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1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 81 > Issue: 3
Jonathan Weisberg Bootstrapping in General
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2. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 81 > Issue: 3
Jessica Brown Knowledge and Assertion
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3. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 81 > Issue: 3
Kristie Miller Persons as Sui Generis Ontological Kinds: Advice to Exceptionists
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Many metaphysicians tell us that our world is one in which persisting objects are four-dimensionally extended in time, and persist by being partially present at each moment at which they exist. Many normative theorists tell us that at least some of our core normative practices are justified only if the relation that holds between a person at one time, and that person at another time, is the relation of strict identity. If these metaphysicians are right about the nature of our world, and these normative theorists are right about what justifies our normative practices, then we should be error theorists about the justification of at least some of our core normative practices and in turn, arguably we should eliminate those practices for which justification is lacking. This paper offers a way of resolving the tension between these two views that does not lead into the grips of error theory. It is a way that is amenable to "exceptionists" about persons: those who think there is something special about persons and the first-person perspective; that personhood cannot be explained naturalistically, and the first-person perspective is naturalistically irreducible. The conclusion is thus a conditional: given that one is an exceptionist, an attractive way to resolve this tension is to embrace the view that persons are sui generis ontological kinds.
4. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 81 > Issue: 3
Lawrence A. Shapiro Lessons from Causal Exclusion
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Jaegwon Kim's causal exclusion argument has rarely been evaluated from an empirical perspective. This is puzzling because its conclusion seems to be making a testable claim about the world: supervenient properties are causally inefficacious. An empirical perspective, however, reveals Kim's argument to rest on a mistaken conception about how to test whether a property is causally efficacious. Moreover, the empirical perspective makes visible a metaphysical bias that Kim brings to his argument that involves a principle of non-inclusion.
5. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 81 > Issue: 3
M. Eddon Three Arguments from Temporary Intrinsics
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The Argument from Temporary Intrinsics is one of the canonical arguments against endurantism. I show that the two standard ways of presenting the argumenthave limited force. I then present a new version of the argument, which provides a more promising articulation of the underlying objection to endurantism.However, the premises of this argument conflict with the gauge theories of particle physics, and so this version of the argument is no more successful than its predecessors. I conclude that no version of the Argument from Temporary Intrinsics gives us a compelling reason to favor one theory of persistence over another.
6. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 81 > Issue: 3
Peter Kung Imagining as a Guide to Possibility
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7. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 81 > Issue: 3
Dennis Whitcomb Curiosity was Framed
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This paper explores the nature of curiosity from an epistemological point of view. First it motivates this exploration by explaining why epistemologists do and should care about what curiosity is. Then it surveys the relevant literature and develops a particular approach.
8. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 81 > Issue: 3
Kris McDaniel A Return to the Analogy of Being
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9. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 81 > Issue: 3
Stewart Cohen Luminosity, Reliability, and the Sorites
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10. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 81 > Issue: 3
Joel Smith Seeing Other People
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book symposium
11. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 81 > Issue: 3
Akeel Bilgrami Precis of Self-Knowledge and Resentment
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12. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 81 > Issue: 3
Calvin G. Normore Fool's Good and other Issues: Comments on Self-Knowledge and Resentment
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13. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 81 > Issue: 3
Thomas Baldwin Comments on A. K. Bilgrami's Self-Knowledge and Resentment
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14. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 81 > Issue: 3
Akeel Bilgrami Replies to Tom Baldwin and Calvin Normore
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15. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 81 > Issue: 3
Michael Liston Rabbits Astray and Significance Awandering: Review Essay on Mark Wilson's Wandering Significance
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16. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 81 > Issue: 3
Recent Publications
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articles
17. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 81 > Issue: 2
Gualtiero Piccinini The Mind as Neural Software?: Understanding Functionalism, Computationalism, and Computational Functionalism
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Defending or attacking either functionalism or computationalism requires clarity on what they amount to and what evidence counts for or against them. My goalhere is not to evaluatc their plausibility. My goal is to formulate them and their relationship clearly enough that we can determine which type of evidence is relevant to them. I aim to dispel some sources of confusion that surround functionalism and computationalism. recruit recent philosophical work on mechanisms and computation to shed light on them, and clarify how functionalism and computationalism mayor may not legitimately come together.
18. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 81 > Issue: 2
Philip J. Nickel Voluntary Belief on a Reasonable Basis
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A person presented with adequate but not conclusive evidence for a proposition is in a position voluntarily to acquire a belief in that proposition, or to suspend judgment about it. The availahility of doxastic options in such cases grounds a moderate form of doxastic voluntarism not based on practical motives. and therefore distinct from pragmatism. In such cases, belief-acquisition or suspension of judgment meets standard conditions on willing: it can express stable character traits of the agent, it can be responsive to reasons, and it is compatible with a subjective awareness of the available options.
19. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 81 > Issue: 2
John Gibbons Things That Make Things Reasonable
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20. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 81 > Issue: 2
Stuart Glennan Mechanisms, Causes, and the Layered Model of the World
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Most philosophical accounts of causation take causal relations to obtain between individuals and events in virtue of nomological relations between properties ofthese individuals and events. Such views fail to take into account the consequences of the fact that in general the properties of individuals and events will dependupon mechanisms that realize those properties. In this paper I attempt to rectify this failure, and in so doing to provide an account of the causal relevance ofhigher-level properties. I do this by critiquing one prominent model of higher-level properties- Kim's functional model of reduction-and contrasting it with a mechanistic approach to higher-level properties and causation.