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plenary session: black feminism
1. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 1
Tempest M. Henning, Scott Aikin IntroductIon: Plenary on Black Feminist Thought
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2. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 1
Andrea Dionne Warmack Smiling Lessons: Toward an Account of AfroSkepticism
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3. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 1
Ayanna De’Vante Spencer Surviving Jane Code: Black Feminist Epistemological Concerns for MeTooBots
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4. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 1
Tempest M. Henning Trying to Stay Safe While Swimming in Toxic Waters
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5. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 1
Nathifa Greene Epistemic Injustice and Transformative Justice
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articles
6. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 1
Shawn Hernandez, N. G. Laskowski What Makes Normative Concepts Normative: (Presidential Prize Award Winner)
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When asked which of our concepts are normative concepts, metaethicists would be quick to list such concepts as good, ought, and reason. When asked why such concepts belong on the list, metaethicists would be much slower to respond. Eklund (2017) is a notable exception. He argues by elimination for “the Normative Role view” that normative concepts are normative in virtue of having a “normative role” or being “used normatively” (2017, p. 79). One view that Eklund aims to eliminate is “the Metaphysical view” that normative concepts are normative in virtue of referring to normative properties (2017, p. 71).2 In addition to arguing that Eklund’s objection looks doubtful by its own lights, we argue that there are several plausible versions of the Metaphysical view that Eklund doesn’t eliminate, defending various claims about normative concepts and their relationships to deliberation, competence, reference, and possession along the way.
7. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 1
Joshua Anderson G.E. Moore and the Problem of the Criterion
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In this paper, I offer an understanding of G.E. Moore’s epistemology as presented in, “A Defence of Common Sense” and “Proof of an External World.” To frame the discussion, I look to Roderick Chisholm’s essay, The Problem of the Criterion. I begin by looking at two ways that Chisholm believes one can respond to the problem of the criterion, and, referring back to Moore’s essays, explain why it is not unreasonable for Chisholm to believe that he is following a line of reasoning that Moore might take. I then show why I believe Chisholm is actually trying to do something quite different from what Moore was, and thus misses Moore’s actual point. I conclude that Moore is best understood as rejecting traditional epistemological concerns. By forcing Moore to deal with a traditional epistemological problem, it will become clear how bold Moore’s “epistemology” is.
8. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 1
Corey R. Horn Thomas Paine and Immanuel Kant’s Cosmopolitanism: Towards a Universal System
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9. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 1
Josué Piñeiro Epistemic Peerhood and Standpoint Theory: What Knowledge from the Margins tells us about Epistemic Peerhood
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This paper uses standpoint theory to explore whether all there is to establish epistemic peerhood between subjects is that they be (i) equally exposed to or familiar with the evidence pertaining to a disagreed claim, and be (ii) equals with regards to intelligence, freedom from bias and similar epistemic virtues within the domain of the claim in question. I argue that there is at least one general circumstance in which conditions (i) and (ii) are met, but nevertheless the subjects deviate in their likelihood to be mistaken about the claim in question, thus preventing them from being epistemic peers. Such a circumstance presents itself as a case in which the claim in question is part of those aspects of social relations and experiences of the marginalized.
10. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 1
Andrew McGonigal, Erin Taylor Aesthetic Reasons and Aesthetic Shoulds
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Some questions about normative structure are global. We can ask how we should live, or what we ought to do all things considered, or whether there are any categorical oughts. But we can also examine local normative structure. We might ask ourselves about what we should do from the moral point of view rather than the prudential one, or discuss promissory obligation in contrast with what friendship demands. How should we understand such localized forms of normativity? We argue that a plausible sounding treatment of the distinction cannot account for what we call the “interrelatedness” of reasons from different domains.
11. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 1
Shane J. Ralston Metaphor Abuse in the Time of Coronavirus: A Reply to Lynne Tirrell
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In the time of Coronavirus, it is perhaps as good a time as any to comment on the use and abuse of metaphors. One of the worst instances of metaphor abuse—especially given the recent epidemiological crisis—is Lynne Tirrell’s notion of toxic speech. In the foregoing reply piece, I analyse Tirrell’s metaphor and reveal how it blinds us to the liberating power of public speech. Lynne Tirrell argues that some speech is, borrowing from field of Epidemiology, toxic in the sense that it harms vulnerable listeners. In this response piece, I summarize the main points of Tirrell’s toxic speech argument, map the underlying conceptual metaphor and pose three objections.
12. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 1
Andrew Ward Gettier Cases, Knowledge and Experimental Inquiry
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In 1963, Edmund Gettier published a short paper in the journal Analysis. That paper, entitled “Is Justifi ed True Belief Knowledge?,” purported to demonstrate that even though a person is justified in believing a true proposition p, having that justified true belief (JTB) is not sufficient for the person knowing that p (Gettier, 1963). In particular, Gettier presented examples purporting to show that a person may have a justified true belief, but the belief is, in one way or another, a “lucky belief,” and so the person having the justified true belief that p does not know that p. In what follows, I argue that justified, but luckily true beliefs do count as knowledge. What is important is that there is a limited ability to generalize from such cases, suggesting that many, if not most of what we count as instances of knowledge are, to a greater or lesser extent, localized.
13. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 1
Heather Stewart Making Sense of “Microaggression”: On Family Resemblance and Standpoint Epistemology
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Though philosophers are beginning to pay attention to the phenomenon of microaggressions, they are yet to fully draw on their training and skills in conceptual analysis to help make sense of what microaggression is. In this paper, I offer a philosophical analysis of the concept of microaggression. I ultimately argue that ‘microaggression’ as a concept gets its meaning not by decomposing into a set of necessary and sufficient conditions, but rather by means of what Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953) has called “family resemblance.” That is to say, what unifies the concept of microaggression is a set of common, overlapping features that link related instances together, but are not necessarily all present in all cases. I identify and explain a common set of features that together form the basis for a family resemblance account of the concept. I then argue that despite the difficulty that microaggressions pose in terms of being reliably recognized and understood as such, some people, in virtue of their epistemic standpoint, are better suited to recognize these features and subsequently identify instances of micraoggression in practice. I argue this by drawing on the vast literature in feminist standpoint epistemology (Alcoff, 1993; Hill Collins, 1990, 2004; hooks, 2004; Harding, 2004, 2008; Wylie, 2013).
14. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 1
Lamont Rodgers What Are Internalist and Externalist Analyses of Utopia?
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15. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 1
Ken Rogerson Utilitarian Aggregation
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I want to tackle a central thesis of contemporary Utilitarianism. Utilitarianism holds what has come to be called the Aggregation Thesis. The Aggregation Thesis claims, roughly, that several individual harms (or benefits) can be “added up” to represent a larger harm (or benefit). One controversial aspect of this view is that, seemingly, one large harm to a single individual (or smaller group) could be justified if such a harm spared a significantly smaller harm dealt out to a much larger number of other individuals. I will argue that on Utilitarian’s own grounds, the aggregation thesis is not warranted.
16. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 1
Alex R Gillham Epicurean Tranquility and the Pleasure of Philosophy
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17. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 1
Samuel Kahn A Problem for Frankfurt Examples
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In this paper I intend to raise a problem for so-called Frankfurt examples. I begin by describing the examples and what they are used for. Then I describe the problem.
18. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 1
Joseph Swenson Saying What One Means: Nietzsche and the Experience of Literary Philosophy
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Few would dispute that Nietzsche writes differently than most philosophers, especially when judged by the standards of contemporary philosophical writing. There is plenty of dispute, however, about why Nietzsche has chosen to present his thinking in the ways that he does. When one turns to much recent Nietzsche scholarship, it would appear that the literary quality of his writing is often treated as something that is merely accidental rather than integral to his philosophical project. Here one finds a working assumption that it is possible to paraphrase Nietzsche’s unconventional style of writing into more conventional forms of philosophical prose without losing sight of the philosophical goals that he is trying to achieve. This paper argues that this working assumption underappreciates the fact that Nietzsche’s chosen style of writing is intended to perform a variety of functions within his philosophy. One underappreciated function of Nietzsche’s writing, I will argue, aims to promote a radical disruption and revaluation of his readers’ basic habitual attitudes towards their experience of their own lives. Such therapeutic and transformative experiences, I conclude, are not only basic to Nietzsche’s philosophical project but are also intimately connected to the literary quality of his writing and cannot easily survive philosophical paraphrase.
19. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 1
Richard R. Eva Religious Liberty and the Alleged Afterlife
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It is common for religiously motivated actions to be specially protected by law. Many legal theorists have asked why: what makes religion special? What makes it worthy of toleration over and above other non-religious deeply held convictions? The answer I put forward is that religions’ alleged afterlife consequences call for a principle of toleration that warrants special legal treatment. Under a Rawlsian principle of toleration, it is reasonable for those in the original position to opt for principles of justice that accommodate actions with alleged afterlife consequences. And, under a utilitarian principle of toleration, a greater psychological harm is eased by such accommodations. Additionally, this alleged afterlife consequence is found in most of the religions that are thought to warrant some level of special toleration—not only do the Abrahamic religions have alleged afterlife consequences, but many eastern religions do as well, e.g. reincarnation.
20. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 1
Ava Thomas Wright Why Moral Rights of Free Speech for Business Corporations Cannot Be Justified
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In this paper, I develop two philosophically suggestive arguments that the late Justice Stevens made in Citizens United against the idea that business corporations have free speech rights. First, (1) while business corporations conceived as real entities are capable of a thin agency conceptually sufficient for moral rights, I argue that they fail to clear important justificatory hurdles imposed by interest or choice theories of rights. Business corporations conceived as real entities lack any interest in their personal security; moreover, they are incapable of exercising innate powers of choice. Second, (2) I argue that the structure and functionally individualized purpose of a business corporation—to increase value for its shareholders—undermines the implicit joint commitment necessary to derive corporate rights of free speech from non-operative shareholder-member rights. Since one cannot transfer innate moral rights such as free speech, any exercise of this right on behalf of another must be limited in scope.