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Displaying: 1-14 of 14 documents


articles
1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 81 > Issue: 2
Gualtiero Piccinini The Mind as Neural Software?: Understanding Functionalism, Computationalism, and Computational Functionalism
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Defending or attacking either functionalism or computationalism requires clarity on what they amount to and what evidence counts for or against them. My goalhere is not to evaluatc their plausibility. My goal is to formulate them and their relationship clearly enough that we can determine which type of evidence is relevant to them. I aim to dispel some sources of confusion that surround functionalism and computationalism. recruit recent philosophical work on mechanisms and computation to shed light on them, and clarify how functionalism and computationalism mayor may not legitimately come together.
2. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 81 > Issue: 2
Philip J. Nickel Voluntary Belief on a Reasonable Basis
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A person presented with adequate but not conclusive evidence for a proposition is in a position voluntarily to acquire a belief in that proposition, or to suspend judgment about it. The availahility of doxastic options in such cases grounds a moderate form of doxastic voluntarism not based on practical motives. and therefore distinct from pragmatism. In such cases, belief-acquisition or suspension of judgment meets standard conditions on willing: it can express stable character traits of the agent, it can be responsive to reasons, and it is compatible with a subjective awareness of the available options.
3. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 81 > Issue: 2
John Gibbons Things That Make Things Reasonable
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4. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 81 > Issue: 2
Stuart Glennan Mechanisms, Causes, and the Layered Model of the World
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Most philosophical accounts of causation take causal relations to obtain between individuals and events in virtue of nomological relations between properties ofthese individuals and events. Such views fail to take into account the consequences of the fact that in general the properties of individuals and events will dependupon mechanisms that realize those properties. In this paper I attempt to rectify this failure, and in so doing to provide an account of the causal relevance ofhigher-level properties. I do this by critiquing one prominent model of higher-level properties- Kim's functional model of reduction-and contrasting it with a mechanistic approach to higher-level properties and causation.
5. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 81 > Issue: 2
Pablo Gilabert Kant and the Claims of the Poor
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6. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 81 > Issue: 2
Bryan Frances The Reflective Episternic Renegade
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Philosophers often find themselves in disagreement with contemporary philosophers they know full well to be their epistemic superiors on the topics relevant tothe disagreement. This looks epistemically irresponsible. I offer a detailed investigation of this problem of the reflective epistemic renegade. I argue that although in some cases the renegade is not epistemically blameworthy, and the renegade situation is significantly less common than most would think, in a troublesome number of cases in which the situation arises the renegade is blameworthy in her disagreement with recognized epistemic superiors. I also offer some thoughts on what it would mean for philosophical practice for us to refrain from being renegades. Finally, I show how a new kind of radical skepticism emerges from modest theses regarding the renegade.
7. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 81 > Issue: 2
Scott Soames Coordination Problems
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8. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 81 > Issue: 2
Kit Fine Comments on Scott Soames' 'Coordination Problems'
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9. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 81 > Issue: 2
Krista Lawlor Varieties of Coreference
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10. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 81 > Issue: 2
Kit Fine Reply to Lawlor's 'Varieties of Coreference'
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11. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 81 > Issue: 2
Paul Hovda Semantics as Information about Semantic Values
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12. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 81 > Issue: 2
Kit Fine Comments on Paul Hovda's 'Semantics as Information About Semantics Values'
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review essay
13. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 81 > Issue: 2
J.A. Burgess Review of J.C. Beall and Greg Restall, Logical Pluralism
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14. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 81 > Issue: 2
Recent Publications
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