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1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 81 > Issue: 3
Jonathan Weisberg Bootstrapping in General
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2. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 81 > Issue: 3
Jessica Brown Knowledge and Assertion
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3. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 81 > Issue: 3
Kristie Miller Persons as Sui Generis Ontological Kinds: Advice to Exceptionists
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Many metaphysicians tell us that our world is one in which persisting objects are four-dimensionally extended in time, and persist by being partially present at each moment at which they exist. Many normative theorists tell us that at least some of our core normative practices are justified only if the relation that holds between a person at one time, and that person at another time, is the relation of strict identity. If these metaphysicians are right about the nature of our world, and these normative theorists are right about what justifies our normative practices, then we should be error theorists about the justification of at least some of our core normative practices and in turn, arguably we should eliminate those practices for which justification is lacking. This paper offers a way of resolving the tension between these two views that does not lead into the grips of error theory. It is a way that is amenable to "exceptionists" about persons: those who think there is something special about persons and the first-person perspective; that personhood cannot be explained naturalistically, and the first-person perspective is naturalistically irreducible. The conclusion is thus a conditional: given that one is an exceptionist, an attractive way to resolve this tension is to embrace the view that persons are sui generis ontological kinds.
4. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 81 > Issue: 3
Lawrence A. Shapiro Lessons from Causal Exclusion
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Jaegwon Kim's causal exclusion argument has rarely been evaluated from an empirical perspective. This is puzzling because its conclusion seems to be making a testable claim about the world: supervenient properties are causally inefficacious. An empirical perspective, however, reveals Kim's argument to rest on a mistaken conception about how to test whether a property is causally efficacious. Moreover, the empirical perspective makes visible a metaphysical bias that Kim brings to his argument that involves a principle of non-inclusion.
5. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 81 > Issue: 3
M. Eddon Three Arguments from Temporary Intrinsics
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The Argument from Temporary Intrinsics is one of the canonical arguments against endurantism. I show that the two standard ways of presenting the argumenthave limited force. I then present a new version of the argument, which provides a more promising articulation of the underlying objection to endurantism.However, the premises of this argument conflict with the gauge theories of particle physics, and so this version of the argument is no more successful than its predecessors. I conclude that no version of the Argument from Temporary Intrinsics gives us a compelling reason to favor one theory of persistence over another.
6. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 81 > Issue: 3
Peter Kung Imagining as a Guide to Possibility
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7. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 81 > Issue: 3
Dennis Whitcomb Curiosity was Framed
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This paper explores the nature of curiosity from an epistemological point of view. First it motivates this exploration by explaining why epistemologists do and should care about what curiosity is. Then it surveys the relevant literature and develops a particular approach.
8. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 81 > Issue: 3
Kris McDaniel A Return to the Analogy of Being
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9. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 81 > Issue: 3
Stewart Cohen Luminosity, Reliability, and the Sorites
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10. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 81 > Issue: 3
Joel Smith Seeing Other People
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book symposium
11. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 81 > Issue: 3
Akeel Bilgrami Precis of Self-Knowledge and Resentment
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12. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 81 > Issue: 3
Calvin G. Normore Fool's Good and other Issues: Comments on Self-Knowledge and Resentment
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13. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 81 > Issue: 3
Thomas Baldwin Comments on A. K. Bilgrami's Self-Knowledge and Resentment
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14. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 81 > Issue: 3
Akeel Bilgrami Replies to Tom Baldwin and Calvin Normore
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15. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 81 > Issue: 3
Michael Liston Rabbits Astray and Significance Awandering: Review Essay on Mark Wilson's Wandering Significance
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16. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 81 > Issue: 3
Recent Publications
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