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1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 62 > Issue: 1
Gopal Sreenivasan Understanding Alien Morals
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Anthropologists often claim to have understood an ethical outlook that they nevertheless believe is largely false. Some moral philosophers---e.g., Susan Hurley---argue that this claim is incoherent because understanding an ethical outlook necessarily involves believing it to be largely true. To reach this conclusion, they apply an argument of Donald Davidson’s to the ethical case. My central aim is to defend the coherence of the anthropologists’ claim against this argument.To begin with, I specify a candidate-language that contains a significant number of alien thick descriptions. A thick description is a term that has both descriptive and evaluative content, e.g., “courageous.” I then argue that, because of its alien thick descriptions, this candidate-language cannot be interpreted by someone who adheres to the strictures of Davidson’s account of interpretation. To complete my criticism, I demonstrate that the meaningfulness of this candidate-language cannot be impugned on Davidson’s own terms. This involves showing that an interpreter’s correctly assigning truth-conditions, expressed in her own language, to sentences featuring alien thick descriptions is consistent with her believing those sentences to be false.
2. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 62 > Issue: 1
Claudio De Almeida What Moore’s Paradox Is About
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On the basis of arguments showing that none of the most influential analyses of Moore’s paradox yields a successful resolution of the problem, a new analysis of it is offered. It is argued that, in attempting to render verdicts of either inconsistency or self-contradiction or self-refutation, those analyses have all failed to satisfactorily explain why a Moore-paradoxical proposition is such that it cannot be rationally believed. According to the proposed solution put forward here, a Moore-paradoxical proposition is one for which the believer can have no non-overridden evidence. The arguments for this claim make use of some of Peter Klein’s views on epistemic defeasibility. It is further suggested that this proposal may have important meta-epistemological implications.
3. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 62 > Issue: 1
David Braddon-Mitchell, Caroline West Temporal Phase Pluralism
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Some theories of personal identity allow some variation in what it takes for a person to survive from context to context; and sometimes this is determined by the desires of person-stages or the practices of communities.This leads to problems for decision making in contexts where what is chosen will affect personal identity.‘Temporal Phase Pluralism’ solves such problems by allowing that there can be a plurality of persons constituted by a sequence of person stages. This illuminates difficult decision making problems when persons have to choose between different life-altering choices.
4. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 62 > Issue: 1
Amy Kind Putting the Image Back in Imagination
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Despite their intuitive appeal and a long philosophical history, imagery-based accounts of the imagination have fallen into disfavor in contemporary discussions. The philosophical pressure to reject such accounts seems to derive from two distinct sources. First, the fact that mental images have proved difficult to accommodate within a scientific conception of mind has led to numerous attempts to explain away their existence, and this in turn has led to attempts to explain the phenomenon of imagining without reference to such ontologically dubious entities as mental images. Second, even those philosophers who accept mental images in their ontology have worried about what seem to be fairly obvious examples of imaginings that occur without imagery. In this paper, I aim to relieve both these points of philosophical pressure and, in the process, develop a new imagery-based account of the imagination: the imagery model.
5. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 62 > Issue: 1
Crawford L. Elder Mental Causation versus Physical Causation: No Contest
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Common sense supposes thoughts can cause bodily movements and thereby bring about changes in where the agent is or how his surroundings are. Many philosophers suppose that any such outcome is realized in a complex state of affairs involving only microparticles; that previous microphysical developments were sufficient to cause that state of affairs; hence that, barring overdetermination, causation by the mental is excluded. This paper argues that the microphysical swarm that realizes the outcome is an accident (Aristotle) or a coincidence (David Owens) and has no cause, though each component movement in it has one. Mental causation faces no competition “from below”.
6. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 62 > Issue: 1
Adolf Grünbaum Does Freudian Theory Resolve “The Paradoxes of Irrationality”?
