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1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 62 > Issue: 2
Daniel Stoljar Two Conceptions of the Physical
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The debate over physicalism in philosophy of mind can be seen as concerning an inconsistent tetrad of theses: (1) if physicalism is true, a priori physicalism is true; (2) a priori physicalism is false; (3) if physicalism is false, epiphenomenalism is true; (4) epiphenomenalism is false. This paper argues that one may resolve the debate by distinguishing two conceptions of the physical: on the theory-based conception, it is plausible that (2) is true and (3) is false; on the object-based conception, it is plausible that (3) is true and (2) is false. The paper also defends and explores the version of physicalism that results from this strategy.
2. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 62 > Issue: 2
A. D. Smith Perception and Belief
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An attempt is made to pinpoint the way in which perception is related to belief. Although, for familiar reasons, it is not true to say that we necessarily believe in the existence of the objects we perceive, nor that they actually have their ostensible characteristics, it is argued that the relation between perception and belief is more than merely contingent.There are two main issues to address. The first is that ‘collateral’ beliefs may impede perceptual belief. It is argued that this still assigns an essential role to belief in perception, though the belief may be of an attenuated form. The second is Fred Dretske’s claim that even attenuated belief may be entirely absent from perception. It is argued that (a) ‘non-epistemic’ perception can be understood only by employing the concept of ‘epistemic’ perception; (b) that the former can occur only partially---i.e., within perceptions that are otherwise epistemic; and (c) that by switching attention from the perception of objects to the Phenomenological tradition’s concern with the perception of world, we can see that perception must be entirely permeated with ‘doxastic’ force.
3. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 62 > Issue: 2
Dorit Bar-On, Douglas C. Long Avowals and First-Person Privilege
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When people avow their present feelings, sensations, thoughts, etc., they enjoy what may be called “first-person privilege.” If I now said: “I have a headache,” or “I’m thinking about Venice,” I would be taken at my word: I would normally not be challenged. According to one prominent approach, this privilege is due to a special epistemic access we have to our own present states of mind. On an alternative, deflationary approach the privilege merely reflects a socio-linguistic convention governing avowals. We reject both approaches. On our proposed account, a full explanation of the privilege must recognize avowals as expressive performances, which can be taken to reveal directly the subject’s present mental condition. We are able to improve on special access accounts and deflationary accounts, as well as familiar expressive accounts, by explaining both the asymmetries and the continuities between avowals and other pronouncements, and by locating a genuine though non-epistemic source for first-person privilege.
4. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 62 > Issue: 2
Ken Gemes Postmodernism’s Use and Abuse of Nietzsche
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I focus on Nietzsche’s architectural metaphor of self-construction in arguing for the claim that postmodern readings of Nietzsche misunderstand his various attacks on dogmatic philosophy as paving the way for acceptance of a self characterized by fundamental disunity. Nietzsche’s attack on essentialist dogmatic metaphysics is a call to engage in a purposive self-creation under a unifying will, a will that possesses the strength to reinterpret history as a pathway to “the problem that we are”. Nietzsche agrees with the postmodernists that unity is not a pre-given, however he would disavow their rejection of unity as a goal. Where the postmodernists celebrate “the death of the subject” Nietzsche rejects this valorization of disunity as a form of Nihilism and prescribes the creation of a genuine unified subjectivity to those few capable of such a goal. Post modernists are nearer Nietzsche’s idea of the Last Man than his idea of the Overman.
5. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 62 > Issue: 2
Jordan Howard Sobel Blackburn’s Problem: On Its Not Insignificant Residue
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Moral properties would supervene upon non-moral properties and be conceptually autonomous. That, according to Simon Blackburn, would make them if not impossible at least mysterious, and evidence for them best explained by theorists who say they are not real. In fact moral properties would not challenge in ways Blackburn has contended. There is, however, something new that can be gathered from his arguments. What would the supervenience of moral properties and their conceptual autonomy from at least total non-moral properties entail not only for Intuitionists, who ‘knew this all along,’ but for all moral realists, that there are synthetic necessary moral principles? There is for all moral realists the problem of explaining ‘what in the world’ makes possible these necessities.
6. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 62 > Issue: 2
Bredo C. Johnsen Contextualist Swords, Skeptical Plowshares
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discussion
7. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 62 > Issue: 2
Tim Bayne Chalmers on the Justification of Phenomenal Judgments
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We seem to enjoy a very special kind of epistemic relation to our own conscious states. In The Conscious Mind (TCM). David Chalmers argues that our phenomenal judgments are fully-justified or certain because we are acquainted with the phenomenal states that are the objects of such judgments. Chalmers holds that the acquaintance account of phenomenal justification is superior to reliabilist accounts of how it is that our PIs are justified. because it alone can underwrite the certainty of our phenomenal judgments. I argue that Chalmers is unable to sustain this claim.
book symposium:
8. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 62 > Issue: 2
Bernard Gert Précis of Morality: Its Nature and Justification
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9. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 62 > Issue: 2
Kurt Baier Justified Morality
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10. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 62 > Issue: 2
Dan W. Brock Gert on the Limits of Morality’s Requirements
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11. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 62 > Issue: 2
Thomas L. Carson Gert on Rationality, Intrinsic Value, and the Overridingness of Morality
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12. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 62 > Issue: 2
Ruth Chang Two Conceptions of Reasons for Action
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13. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 62 > Issue: 2
David Copp Against Internalism About Reasons—Gert’s Rational Options
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14. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 62 > Issue: 2
Bernard Gert Replies
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critical notices
15. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 62 > Issue: 2
Ramon M. Lemos The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy
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16. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 62 > Issue: 2
David Gauthier Trust within Reason
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17. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 62 > Issue: 2
Rex Martin Real History: Reflections on Historical Practice
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18. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 62 > Issue: 2
Andrew D. Cling Harmless Naturalism: The Limits of Science and the Nature of Philosophy
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