibility (i.e. modal claims)—where 'necessity' and 'possibility' denote metaphysical necessity and possibility, ways things may or may not have been given how they actually are.
3. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 83 > Issue: 2
John Turri Contingent A Priori Knowledge
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I argue that you can have a priori knowledge of propositions that neither are nor appear necessarily true. You can know a priori contingent propositions that yourecognize as such. This overturns a standard view in contemporary epistemology and the traditional view of the a priori, which restrict a priori knowledge to necessary truths, or at least to truths that appear necessary.
4. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 83 > Issue: 2
David J. Bennett How the World Is Measured Up in Size Experience
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I develop a Russellian representationalist account of size experience that draws importantly from contemporary vision science research on size perception. Thecore view is that size is experienced in 'body-scaled' units. So, an object might, say, be experienced as two eye-level units high. The view is sharpened in response to Thompson's (forthcoming) Doubled Earth example. This example is presented by Thompson as part of an argument for a Fregean view of size experience. But I argue that the Russellian view I develop handles the Doubled Earth example in a natural and illuminating way, thereby avoiding the need to posit irreducible experiential 'modes of presentation'. I also address a kind of neo-Fregean 'reference-fixing' view of size experience, that shares features with the Russellian view developed. I give reasons for favoring the latter. Finally, I argue that Peacocke's claim that spatial experience is 'unit free' is not persuasive.
5. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 83 > Issue: 2
Farid Masrour Is Perceptual Phenomenology Thin?
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6. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 83 > Issue: 2
Ephraim Glick Two Methodologies for Evaluating Intellectualism
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7. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 83 > Issue: 2
Alvin Plantinga Content and Natural Selection
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book symposium
8. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 83 > Issue: 2
T.M. Scanlon Précis of Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame
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9. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 83 > Issue: 2
Ralph Wedgwood Scanlon on Double Effect
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10. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 83 > Issue: 2
Michelle Mason Blame: Taking it Seriously
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11. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 83 > Issue: 2
Thomas Hill Scanlon on Moral Dimensions
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12. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 83 > Issue: 2
T.M. Scanlon Reply to Hill, Mason and Wedgwood
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review essay
13. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 83 > Issue: 2
Jonathan E. Adler Bryan Frances, Scepticism Comes Alive
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14. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 83 > Issue: 2
Recent Publications
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