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Displaying: 1-12 of 12 documents


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1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 70 > Issue: 1
Michael Della Rocca Descartes, the Cartesian Circle, and Epistemology Without God
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This paper defends an interpretation of Descartes according to which he sees us as having normative (and not merely psychological) certainty of all clear and distinct ideas during the period in which they are apprehended clearly and distinctly. However, on this view, a retrospective doubt about clear and distinct ideas is possible. This interpretation allows Descartes to avoid the Cartesian Circle in an effective way and also shows that Descartes is surprisingly, in some respects, an epistemological externalist. The paper goes on to defend this interpretation against some powerful philosophical objections by Margaret WiIson and others by showing how Descartes’ doctrine of the creation of the eternal truths can be brought in to support his epistemology. This doctrine and other analogous positions in Descartes can also reveal that Descartes, again surprisingly, takes important steps toward doing epistemology without direct appeal to God and God’s veracity.
2. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 70 > Issue: 1
Michael Ridge Universalizability for Collective Rational Agents: A Critique of Agent-relativism
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This paper contends that a Kantian universalizability constraint on theories of practical reason in conjunction with the possibility of collective rational agents entails the surprisingly strong conclusion that no fully agent-relative theory of practical reason can be sound. The basic point is that a Kantian universalizability constraint, the thesis that all reasons for action are agent-relative and the possibility of collective rational agents gives rise to a contradiction. This contradiction can be avoided by either rejecting Kantian universalizability, the possibility of collective rational agents, or the tenability of a fully agent-relative theory of practical reason; we cannot have all three.
3. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 70 > Issue: 1
Eli Hirsch Physical-Object Ontology, Verbal Disputes, and Common Sense
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Two main claims are defended in this paper: first, that typical disputes in the literature about the ontology of physical objects are merely verbal; second, that the proper way to resolve these disputes is by appealing to common sense or ordinary language. A verbal dispute is characterized not in terms of private idiolects, but in terms of different linguistic communities representing different positions. If we imagine a community that makes Chisholm’s mereological essentialist assertions, and another community that makes Lewis’s four-dimensionalist assertions, the members of each community speak the truth in their respective languages. This follows from an application of the principle of interpretive charity to the two communities.
4. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 70 > Issue: 1
Erik J. Olsson Not Giving the Skeptic a Hearing: Pragmatism and Radical Doubt Lund University, Sweden
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Pragmatist responses to radical skepticism do not receive much attention In contemporary analytic epistemology. This observation is my motivation for undertaking a search for a coherent pragmatist reply to radical doubt, one that can compete, in terms of clarity and sophistication, with the currently most popular approaches, such as contextualism and relevant alternatives theory. As my point of departure I take the texts of C. S. Peirce and William James. The Jamesian response is seen to consist in the application of a wager argument to the skeptical issue in analogy with Pascal’s wager. The Peircean strategy, on the other hand, is to attempt a direct rejection of one of the skeptic’s main premises: that we do not know we are not deceived. I argue that while the Jamesian attempt is ultimately incoherent, Peirce’s argument contains the core of a detailed and characteristically “pragmatic” rebuttal of skepticism, one that deserves to be taken seriously in the contemporary debate.
5. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 70 > Issue: 1
Fiona MacPherson Colour Inversion Problems for Representationalism
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In this paper I examine whether representationalism can account for various thought experiments about colour inversions. Representationalism is, at minimum, the view that, necessarily, if two experiences have the same representational content then they have the same phenomenal character. I argue that representationalism ought to be rejected if one holds externalist views about experiential content and one holds traditional externalist views about the nature of the content of propositional attitudes. Thus, colour inversion scenarios are more damaging to externalist representationalist views than have been previously thought. More specifically, I argue that representationalists who endorse externalism about experiential content either have to become internalists about the content of propositional attitudes or they have to adopt a novel variety of externalism about the content of propositional attitudes. This novel type of propositional attitude externalism is investigated. It can be seen that adopting it forces one to reject Putnam’s and Burge’s externalist considerations about the nature of the propositional attitudes.
6. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 70 > Issue: 1
Richard Tieszen Free Variation and the Intuition of Geometric Essences: Some Reflections on Phenomenology and Modern Geometry
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Edmund Husserl has argued that we can intuit essences and, moreover, that it is possible to formulate a method for intuiting essences. Husserl calls this method ‘ideation’. In this paper I bring a fresh perspective to bear on these claims by illustrating them in connection with some examples from modern pure geometry. I follow Husserl in describing geometric essences as in variants through different types of free variations and I then link this to the mapping out of geometric invariants in modern mathematics. This view leads naturally to different types of spatial ontologies and it can be used to shed light on Husserl’s general claim that there are different ontologies in the eidetic sciences that can be systematically related to one another. The paper is rounded out with a consideration of the role of ideation in the origins of modern geometry, and with a brief discussion of the use of ideation outside of pure geometry.
7. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 70 > Issue: 1
Jim Stone Why There Still Are No People
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This paper argues that there are no people. If identity isn’t what matters in survival, psychological connectedness isn’t what matters either. Further, fissioning cases do not support the claim that connectedness is what matters. I consider Peter Unger’s view that what matters is a continuous physical realization of a core psychology. I conclude that if identity isn’t what matters in survival, nothing matters. This conclusion is deployed to argue that there are no people. Objections to Eliminativism are considered, especially that morality cannot survive the loss of persons.
8. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 70 > Issue: 1
Don Loeb Moral Explanations of Moral Beliefs
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Gilbert Harman and Judith Thomson have argued that moral facts cannot explain our moral beliefs, claiming that such facts could not play a causal role in the formation of those beliefs. This paper shows these arguments to be misguided, for they would require that we abandon any number of intuitively plausible explanations in non-moral contexts as well. But abandoning the causal strand in the argument over moral explanations does not spell immediate victory for the moral realist, since it must still be shown that moral facts do figure in our best global explanatory theory.
9. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 70 > Issue: 1
Gary Rosenkrantz An Epistemic Argument for Enduring Human Persons
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A typical human person has privileged epistemic access to its identity over time in virtue of having a first-person point of view. In explaining this phenomenon in terms of an intimate relation of self-attribution or the like, I infer that a typical human person has direct consciousness of itself through inner awareness or personal memory. Direct consciousness of oneself is consciousness of oneself, but not by consciousness of something else. Yet, a perduring human person, Sp, i.e., a human person with temporal parts, is identical with the complete series of its temporal parts. I argue that because Sp is diverse from any incomplete series of its temporal parts, and because Sp cannot be conscious of all of its temporal parts through inner awareness or personal memory. Sp cannot have direct consciousness of itself. I conclude that a human person endures, i.e., wholly exists at each of the times it exists.
10. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 70 > Issue: 1
Stephen Maitzen Anselmian Atheism
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On the basis of Chapter 15 of Anselm’s Proslogion, I develop an argument that confronts theology with a trilemrna: atheism, utter mysticism, or radical anti-Anselmianism. The argument establishes a disjunction of claims that Anselmians in particular, but not only they, will find disturbing: (a) God does not exist, (b) no human being can have even the slightest conception of God, or (c) the Anselmian requirement of maximal greatness in God is wrong. My own view, for which I argue briefly, is that (b) is false on any correct reading of what conceiving of requires and that (c) is false on any correct reading of the concept of God. Thus, my own view is that the argument establishes atheism. In any case, one consequence of the argument is that Anselmian theology is possible for human beings only if it lacks a genuine object of study.
11. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 70 > Issue: 1
David H. Sanford Difficulties for the Reconciling and Estranging Projects: Some Symmetries
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Suppose that Susan did not go to the movies. The reconciling project attempts to show that this plus Determinism does not imply that Susan could not have gone to the movies. The estranging project attempts to show the opposite. A counter-entailment argument is of the form A is consistent with C, and C entails not-B, therefore A does not entail B. An instance of the counter-entailment arguments undermines a central argument for the reconciling project. Another instance undermines a central argument for the estranging project. This is one symmetry. In each case, the natural response to the counter-entailment argument begs the question. This is another symmetry.
critical notice
12. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 70 > Issue: 1
Bonnie Kent Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation
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