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1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 61 > Issue: 2
Steven Yalowitz A Dispositional Account of Self-Knowledge
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It is widely thought that dispositional accounts of content cannot adequately provide for two of its essential features: normativity and non-inferentially-based self-knowledge. This paper argues that these criticisms depend upon having wrongly bracketed the presumption of first-person authority. With that presumption in place, dispositional conceptions can account for normativity: conditions of correctness must then be presumed, ceteris paribus, to be successfully grasped in particular cases, and thus to result from semantic-constituting dispositions; error occurs when cetera are not paria. An account of these ceteris paribus conditions is offered. An expressivist epistemology is then developed that accounts for the non-inferential self-ascription of semantic-constituting dispositions. It is argued that simply being the subject of such dispositions accounts for one’s authoritative and direct semantic knowledge. Semantic knowledge consists in knowing how to apply an expression or thought, and such know-how is expressed in semantic self-ascriptions.
2. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 61 > Issue: 2
Mark Kaplan To What Must an Epistemology Be True?
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J. L. Austin famously thought that facts about the circumstances in which it is ordinarily appropriate and reasonable to make (challenge) claims to knowledge have a great bearing on the propriety of a philosophical account of knowledge. His major criticism of the epistemological doctrines about which he wrote was precisely that they lacked fidelity to our ordinary linguistic practices. In The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism, Barry Stroud argues that Austin was misguided: it is one thing for it to be inappropriate under ordinary circumstances to (say) deny that someone knows that P, another thing for it to be true that she knows that P. Thus, to the philosophical enterprise of determining which knowledge attributions are true, Austin’s form of criticism is beside the point. I argue that, attractive though it may be, this response to Austin badly underestimates the force of his sort of criticism.
3. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 61 > Issue: 2
Lorne Falkenstein Reid’s Account of Localization
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This paper contrasts three different positions taken by 18th century British scholars on how sensations, particularly sensations of colour and touch, come to be localized in space: Berkeley’s view (initiated, though not fully executed) that we learn to localize ideas of colour by associating certain purely qualitative features of those ideas with ideas of touch and motion, Hume’s view that visual and tangible impressions are originally disposed in space, and Reid’s view (inspired by Porterfield) that we are innately disposed to refer appearances of colour to the end of a line passing through the centre of the eye and originating from the spot on the back of the retina where the material impression causing that appearance was received. Reid’s reasons for rejecting the Berkeleian and Humean views are examined. It is argued that Reid’s position on visual localization is ultimately driven by his dualistic metaphysical commitments rather than by an empirically grounded investigation of the phenomena of vision. To this extent, his position sits uncomfortably with his own methodological commitments.
4. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 61 > Issue: 2
Brian Ellis Causal Laws and Singular Causation
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In this paper it will be argued that causal laws describe the actions of causal powers. The process which results from such an action is one which belongs to a natural kind, the essence of which is that it is a display of this causal power. Therefore, if anything has a given causal power necessarily, it must be naturally disposed to act in the manner prescribed by the causal law describing the action of this causal power. In the formal expressions of causal laws, the necessity operators occur within the scopes of the universal quantifiers. Hence the necessities must hold of each instance. The causal laws may thus be shown to be concerned with necessary connections between events or circumstances of precisely the sort required for a decent account of singular causation.
5. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 61 > Issue: 2
José Luis Bermúdez Naturalized Sense Data
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This paper examines and defends the view that the immediate objects of visual perception, or what are often called sense data, are parts of the facing surfaces of physical objects-the naturalized sense data (NSD) theory. Occasionally defended in the literature on the philosophy of perception, most famously by G. E. Moore (1918-1919), it has not proved popular and indeed was abandoned by Moore himself. The contemporary situation in the philosophy of perception seems ripe for a revaluation of the NSD theory. however. The NSD theory allows us to accommodate the very real shortcomings in uncritical direct realism without postulating the existence of non-physical sense data in a way that has seemed to many incompatible with any robust form of philosophical naturalism.The argument to establish the NSD theory proceeds in two stages. In §II I argue against the direct realist that we perceive three-dimensional material objects in virtue of perceiving parts of their surfaces. The argument for this conclusion involves clearly distinguishing (in § I) between two notions that have tended to be run together in discussions of perception---namely, immediate perception and direct perception. In §III I argue against the sense-datum theorist that those parts of the surfaces of those objects are not themselves perceived in virtue of the perception of anything else.
6. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 61 > Issue: 2
Ned Markosian What Are Physical Objects?
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The concept of a physical object has figured prominently in the history of philosophy, and is probably more important now than it has ever been before. Yet the question What are physical objects?, i.e., What is the correct analysis of the concept of a physical object?, has received surprisingly little attention. The purpose of this paper is to address this question. I consider several attempts at answering the question, and give my reasons for preferring one of them over its rivals. The account of physical objects that I recommend---the Spatial Location Account---defines physical objects as objects with spatial locations. The intuitive idea behind the Spatial Location Account is this. Objects from all of the different ontological categories---physical objects; non-physical objects like souls, if there are any; propositions; universals; etc.---have this much in common: they all exist in time. But not all of them exist in space. The ones that exist in time and space, i.e., the ones that have spatial locations, are the ones that count as physical objects.
7. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 61 > Issue: 2
Michael Huemer Direct Realism and the Brain-in-a-Vat Argument
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The brain-in-a-vat argument for skepticism is best formulated, not using the closure principle, but using the “Preference Principle,” which states that in order to be justified in believing H on the basis of E, one must have grounds for preferring H over each alternative explanation of E. When the argument is formulated this way, Dretske’s and Klein’s responses to it fail. However, the strengthened argument can be refuted using a direct realist account of perception. For the direct realist, refuting the SIV scenario is not a precondition on knowledge of the external world, and only the direct realist can give a non-circular account of how we know we’re not brains in vats.
8. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 61 > Issue: 2
Alan Sidelle Finding an Intrinsic Account of Identity: What Is the Source of Duplication Cases?
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Many philosophers believe that identity through time cannot depend on features extrinsic to the relata and relations between them. This goes with the view that one must deny identity in cases for which there is a ‘duplication case’-a case just like the first, but for an additional, ‘external’ element which provides an equal or better ‘candidate’ for identity with one of the relata. Such friends of intrinsicness cannot remedy the failure of continuity of function/form to be one-one by non-branching or closest competitor clauses. The obvious intrinsic approach-perhaps taken for granted-appeals to considerations of quantity of matter, requiring over 50% shared matter between identicals (at adjacent times). But this rules out plausible cases of halving and doubling for which there are not duplication cases. After bringing out this problem, I ask what makes duplication cases possible, and use this to formulate an intrinsic condition which allows identity whenever there is continuity of function, but no threat to intrinsic ness via duplication cases.
9. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 61 > Issue: 2
Arda Denkel The Refutation of Substrata
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This article considers reasons for and reasons against postulating substrata in ontology, and argues that the case against amounts to a refutation.
book symposium:
10. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 61 > Issue: 2
John Martin Fischer, Mark Ravizza Précis of Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility
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11. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 61 > Issue: 2
Alfred R. Mele Reactive Attitudes, Reactivity, and Omissions
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12. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 61 > Issue: 2
Michael E. Bratman Fischer and Ravizza on Moral Responsibility and History
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13. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 61 > Issue: 2
Eleonore Stump The Direct Argument for Incompatibilism
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14. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 61 > Issue: 2
John Martin Fischer, Mark Ravizza Replies
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critical notices
15. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 61 > Issue: 2
Michael Kelly A Philosophy of Mass Art
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16. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 61 > Issue: 2
T. L. S. Sprigge Other Times: Philosophical Perspectives on Past, Present, and Future
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17. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 61 > Issue: 2
David B. Martens Points of View
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18. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 61 > Issue: 2
David Schmidtz An Essay on the Modern State
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