Already a subscriber? - Login here
Not yet a subscriber? - Subscribe here

Browse by:



Displaying: 1-20 of 44 documents


articles
1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 80 > Issue: 3
Allan Hazlett The Myth of Factive Verbs
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
2. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 80 > Issue: 3
Randolph Clarke Skilled Activity and the Causal Theory of Action
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Skilled activity, such as shaving or dancing, differs in important ways from many of the stock examples that are employed by action theorists. Some critics of thecausal theory of action contend that such a view founders on the problem of skilled activity. This paper examines how a causal theory can be extended to thecase of skilled activity and defends the account from its critics.
3. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 80 > Issue: 3
Felipe Leon, Neal A. Tognazzini Why Frankfurt-Examples Don't Need to Succeed to Succeed
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
4. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 80 > Issue: 3
Heidi L. Maibom The Descent of Shame
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Shame is a painful emotion concerned with failure to live up to certain standards, norms, or ideals. The subject feels that she falls in the regard of others; she feels watched and exposed. As a result, she feels bad about the person that she is. The most popular view of shame is that someone only feels ashamed if she fails to live up to standards, norms, or ideals that she, herself, accepts. In this paper, I provide support for a different view, according to which shame is about failure to live up to public expectations. Such a view of shame has difficulties explaining why an audience is central to shame, why shame concerns the self as a whole, and why the social rank of someone affects their ability to shame others. These features, I argue, are best explained by reference to the descent of shame in the emotion connected with submission in nonhuman animals. The function of submission-to appease relevant social others-also throws light on the sort of emotion that shame is. From the point of view of other people, a subject who experiences shame at her own failing is someone who is committed to living together with others in a socially sanctioned way. The argument is not that we must understand the nature of shame in terms of what it evolved for, but that its heritage is important to understanding the emotion that shame has become.
5. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 80 > Issue: 3
Jessica Wilson What is Hume's Dictum, and Why Believe It?
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
6. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 80 > Issue: 3
Jennifer Church Seeing Reasons
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
book symposium
7. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 80 > Issue: 3
Frances Kamm Précis of Indicate Ethics: Rights, Responsiblities and Permissible Harm
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
8. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 80 > Issue: 3
Jeff McMahan Responsibility, Permissibility, and Vicarious Agency
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
9. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 80 > Issue: 3
Gideon Rosen Kamm on Collaboration
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
10. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 80 > Issue: 3
Thomas Scanlon Some Intricacies
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
11. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 80 > Issue: 3
Frances Kamm Substitution, Subordination, and Responsibility: Response to Scanlon, McMahan, and Rosen
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
critical notice
12. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 80 > Issue: 3
Jane Heal Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology and Neuroscience of Mindreading
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
13. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 80 > Issue: 3
Recent Publications
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
articles
14. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 80 > Issue: 2
Masahiro Yamada Rule Following: A Pedestrian Approach
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
15. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 80 > Issue: 2
John Turri On the Relationship between Propositional and Doxastic Justification
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
I argue against the orthodox view of the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification. The view under criticism is: if p is propositionally justifiedfor S in virtue of S's having reason(s) R, and S believes p on the basis of R, then S's belief that p is doxastically justified. I then propose and evaluate alternativeaccounts of the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification, and conclude that we should explain propositional justification in terms of doxastic justification. If correct, this proposal would constitute a significant advance in our understanding of the sources of epistemic justification.
16. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 80 > Issue: 2
Joseph Shieber Between Autonomy and Authority: Kant on the Epistemic Status of Testimony
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
17. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 80 > Issue: 2
Seth Shabo Uncompromising Source Incompatibilism
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
18. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 80 > Issue: 2
A.D. Smith Disjunctivism and Illusion
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
19. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 80 > Issue: 2
Leon Horsten Impredicative Identity Criteria
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In this paper, a general perspective on criteria of identity of kinds of objects is developed. The question of the admissibility of impredicative or circular identitycriteria is investigated in the light of the view that is articulated. It is argued that in and of itself impredicativity docs not constitute sufficient grounds for rejecting aputative identity criterion. The view that is presented is applied to Davidson's criterion of identity for events and to the structuralist criterion of identity of placesin a structure.
20. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 80 > Issue: 2
Carl Ginet, David Palmer On Mele and Robb's Indeterministic Frankfurt-Style Case
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Alfred Mele and David Robb (1998, 2003) offer what they claim is a counter-example to the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP), the principle that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. In their example, a person makes a decision by his own indeterministic causal process though antecedent circumstances ensure he could not have done otherwise. Specifically, a simultaneously occurring process in him would deterministically cause the decision at the precise time it actually occurs if he were not to make it 'on his own' i.e. without being deterministically caused.Their case is designed to avoid a well-known dilemma that has plagued earlier apparent counterexamples of this sort. We argue, however, that Mele andRobb's example does not have all the features necessary in order for it to undermine PAP. It still fails to avoid the original dilemma.