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Displaying: 1-9 of 9 documents


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1. Res Philosophica: Volume > 96 > Issue: 3
Amie L. Thomasson What Can Phenomenology Bring to Ontology?
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“Ontology” is understood and undertaken very differently in the phenomenological tradition than it is in the recent analytic tradition. Here I argue that those differences are not accidental, but instead reflect deeper differences in views about what the proper role and methods for philosophy are. I aim to show that, from a phenomenological perspective, questions about what exists can be answered ‘easily,’ whether through trivial inferences (in the case of ideal abstracta) or (always tentatively, of course) by ordinary empirical means—seeing how our observations hang together. As a result, it can get us away from the obscurities, epistemological mysteries, and skepticism that the neo-Quinean approach to ontology has left us in and provide a clearer and less problematic approach to questions of ontology.
2. Res Philosophica: Volume > 96 > Issue: 3
Daniel Coren Freedom, Gratitude, and Resentment: Olivi and Strawson
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I argue that by attending to a distinction among perspectives on the root causes of our reactive attitudes, we can better understand the bases and limitations of longstanding debates about free will and moral responsibility. I characterize this distinction as “objectivism vs. subjectivism.” I bring out this distinction by first scrutinizing an especially sharp divergence between Peter Strawson and Peter John Olivi. For Olivi, our ordinary human attitudes make it obvious that we have free will, and our attitudes would be senseless if we did not firmly believe that we have free will. For Strawson, reactive attitudes would carry on despite a theoretical acceptance that we lack free will. I apply my distinction to more recent disagreements, such as between Peter van Inwagen and John Martin Fischer/Mark Ravizza. By getting clearer on why we disagree, we can move closer toward a resolution and we can avoid talking past each other.
3. Res Philosophica: Volume > 96 > Issue: 3
Luke Teeninga Who Must Benefit from Divine Hiddenness?
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Some have argued that God would not allow some person S to be the victim of an evil for the sake of some good G unless G benefits S in particular, not just someone else. Is this true and, if so, is a similar principle true regarding divine hiddenness? That is, would God remain hidden from some person S for the sake of some good G only if G benefits S? I will argue that this principle has a number of exceptions, even in the context of evil, but particularly in the context of divine hiddenness.
4. Res Philosophica: Volume > 96 > Issue: 3
Eric Schwitzgebel Aiming for Moral Mediocrity
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Most people aim to be about as morally good as their peers—not especially better, not especially worse. We do not aim to be good, or non-bad, or to act permissibly rather than impermissibly, by fixed moral standards. Rather, we notice the typical behavior of our peers, then calibrate toward so-so. This is a somewhat bad way to be, but it’s not a terribly bad way to be. We are somewhat morally criticizable for having low moral ambitions. Typical arguments defending the moral acceptability of low moral ambitions—the So-What-If-I’m-Not-a-Saint Excuse, the Fairness Objection, the Happy Coincidence Defense, and the claim that you’re already in The-Most-You-Can-Do Sweet Spot—do not survive critical scrutiny.
book symposium
5. Res Philosophica: Volume > 96 > Issue: 3
Michael D. K. Ing Précis to The Vulnerability of Integrity in Early Confucian Thought
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6. Res Philosophica: Volume > 96 > Issue: 3
Julianne Nicole Chung A Paradox of Vulnerability
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7. Res Philosophica: Volume > 96 > Issue: 3
Alexus McLeod Comments on Michael Ing's The Vulnerability of Integrity in Early Confucian Thought
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8. Res Philosophica: Volume > 96 > Issue: 3
Bongrae Seok Moral Psychology of Vulnerability and Ing's Interpretation of Confucian Moral Integrity
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9. Res Philosophica: Volume > 96 > Issue: 3
Michael D. K. Ing Sages, Integrity, and the Paradox of Vulnerability: Reply to Chung, McLeod, and Seok
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