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Displaying: 1-12 of 12 documents


1. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 4
Phillip Shannon The Piety of Escape
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This paper examines two seemingly contradictory views of piety found in Plato’s Euthryphro and Crito. Using the Socratic dialogues for evidence of what Socrates actually believed and to piece together a Socratic account of piety, it seems that his argument in favor of remaining in prison is inconsistent with his own beliefs. The paper concludes that Socrates ought not to have thought it was impious to escape from prison.
2. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 4
Stephen Bailey Certainly Uncertain: Nietzschean Pessimism for an Optimistic World
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In this paper, I contrast pre- and post-Socratic Greek thought, particularly with respect to Apollonian optimism and Dionysian pessimism. I show how Socrates’ judgment of a “right” way of living undermined Greek pessimism and was the first step towards modern scientific optimism, the belief that the world can be understood. I then argue that new developments in quantum physics make this optimism untenable, and I finally assert that Nietzschean pessimism is a coherent and beneficial metaphysical perspective.
3. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 4
Jenna Kreyche How We Are Moral: Benevolence, Utility, and Self-Love in Hobbes and Hume
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In this paper, I reconstruct Hobbes’ theory of self-love. I then examine Hume’s arguements that (i) self-love does not properly account for moral behavior and (ii) self-love is unnecessary for moral theory. I argue that Hobbesian self-love can account for both of Hume’s objections. Further, I use an analysis of Hobbes’ Deliberation to show, contra Hume, that self-love does not entail a lack of intention in moral action.
4. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 4
Anthony Adrian Ruminations on Intermittent Existence
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Can objects exist, cease to exist, and then exist once more? I lay out three ways to think about intermittent existence (IE). The first section is based on intuitions. The second section will show that the intuitions are bolstered by the concept of supervenience. The final section will argue that the strongest way to think about IE, and about supervenience, is in terms of mereology, the theory of parts and wholes.
5. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 4
Zachary Stinson A Multi-Causal Approach To Synchronicity
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Synchronicity has long been described as an ‘acausal’ connecting principle. However, the use of this descriptor is not only misleading, but also outright false on any seriously considered picture of synchronicity due to admissions of multiple types of causes. Furthermore, previous attempts to clarify the ‘acausal’ label have served only to further muddy the waters of discussion. A ‘multi-causal’ conception of synchronicity is proposed to ease and encourage future discussion in many disciplines.
6. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 4
Leonardo Moauro A Critical Assessment of George Klosko’s Version of the Principle of Fair Play
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The nature of our obligation to obey the law has consistently been an important object of philosophical dispute. Fair play based theories of obligation purport to show that it is unfair for us to benefit from an organizational scheme (such as the state) without contributing our fair share to the provision of goods. George Klosko is a major proponent of this approach. I develop his particular version of the argument from fair play into a defensible theory of citizens’ obligation to obey the laws of their state.
7. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 4
Kenneth Stalkfleet Gettiering Goldman
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This paper examines the causal theory of knowledge put forth by Alvin Goldman in his 1967 paper “A Causal Theory of Knowing.” Goldman contends that a justified, true belief is knowledge if and only if it is causally connected to the fact that makes it true. This paper provides examples, however, of justified, true beliefs with such causal connections that are clearly not knowledge. The paper further shows that attempts to salvage the causal theory are unsatisfactory.
8. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 4
Bo Fox Pons A Rawlsian Revitalization of Gewirth’s Normative Structure for Action
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Alan Gewirth’s Reason and Morality justifies certain fundamental moral principles and develops morality out of the basic structure of action. Contemporary literature exposes a critical flaw in the second stage of Gewirth’s argument contending that Gewirth fails to create agent-neutral moral claims. In order to provide a transfer of interests between agents, the solution to Gewirth’s problem, I argue that certain Rawlsian concepts buttress and are consistent with Gewirth’s argument for the normative structure of action.
9. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 4
Pete Faulconbridge A New Approach to the Paradox of Fiction
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It seems that an intuitive characterization of our emotional engagement with fiction contains a paradox, which has been labelled the ‘Paradox of Fiction’. Using insights into the nature of mental content gained from the disjunctive theory of perception I propose a novel solution to the Paradox, explained and motivated by reference to Kendall Walton’s influential account of fictionality. Using this insight I suggest that we can take the phenomenology of fictional engagement seriously in a way not allowed by Walton.
10. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 4
Blake McAllister The Universe Began to Exist?: Craig’s Philosophical Arguments For A Finite Past
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William Lane Craig offers two philosophical arguments for the conclusion that the universe began to exist. To be compelling, these arguments must not only be sound—we must also have reasons to believe that they are sound. I determine that these arguments do not provide such reasons to many individuals. The arguments ultimately rely on supposedly intuitively obvious absurdities. However, if one fails to see these ostensible absurdities—as many philosophers do—then for her, Craig’s arguments lack all epistemic force.
11. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 4
Brittney Sovik Why Some Things Should Not Be for Sale by Debra Satz
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12. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 4
About the Authors
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