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1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 83 > Issue: 1
Susanna Schellenberg Ontological Minimalism about Phenomenology
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I develop a view of the common factor between subjectively indistinguishable perceptions and hallucinations that avoids analyzing experiences as involving awareness relations to abstract entities, sense-data, or any other peculiar entities. The main thesis is that hallucinating subjects employ concepts (or analogous nonconceptual structures), namely the very same concepts that in a subjectively indistinguishable perception are employed as a consequence of being related to external, mind-independent objects or property-instances. These concepts and nonconceptual structures are identified with modes of presentation types. Since a hallucinating subject is not related to any such objects or property-instances, the concepts she employs remain empty. I argue that the phenomenology of hallucinations and perceptions can be identified with employing concepts and analogous nonconceptual structures. By doing so, I defend an ontologically minimalist view of the phenomenology of experience that (1) vindicates Aristotelianism about types and (2) amounts to a naturalized view of the phenomenology of experience.
2. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 83 > Issue: 1
Patricia Marino Ambivalence, Valuational Inconsistency, and the Divided Self
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3. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 83 > Issue: 1
Masahiro Yamada Getting It Right By Accident
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4. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 83 > Issue: 1
Unifying the Intellectual Virtues
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The intellectual virtues include two seemingly quite different types of traits: reliable faculties on the one hand and inquiry-regulating traits of intellectual character like conscientiousness and openmindedness on the other. Extant virtue theories do not appear to have provided a single account that adequately covers both types of virtue. In this paper, I examine the different ways in which a trait or disposition can contribute to our cognitive goal of acquiring significant true beliefs. I propose that the two types of virtues can be understood as contributing in different ways to our cognitive goal, and develop a general framework for understanding their value.
5. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 83 > Issue: 1
Lei Zhong Can Counterfactuals Solve the Exclusion Problem?
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A quite popular approach to solving the Causal Exclusion Problem is to adopt a counterfactual theory of causation. In this paper, I disdnguish three versions ofthe Causal Exclusion Argument. I argue that the counterfactualist approach can block the first two exclusion arguments, because the Causal Inheritance Principleand the Upward Causation Principle upon which the two arguments are based respechvely are problematic from the perspective of the counterfactual account ofcausation. However, I attempt to show that the counterfactualist approach is unable to refute a sophisticated version (i.e. the third version) of the exclusionargument in that the Downward Causation Principle, a premise of the third exclusion argument, is actually implied by the counterfactual theory of causation.Therefore, even if other theories of causation might help the non-reductive physicalist to solve the exclusion problem, the counterfactual theory of causationcannot.
6. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 83 > Issue: 1
Adrienne M. Martin Hopes and Dreams
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discussion
7. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 83 > Issue: 1
Yuval Avnur Hawthorne Contingent on the Deeply A Priori
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book symposium
8. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 83 > Issue: 1
Trenton Merricks Précis of Truth and Ontology
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9. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 83 > Issue: 1
Karen Bennett Truthmaking and Case-Making
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10. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 83 > Issue: 1
Katherine Hawley Trivial Truthmaking Matters
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11. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 83 > Issue: 1
Kristopher McDaniel Trenton Merricks' Truth and Ontology
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12. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 83 > Issue: 1
Trenton Merricks Replies
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critical notice
13. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 83 > Issue: 1
Anna Marmodoro The 'common sense' in Aristotle's theory of perception
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review essay
14. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 83 > Issue: 1
Barry Dainton Review of Consciousness and its Place in Nature
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15. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 83 > Issue: 1
Recent Publications
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