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This paper consists of two related parts:I. A detailed critique of Donald Davidson’s thesis---in his “The Paradoxes of Irrationality”---that “...any satisfactory [explanatory] view [of irrationality] must embrace some of Freud’s most important theses” (p. 290). I argue that this conclusion is doubly flawed: (i) Davidson’s case for it is logically ill-founded, and (ii) its Freudian plaidoyer is also factually false.II. Relatedly, in the second part, I confute the recent arguments given by Marcia Cavell, Thomas Nagel, et al. to establish that psychoanalytic causal explanations of irrationality are epistemically justified, because they are extensions of the desire-cum-belief pattern of accounting for intentional actions. As a corollary, it becomes clear that these authors have failed to undermine my epistemological strictures on the foundations of psychoanalysis.
7. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 62 > Issue: 1
Trenton Merricks Varieties of Vagueness
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According to one account, vagueness is “metaphysical.” The friend of metaphysical vagueness believes that, for some object and some property, there can be no determinate fact of the matter whether that object exemplifies that property. A second account maintains that vagueness is due only to ignorance. According to the epistemic account, vagueness is explained completely by and is nothing over and above our not knowing some relevant fact or facts. These are the minority views. The dominant position maintains that there is a third possible variety of vagueness, linguistic vagueness. And, it goes on to insist, all vagueness is of this third variety. I shall argue, however, that linguistic vagueness is not a third variety of vagueness. Either it is a species of metaphysical vagueness or a kind of ignorance. And this, I argue, makes trouble for the claim that all vagueness is linguistic.
8. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 62 > Issue: 1
William Lane Craig Wishing It Were Now Some Other Time
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One of the most serious obstacles to accepting a tenseless view of time is the challenge posed by our experience of tense. A particularly striking example of such experience, pointed out by Schlesinger but largely overlooked in the literature, is the wish felt by probably all of us at some time or other that it were now some other time. Such a wish seems evidently rational to hold, and yet on a tenseless theory of time such a wish must be regarded as irrational, since it is logically impossible for the now to be located at some other time, there being no such thing as an objective now or present. In order to accommodate rationally such a belief, most protagonists of tenseless time twist the evident meaning of the wish. Oaklander, for example, misconstrues the wish in terms of my wanting to have different perceptions. Others, like Coburn, admit frankly that such a wish is rational only on a tensed theory of time but mistakenly reject that theory on grounds that at best constitute a defeater of an argument for a tensed view of time, rather than a defeater of the tensed view itself. The argument for a tensed view of time from the experience of tense remains undefeated.
discussions
9. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 62 > Issue: 1
Richard Schantz The Given Regained. Reflections on the Sensuous Content of Experience
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The major part of our beliefs and our knowledge of the world is based on, or grounded in, sensory experience. But, how is it that we can have perceptual beliefs that things are thus and so, and, moreover, be justified in having them? What conditions must experience satisfy to rationally warrant, and not merely to cause, our beliefs? Against the currently very popular contention that experience itself already has to be propositionally and conceptually structured, I will rehabilitate the claim that there is given element in experience which is independent of thought and which is possessed of a distinctive nonpropositional and nonconceptual content. Further, I will argue that this given element is indeed fit to play a significant evidential role in the justification of our beliefs about the world.
10. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 62 > Issue: 1
John McDowell Comment on Richard Schantz, “The Given Regained”
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book symposium:
11. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 62 > Issue: 1
Don Garrett Précis of Cognition and Commitment in Hume’s Philosophy
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12. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 62 > Issue: 1
David Owen Reason and Commitment
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13. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 62 > Issue: 1
Charlotte Brown Is the General Point of View the Moral Point of View?
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14. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 62 > Issue: 1
Don Garrett Replies
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review essays
15. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 62 > Issue: 1
Bernard Reginster The Paradox of Perspectivism
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critical notices
16. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 62 > Issue: 1
Michael Bradie Beyond Evolution: Human Nature and the Limits of Evolutionary Explanation
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17. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 62 > Issue: 1
Eli Hirsch Object and Property
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18. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 62 > Issue: 1
Raymond Martin The Kinds of Things: A Theory of Personal Identity Based on Transcendental Argument
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19. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 62 > Issue: 1
David H. Sanford Causal Asymmetries
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20. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 62 > Issue: 1
D. M. Armstrong Dispositions
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