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Displaying: 1-20 of 51 documents


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1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 82 > Issue: 3
Patrick Greenough Truthmaker Gaps and the No-No Paradox
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2. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 82 > Issue: 3
Alexander Jackson Appearances, Rationality, and Justified Belief
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One might think that its seeming to you that p makes you justified in believing that p. After all, when you have no defeating beliefs, it would be irrational to have itseem to you that p but not believe it. That view is plausible for perceptual justification, problematic in the case of memory, and clearly wrong for inferentialjustification, I propose a view of rationality and justified belief that deals happily with inference and memory. Appearances are to be evaluated as 'sound' or'unsound.' Only a sound appearance can give rise to a justified belief, yet even an unsound appearance can 'rationally require' the subject to form the belief. Some of our intuitions mistake that rational requirement for the beliefs being justified. The resulting picture makes it plausible that there are also unsound perceptual appearances. I suggest that to have a sound perceptually basic appearance that p, one must see that p.
3. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 82 > Issue: 3
Randolph Clarke Omissions, Responsibility, and Symmetry
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4. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 82 > Issue: 3
Elijah Chudnoff What Intuitions Are Like
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5. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 82 > Issue: 3
Roy Sorensen Interestingly Dull Numbers
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6. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 82 > Issue: 3
Guy Kahane Should We Want God to Exist?
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Whether God exists is a metaphysical question. But there is also a neglected evaluative question about God's existence: Should we want God to exist? Very many, including many atheists and agnostics, appear to think we should. Theists claim that if God didn't exist things would be far worse, and many atheists agree; they regret God's inexistence. Some remarks by Thomas Nagel suggest an opposing view: that we should want God not to exist. I call this view anti-theism. I explain how such view can be coherent, and why it might be correct. Anti-theism must be distinguished from the argument from evil or the denial of God's goodness; it is a claim about the goodness of God's existence. Anti-theists must claim that it's a logical consequence of God's existence that things are worse in certain respects. The problem is that God's existence would also make things better in many ways. Given that God's existence is likely to be impersonally better overall, anti-theists face a challenge similar to that facing nonconsequentialists. I explore two ways of meeting this challenge.
7. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 82 > Issue: 3
Noah Lemos Intrinsic Value and the Partiality Problem
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8. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 82 > Issue: 3
Anil Gupta Frey on Experiendal Transparency and Its Rational Role
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9. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 82 > Issue: 3
Christopher Frey On the Rational Contribution of Experiential Transparency
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book symposium
10. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 82 > Issue: 3
Jenann Ismael Precis of The Situated Self
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The riddle posed by the double nature of the ego certainly lies beyond [the limits of science]. On the one hand, I am a real individual man, born by a mother anddestined to carrying out real and psychical acts (far too many, I may think, if boarding a subway during an hour). On the other hand, I am "vision" open toreason, a self-penetrating light, immanent sense-giving consciousness, or how ever you may call it, and as such unique. (Weyl, Address, 3)
11. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 82 > Issue: 3
Elijah Millgram Ismael's Anscombian and Dennettian Selves
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12. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 82 > Issue: 3
Paul Teller Robots, Action, and the "Essential Indexical"
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13. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 82 > Issue: 3
Huw Price Abusing One's Position
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14. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 82 > Issue: 3
Jenann Ismael Responses to Symposiasts
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review essay
15. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 82 > Issue: 3
Gilbert Harman Review of Ernest Lepore and Kirk Ludwig, Donald Davidson's Truth-Theoretic Semantics
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critical notices
16. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 82 > Issue: 3
John Turri Intellectual Virtues: An Essay in Regulative Epistemology
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17. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 82 > Issue: 3
Recent Publications
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articles
18. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 82 > Issue: 2
Karl Schafer Faultless Disagreement and Aesthetic Realism
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It has recently been argued that certain areas of discourse, such as discourse about matters of taste, involve a phenomenon of "faultless disagreement" that rules out giving a standard realist or contextualist semantics for them. Thus, it is argued, we are left with no choice but to consider more adventurous semantic alternatives for these areas, such as a semantic account that involves relativizing truth to perspectives or contexts of assessment. I argue that the sort of faultless disagreement present in these cases is in fact compatible with a realist treatment of their semantics. Then I briefly consider other considerations that might be thought to speak against realism about these areas of discourse. I conclude with the tentative suggestion that realism about matters of taste is far more plausible (at least in some cases) than most philosophers believe today.
19. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 82 > Issue: 2
Jonathan Ichikawa Quantifiers, Knowledge, and Counterfactuals
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Many of the motivations in favor of contextualism about knowledge apply also to a contextualist approach to counterfactuals. I motivate and articulate such anapproach, in terms of the context-sensitive 'all cases', in the spirit of David Lewis's contextualist view about knowledge. The resulting view explains intuitive data,resolves a puzzle parallel to the skeptical paradox, and renders safety and sensitivity, construed as counterfactuals, necessary conditions on knowledge.
20. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 82 > Issue: 2
M. Eddon Intrinsicality and Hyperintensionality
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The standard counterexamples to David Lewis's account of intrinsicality involve two sorts of properties: identity properties and necessary properties. Proponents of the account have attempted to deflect these counterexamples in a number of ways. This paper argues that none of these moves are legitimate. Furthermore, this paper argues that no account along the lines of Lewis's can succeed, for an adequate account of intrinsicality must be sensitive to hyperintensional distinctions among properties.