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1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 61 > Issue: 1
Christopher Kutz Acting Together
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Collective action is a widespread social phenomenon, ranging from intricate duets to routinized, hierarchical cooperation within bureaucratic structures. Standard accounts of collective action (such as those offered by Bratman, Gilbert, Searle, and Tuomela and Miller) have attempted to explain cooperation in the context of small-scale, interdependent, egalitarian activities. Because the resulting analyses focus on the intricate networks of reciprocal expectation present in these contexts, they are less useful in explaining the nature of collective action in larger or more diffuse social contexts. I argue here instead for a minimalist account of collective action, which explains collective action across a broad range of contexts by reference to individuals’ overlapping “participatory intentions,” i.e., intentions to do one’s part in a collective act. Participatory intentions are, formally, simply species of individual instrumental intentions, although their objects make irreducible reference to collective acts.
2. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 61 > Issue: 1
Patricia Kitcher On Interpreting Kant’s Thinker as Wittgenstein’s ‘I’
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Although both Kant and Wittgenstein made claims about the “unknowability” of cognitive subjects, the current practice of assimilating their positions is mistaken. I argue that Allison’s attempt to understand the Kantian self through the early Wittgenstein and McDowell’s linking of Kant and the later Wittgenstein distort rather than illuminate. Against McDowell, I argue further that the Critique’s analysis of the necessary conditions for cognition produces an account of the sources of epistemic nonnativity that is importantly different from McDowell’s own account in terms of a ‘second nature’ created through ‘Bildung’. Finally, I argue that Kant’s epistemic analyses also lead to a model of the cognitive self that answers two contemporary questions: why should we refer to selves at all? in what dies the unity of a subject of thought consist?
3. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 61 > Issue: 1
Justin D’Arms, Daniel Jacobson The Moralistic Fallacy: On the ‘Appropriateness’ of Emotions
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Philosophers often call emotions appropriate or inappropriate. What is meant by such talk? In one sense, explicated in this paper, to call an emotion appropriate is to say that the emotion is fitting: it accurately presents its object as having certain evaluative features. For instance, envy might be thought appropriate when one’s rival has something good which one lacks. But someone might grant that a circumstance has these features, yet deny that envy is appropriate, on the grounds that it is wrong to be envious. These two senses of ‘appropriate’ have much less in common than philosophers have supposed. Indeed, the distinction between propriety and correctness is crucial to understanding the distinctive role of the emotions in ethics. We argue here that an emotion can be fitting despite being wrong to feel, and that various philosophical arguments are guilty of a systematic error which we term the moralistic fallacy.
4. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 61 > Issue: 1
Abraham Sesshu Roth What Was Hume’s Problem with Personal Identity?
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An appreciation of Hume’s psychology of object identity allows us to recognize certain tensions in his discussion of the origin of our belief in personal identity---tensions which have gone largely unnoticed in the secondary literature. This will serve to provide a new solution to the problem of explaining why Hume finds that discussion of personal identity so problematic when he famously disavows it in the Appendix to the Treatise. It turns out that the two psychological mechanisms which respectively generate the ideas of object and of personal identity are mutually incompatible. It is this sort of conflict within Hume’s introspective or subjectivist psychology which is the source of his worry.
5. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 61 > Issue: 1
Jonathan Cohen Analyticity and Katz’s New Intensionalism: or, If You Sever Sense from Reference, Analyticity is Cheap but Useless
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In “Analyticity, Necessity, and the Epistemology of Semantics,” Jerrold Katz argues against the Fregean thesis that sense detennines reference. He proposes a reconception of sense, uses this to give a non-standard understanding of analyticity, and then goes on to show how these moves block arguments for semantic externalism, evade Quine’s attacks on analyticity, and ground a “rationalist/internalist” conception of semantic knowledge. For these reasons it seems that quite a lot hangs on the viability of Katz’s proposal. Therefore, the question whether his program can be sustained is of considerable philosophical interest. This paper argues that Katz’s program cannot succeed. Because he rejects the Fregean thesis, Katz ends up with an impoverished account of analyticity incapable of doing the work Katz (or anyone else) requires of it. If this is right, then we have no reason to endorse Katz’s idiosyncratic notions of sense and analyticity over their traditional competitors.
6. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 61 > Issue: 1
J. Harvey Colour-Dispositionalism and Its Recent Critics
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Dispositionalist accounts of colour concepts are now largely discarded. But a number of recent and influential objections to this type of theory can be readily answered providing the dispositionalist account contains the key elements it should---which actual versions in the literature do not. I explicate some of the conceptual components needed in such an account once we correctly understand the anthropocentricity of the colour concepts involved. When these components are incorporated into dispositionalism, including one crucial distinction in particular, some powerful seeming objections against this revised dispositionalism fail. In addition, dispositionalism has extra advantages over the far more popular physicalist theories, and I therefore contend that we should explore vigorously this kind of enriched dispositionalist account.
7. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 61 > Issue: 1
James Cargile Skepticism and Possibilities
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One skeptical strategy against A’s claim to know that P is to hold that it is logically possible for someone to have the same “base” (a term needing explaining) for P as A does in spite of its not being true that P. Philosophical replies have focussed on showing that these are not genuine possibilities. Whether they are can be an interesting question of metaphysics, but it is argued in this paper that this metaphysical discussion is not the proper focus for an assessment of skepticism. Even if there are the odd logical possibilities, they do not suffice to warrant skeptical doubts. Rather, there has to be good reason to think that there is a genuine chance of the alleged possibility obtaining. This requirement cannot be satisfied generically, and that is what is wrong with generic skepticism.
discussions
8. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 61 > Issue: 1
Thomas M. Crisp, Ted A. Warfield The Irrelevance of Indeterministic Counterexamples to Principle Beta
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Incompatibilism about freedom and causal determinism is commonly supported by appeal to versions of the well known Consequence argument. Critics of theConsequence argument have presented counterexamples to the Consequence argument’s central inference principle. The thesis of this article is that proponents of the Consequence argument can easily bypass even the best of these counterexamples.
9. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 61 > Issue: 1
Michael C. Rea, David Silver Personal Identity and Psychological Continuity
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In a recent article, Trenton Mericks argues that psychological continuity analyses (PC-analyses) of personal identity over time are incompatible with endurantism. We contend that if Merricks’s argument is valid, a parallel argument establishes that PC-analyses of personal identity are incompatible with perdurantism; hence, the correct conclusion to draw is simply that such analyses are all necessarily false. However, we also show that there is good reason to doubt that Merricks’s argument is valid.
10. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 61 > Issue: 1
Trenton Merricks Perdurance and Psychological Continuity
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If persons endure, personal identity cannot be analyzed in terms of psychological continuity. That is one conclusion defended in my “Endurance, Psychological Continuity, and the Importance of Personal Identity’ (PPR, 1999). Rea and Silver (PPR, 2000) claim that my argument for that conclusion is sound only if a parallel argument is sound. The parallel argument concludes that if persons perdure, personal identity cannot be analyzed in terms of psychological continuity. In this paper, I show that Rea and Silver are mistaken. My argument is sound but the parallel argument is not.
11. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 61 > Issue: 1
John Hawthorne, Mark Scala Seeing and Demonstration
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We see things. We also perceptually demonstrate things. There seems to be some sort of link between these two phenomena. Indeed. in the standard case, the former is accompanied by a capacity for the latter. One sees a dog and can, on the basis of one’s perceptual capacities, think thoughts of the form ‘That is F’. But how strong is that link? Does seeing a thing (in the success sense of seeing) inevitably bring with it the capacity for perceptually demonstrating it? In what follows, we argue for a negative answer to this question. In so doing, we hope to shed some light on the phenomenon of perceptual demonstration. After presenting the main argument in section one, we go on in section two to consider a series of objections and replies.
review essay
12. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 61 > Issue: 1
Kim Sterelny Roboroach, or, the Extended Phenotype Meets Cognitive Science
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critical notices
13. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 61 > Issue: 1
H. Scott Hestevold A Realistic Theory of Categories: An Essay on Ontology
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14. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 61 > Issue: 1
Don Garrett Representation and the Mind-Body Problem in Spinoza
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15. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 61 > Issue: 1
Donald Rutherford Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist
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16. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 61 > Issue: 1
Alastair Hannay Sketches of Landscapes: Philosophy by Example
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17. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 61 > Issue: 1
Amie L. Thomasson Denying Existence: The Logic, Epistemology and Pragmatics of Negative Existentials and Fictional Discourse
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18. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 61 > Issue: 1
Brie Gertler The World Without, the Mind Within: An Essay on First-Person Authority
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19. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 61 > Issue: 1
Anthony Cunningham Dignity and Vulnerability, Strength and Quality of Character
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20. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 61 > Issue: 1
Timothy O’Connor Trying Without Willing: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind
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