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1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 81 > Issue: 1
Hemdat Lerman Non-conceptual Experiential Content and Reason-giving
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According to John McDowell and Bill Brewer, our experiences have the type of content which can be the content of judgements - content which is the result of the actualization of specific conceptual abilities. They defend this view by arguing that our experiences must have such content in order for us to be able to think about our environment. In this paper I show that they do not provide a conclusive argument for this view. Focusing on Brewer's version of the argument. I show that it rests on a questionable assumption - namely, that if a subject can recognize the normative bearing of a mental contcnt upon what she should think and do,then this content must be the result of the actualization of conceptual capacities (and in this sense conceptual). I argue that considerations regarding the rolesplayed by experience and concepts in our mental lives may require us to reject this assumption.
2. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 81 > Issue: 1
David Sanson, Ben Caplan The Way Things Were
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3. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 81 > Issue: 1
Nellie Wieland Context Sensitivity and Indirect Reports
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In this paper, I argue that Contextualist theories of semantics are not undermined by their purported failure to explain the practice of indirect reporting. I adoptCappelen & Lepore's test for context sensitivity to show that the scope of context sensitivity is much broader than Semantic Minimalists are willing to accept. Thefailure of their arguments turns on their insistence that the content of indirect reports is semantically minimal.
4. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 81 > Issue: 1
Michael Pelczar Must an Appearance of Succession Involve a Succession of Appearances?
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5. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 81 > Issue: 1
Samuel Newlands The Harmony of Spinoza and Leibniz
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6. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 81 > Issue: 1
Mark Textor Proper Names and Practices: On Reference without Referents
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7. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 81 > Issue: 1
Philip Goff Ghosts and Sparse Properties: Why Physicalists Have More to Fear from Ghosts than Zombies
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8. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 81 > Issue: 1
Edward Wilson Averill, Allan Hazlett A Problem For Relational Theories of Color
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9. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 81 > Issue: 1
Brad Thompson The Spatial Content of Experience
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10. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 81 > Issue: 1
David Christensen Higher-Order Evidence
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book symposium
11. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 81 > Issue: 1
Stephen Darwall Precis: The Second-Person Standpoint
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12. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 81 > Issue: 1
Tamar Schapiro Desires as Demands: How the Second-Person Standpoint Might Be Internal to Reflective Agency
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13. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 81 > Issue: 1
Michael Smith, Jada Twedt Strabbing Moral Obligation, Accountability, and Second-Personal Reasons
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14. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 81 > Issue: 1
Gideon Yaffe Comment on Stephen Darwall's The Second Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect and Accountability
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15. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 81 > Issue: 1
Stephen Darwall Reply to Schapiro, Smith/Strabbing, and Yaffe
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16. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 81 > Issue: 1
Recent Publications
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