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1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 80 > Issue: 3
Allan Hazlett The Myth of Factive Verbs
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2. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 80 > Issue: 3
Randolph Clarke Skilled Activity and the Causal Theory of Action
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Skilled activity, such as shaving or dancing, differs in important ways from many of the stock examples that are employed by action theorists. Some critics of thecausal theory of action contend that such a view founders on the problem of skilled activity. This paper examines how a causal theory can be extended to thecase of skilled activity and defends the account from its critics.
3. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 80 > Issue: 3
Felipe Leon, Neal A. Tognazzini Why Frankfurt-Examples Don't Need to Succeed to Succeed
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4. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 80 > Issue: 3
Heidi L. Maibom The Descent of Shame
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Shame is a painful emotion concerned with failure to live up to certain standards, norms, or ideals. The subject feels that she falls in the regard of others; she feels watched and exposed. As a result, she feels bad about the person that she is. The most popular view of shame is that someone only feels ashamed if she fails to live up to standards, norms, or ideals that she, herself, accepts. In this paper, I provide support for a different view, according to which shame is about failure to live up to public expectations. Such a view of shame has difficulties explaining why an audience is central to shame, why shame concerns the self as a whole, and why the social rank of someone affects their ability to shame others. These features, I argue, are best explained by reference to the descent of shame in the emotion connected with submission in nonhuman animals. The function of submission-to appease relevant social others-also throws light on the sort of emotion that shame is. From the point of view of other people, a subject who experiences shame at her own failing is someone who is committed to living together with others in a socially sanctioned way. The argument is not that we must understand the nature of shame in terms of what it evolved for, but that its heritage is important to understanding the emotion that shame has become.
5. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 80 > Issue: 3
Jessica Wilson What is Hume's Dictum, and Why Believe It?
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6. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 80 > Issue: 3
Jennifer Church Seeing Reasons
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book symposium
7. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 80 > Issue: 3
Frances Kamm Précis of Indicate Ethics: Rights, Responsiblities and Permissible Harm
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8. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 80 > Issue: 3
Jeff McMahan Responsibility, Permissibility, and Vicarious Agency
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9. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 80 > Issue: 3
Gideon Rosen Kamm on Collaboration
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10. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 80 > Issue: 3
Thomas Scanlon Some Intricacies
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11. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 80 > Issue: 3
Frances Kamm Substitution, Subordination, and Responsibility: Response to Scanlon, McMahan, and Rosen
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critical notice
12. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 80 > Issue: 3
Jane Heal Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology and Neuroscience of Mindreading
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13. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 80 > Issue: 3
Recent Publications
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