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1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 80 > Issue: 2
Masahiro Yamada Rule Following: A Pedestrian Approach
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2. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 80 > Issue: 2
John Turri On the Relationship between Propositional and Doxastic Justification
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I argue against the orthodox view of the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification. The view under criticism is: if p is propositionally justifiedfor S in virtue of S's having reason(s) R, and S believes p on the basis of R, then S's belief that p is doxastically justified. I then propose and evaluate alternativeaccounts of the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification, and conclude that we should explain propositional justification in terms of doxastic justification. If correct, this proposal would constitute a significant advance in our understanding of the sources of epistemic justification.
3. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 80 > Issue: 2
Joseph Shieber Between Autonomy and Authority: Kant on the Epistemic Status of Testimony
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4. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 80 > Issue: 2
Seth Shabo Uncompromising Source Incompatibilism
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5. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 80 > Issue: 2
A.D. Smith Disjunctivism and Illusion
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6. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 80 > Issue: 2
Leon Horsten Impredicative Identity Criteria
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In this paper, a general perspective on criteria of identity of kinds of objects is developed. The question of the admissibility of impredicative or circular identitycriteria is investigated in the light of the view that is articulated. It is argued that in and of itself impredicativity docs not constitute sufficient grounds for rejecting aputative identity criterion. The view that is presented is applied to Davidson's criterion of identity for events and to the structuralist criterion of identity of placesin a structure.
7. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 80 > Issue: 2
Carl Ginet, David Palmer On Mele and Robb's Indeterministic Frankfurt-Style Case
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Alfred Mele and David Robb (1998, 2003) offer what they claim is a counter-example to the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP), the principle that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. In their example, a person makes a decision by his own indeterministic causal process though antecedent circumstances ensure he could not have done otherwise. Specifically, a simultaneously occurring process in him would deterministically cause the decision at the precise time it actually occurs if he were not to make it 'on his own' i.e. without being deterministically caused.Their case is designed to avoid a well-known dilemma that has plagued earlier apparent counterexamples of this sort. We argue, however, that Mele andRobb's example does not have all the features necessary in order for it to undermine PAP. It still fails to avoid the original dilemma.
8. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 80 > Issue: 2
Juan Comesaña, Holly Kantin Is Evidence Knowledge?
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book symposium
9. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 80 > Issue: 2
Peter Unger Précis of All the Power in the World
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10. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 80 > Issue: 2
James Van Cleve Matter, Space and Quality: Reflections on Unger's All the Power in the World
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11. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 80 > Issue: 2
Peter Unger Reply to James Van Cleve
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12. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 80 > Issue: 2
Stephen Mumford No Power in Unger's World
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13. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 80 > Issue: 2
Peter Unger Reply to Stephen Mumford
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critical notice
14. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 80 > Issue: 2
William E. Mann Evidence and Faith: Philosophy and Religion since the Seventeenth Century
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15. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 80 > Issue: 2
Recent Publications
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