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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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James Levine
On the “Gray’s Elegy” Argument and its Bearing on Frege’s Theory of Sense
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In his recent book, The Metaphysicians of Meaning (2000), Gideon Makin argues that in the so-called “Gray’s Elegy” argument (the GEA) in “On Denoting”, Russell provides decisive arguments against not only his own theory of denoting concepts but also Frege’s theory of sense. I argue that by failing to recognize fundamental differences between the two theories, Makin fails to recognize that the GEA has less force against Frege’s theory than against Russell’s own earlier theory. While I agree with many aspects of Makin’s interpretation of the GEA, I differ with him regarding some significant details and present an interpretation according to which the GEA emerges as simpler, stronger, and more integrated.
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Robert Stern
Coherence as a Test for Truth
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This paper sets out to demonstrate that a contrast can be drawn between coherentism as an account of the structure of justification, and coherentism as a method of inquiry. Whereas the former position aims to offer an answer to the ‘regress of justification’ problem, the latter position claims that coherence plays a vital and indispensable role as a criterion of truth, given the fallibility of cognitive methods such as perception and memory. It is argued that ‘early’ coherentists like Bradley and Blanshard were coherentists of the latter kind, and that this sort of coherentism is not open to certain sorts of standard objection that can be raised against justificatory coherentism.
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Dominic Gregory
Imagining Possibilities
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This paper argues that the imaginability of propositions of a certain kind under certain special circumstances implies their possibility. It then attempts to use that conclusion in doing some modal epistemology. In particular, the paper argues that the conclusion justifies some ascriptions of possibility and that it promises to justify some ascriptions of impossibility.
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Laurence Bonjour
In Search of Direct Realism
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Peter B. M. Vranas
Have Your Cake and Eat It Too:
The Old Principal Principle Reconciled with the New
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David Lewis (1980) proposed the Principal Principle (PP) and a “reformulation” which later on he called ‘OP’ (Old Principle). Reacting to his belief that these principles run into trouble, Lewis (1994) concluded that they should be replaced with the New Principle (NP). This conclusion left Lewis uneasy, because he thought that an inverse form of NP is “quite messy”, whereas an inverse form of OP, namely the simple and intuitive PP, is “the key to our concept of chance”. I argue that, even if OP should be discarded, FP need not be. Moreover, far from being messy, an inverse form of NP is a simple and intuitive Conditional Principle (CP). Finally, both PP and CP are special cases of a General Principle (GP): it follows that so are PP and NP, which are thus compatible rather than competing.
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Adam Elga
Defeating Dr. Evil with Self-Locating Belief
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Dr. Evil learns that a duplicate of Dr. Evil has been created. Upon learning this, how seriously should he take the hypothesis that he himself is that duplicate? I answer: very seriously. I defend a principle of indifference for self-locating belief which entails that after Dr. Evil learns that a duplicate has been created, he ought to have exactly the same degree of belief that he is Dr. Evil as that he is the duplicate. More generally, the principle shows that there is a sharp distinction between ordinary skeptical hypotheses, and self-locating skeptical hypotheses.
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Michael Levin
Virtue Epistemology:
No New Cures
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One version of virtue epistemology defines knowledge as belief whose truth arises from, or is explained by, the motives that produced it. This version is also intended to solve the Gettier problem, by shielding properly caused beliefs from double accidents. Unfortunately, there is no notion of “explains” or “arises from” which explains in the intended sense the truth of true beliefs.
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Richard Double
The Ethical Advantages of Free Will Subjectivism
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Adopting meta-level Free Will Subjectivism is one among several ways to maintain that persons never experience moral freedom in their choices. The other ways of arguing against moral freedom I consider are presented by Saul Smilansky, Ted Honderich, Bruce Waller, Galen Strawson, and Derk Pereboom. In this paper, without arguing for the acceptance of free will subjectivism, I argue that subjectivism has some moral and theoretical advantages over its kindred theories.
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Richard Moran
Précis of Authority and Estrangement:
An Essay on Self-Knowledge
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Jane Heal
Moran’s Authority and Estrangement
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Bernard Reginster
Self-Knowledge, Responsibility, and the Third Person
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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George M. Wilson
Comments on Authority and Estrangement
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Jonathan Lear
Avowal and Unfreedom
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Richard Moran
Replies to Heal, Reginster, Wilson, and Lear
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review essays |
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Daniel C. Dennett
Commentary on John Dupré’s Human Nature and the Limits of Science
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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David Braun
Consciousness and Cognition
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critical notices |
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Ben Bradley
The Nature of Intrinsic Value
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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G. F. Schueler
Doing Things for Reasons
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