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1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 69 > Issue: 3
R. Lanier Anderson It Adds Up After All: Kant’s Philosophy of Arithmetic in Light of the Traditional Logic
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Officially, for Kant, judgments are analytic iff the predicate is “contained in” the subject. I defend the containment definition against the common charge of obscurity, and argue that arithmetic cannot be analytic, in the resulting sense. My account deploys two traditional logical notions: logical division and concept hierarchies. Division separates a genus concept into exclusive, exhaustive species. Repeated divisions generate a hierarchy, in which lower species are derived from their genus, by adding differentia(e). Hierarchies afford a straightforward sense of containment: genera are contained in the species formed from them. Kant’s thesis then amounts to the claim that no concept hierarchy conforming to division rules can express truths like ‘7+5= 12.’ Kant is correct. Operation concepts (<7+5>) bear two relations to number concepts: <7> and <5> are inputs, <12> is output. To capture both relations, hierarchies must posit overlaps between concepts that violate the exclusion rule. Thus, such truths are synthetic.
2. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 69 > Issue: 3
Michael Glanzberg Quantification and Realism
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This paper argues for the thesis that, roughly put, it is impossible to talk about absolutely everything. To put the thesis more precisely, there is a particular sense in which, as a matter of semantics, quantifiers always range over domains that are in principle extensible, and so cannot count as really being ‘absolutely everything’. The paper presents an argument for this thesis, and considers some important objections to the argument and to the formulation of the thesis. The paper also offers an assessment of just how implausible the thesis really is. It argues that the intuitions against the thesis come down to a few special cases, which can be given special treatment. Finally, the paper considers some metaphysical ideas that might surround the thesis. Particularly, it might be maintained that an important variety of realism is incompatible with the thesis. The paper argues that this is not the case.
3. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 69 > Issue: 3
Raphael Woolf A Shaggy Soul Story: How not to Read the Wax Tablet Model in Plato’s Theaetetus
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This paper sets out to re-examine the famous Wax Tablet model in Plato’s Theaetetus, in particular the section of it which appeals to the quality of individual souls’ wax as an explanation of why some are more liable to make mistakes than others (194c-195a). This section has often been regarded as an ornamental flourish or a humorous appendage to the model’s main explanatory business. Yet in their own appropriations both Aristotle and Locke treat the notion of variable wax quality as an important part of the model’s utility in dealing with mistake. What, then, is its status for Plato? I shall argue that the section on variable wax quality is there to suggest to the reader a tempting way of misinterpreting the model. This will highlight the distinctive character of the model in its original version, and provide an unusual example of a philosopher describing how not to read one of his own doctrines.
4. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 69 > Issue: 3
Sven Bernecker Memory and Externalism
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Content externalism about memory says that the individuation of memory contents depends on relations the subject bears to his past environment. I defend externalism about memory by arguing that neither philosophical nor psychological considerations stand in the way of accepting the context dependency of memory that follows from externalism.
5. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 69 > Issue: 3
François Schroeter Endorsement and Autonomous Agency
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We take self-governance or autonomy to be a central feature of human agency: we believe that our actions normally occur under our guidance and at our command. A common criticism of the standard theory of action is that it leaves the agent out of his actions and thus mischaracterizes our autonomy. According to proponents of the endorsement model of autonomy, such as Harry Frankfurt and David Velleman, the standard theory simply needs to be supplemented with the agent’s actual endorsement of his actions in order to make room for our autonomy. I argue that their proposal fails and that a more substanti ve enrichment of the standard theory is called for.
6. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 69 > Issue: 3
John Divers Agnosticism About Other Worlds: A New Antirealist Programme in Modality
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The modal antirealist, as presented here, aims to secure at least some of the benefits associated with talking in genuine modal realist terms while avoiding commitment to a plurality of Lewisian (or ersatz) worlds. The antirealist stance of agnosticism about other worlds combines acceptance of Lewis’s account of what world-talk means with refusal to assert, or believe in, the existence of other worlds. Agnosticism about other worlds does not entail a comprehensive agnosticism about modality, but where such agnosticism about modality is enforced, the aim of the agnostic programme is to show that it is not detrimental to our modal practices. The agnostic programme consists in an attempt to demonstrate the rational dispensability of that disputed class of modal beliefs which the agnostic eschews, but which are held by the realist and the folk. Here I attempt to motivate, describe, and illustrate such an agnostic antirealist programme in modal philosophy.
7. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 69 > Issue: 3
David S. Oderberg Temporal Parts and the Possibility of Change
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8. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 69 > Issue: 3
Michael Bergmann Epistemic Circularity: Malignant and Benign
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review essay
9. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 69 > Issue: 3
Eric Watkins Autonomy and Idealism in and after Kant
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recent publications
10. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 69 > Issue: 3
Recent Publications
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11. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 69 > Issue: 2
James Levine On the “Gray’s Elegy” Argument and its Bearing on Frege’s Theory of Sense
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In his recent book, The Metaphysicians of Meaning (2000), Gideon Makin argues that in the so-called “Gray’s Elegy” argument (the GEA) in “On Denoting”, Russell provides decisive arguments against not only his own theory of denoting concepts but also Frege’s theory of sense. I argue that by failing to recognize fundamental differences between the two theories, Makin fails to recognize that the GEA has less force against Frege’s theory than against Russell’s own earlier theory. While I agree with many aspects of Makin’s interpretation of the GEA, I differ with him regarding some significant details and present an interpretation according to which the GEA emerges as simpler, stronger, and more integrated.
12. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 69 > Issue: 2
Robert Stern Coherence as a Test for Truth
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This paper sets out to demonstrate that a contrast can be drawn between coherentism as an account of the structure of justification, and coherentism as a method of inquiry. Whereas the former position aims to offer an answer to the ‘regress of justification’ problem, the latter position claims that coherence plays a vital and indispensable role as a criterion of truth, given the fallibility of cognitive methods such as perception and memory. It is argued that ‘early’ coherentists like Bradley and Blanshard were coherentists of the latter kind, and that this sort of coherentism is not open to certain sorts of standard objection that can be raised against justificatory coherentism.
13. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 69 > Issue: 2
Dominic Gregory Imagining Possibilities
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This paper argues that the imaginability of propositions of a certain kind under certain special circumstances implies their possibility. It then attempts to use that conclusion in doing some modal epistemology. In particular, the paper argues that the conclusion justifies some ascriptions of possibility and that it promises to justify some ascriptions of impossibility.
14. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 69 > Issue: 2
Laurence Bonjour In Search of Direct Realism
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15. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 69 > Issue: 2
Peter B. M. Vranas Have Your Cake and Eat It Too: The Old Principal Principle Reconciled with the New
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David Lewis (1980) proposed the Principal Principle (PP) and a “reformulation” which later on he called ‘OP’ (Old Principle). Reacting to his belief that these principles run into trouble, Lewis (1994) concluded that they should be replaced with the New Principle (NP). This conclusion left Lewis uneasy, because he thought that an inverse form of NP is “quite messy”, whereas an inverse form of OP, namely the simple and intuitive PP, is “the key to our concept of chance”. I argue that, even if OP should be discarded, FP need not be. Moreover, far from being messy, an inverse form of NP is a simple and intuitive Conditional Principle (CP). Finally, both PP and CP are special cases of a General Principle (GP): it follows that so are PP and NP, which are thus compatible rather than competing.
16. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 69 > Issue: 2
Adam Elga Defeating Dr. Evil with Self-Locating Belief
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Dr. Evil learns that a duplicate of Dr. Evil has been created. Upon learning this, how seriously should he take the hypothesis that he himself is that duplicate? I answer: very seriously. I defend a principle of indifference for self-locating belief which entails that after Dr. Evil learns that a duplicate has been created, he ought to have exactly the same degree of belief that he is Dr. Evil as that he is the duplicate. More generally, the principle shows that there is a sharp distinction between ordinary skeptical hypotheses, and self-locating skeptical hypotheses.
17. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 69 > Issue: 2
Michael Levin Virtue Epistemology: No New Cures
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One version of virtue epistemology defines knowledge as belief whose truth arises from, or is explained by, the motives that produced it. This version is also intended to solve the Gettier problem, by shielding properly caused beliefs from double accidents. Unfortunately, there is no notion of “explains” or “arises from” which explains in the intended sense the truth of true beliefs.
18. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 69 > Issue: 2
Richard Double The Ethical Advantages of Free Will Subjectivism
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Adopting meta-level Free Will Subjectivism is one among several ways to maintain that persons never experience moral freedom in their choices. The other ways of arguing against moral freedom I consider are presented by Saul Smilansky, Ted Honderich, Bruce Waller, Galen Strawson, and Derk Pereboom. In this paper, without arguing for the acceptance of free will subjectivism, I argue that subjectivism has some moral and theoretical advantages over its kindred theories.
book symposium:
19. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 69 > Issue: 2
Richard Moran Précis of Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge
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20. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 69 > Issue: 2
Jane Heal Moran’s Authority and Estrangement
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