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presidential plenary session: philosophy and wine
1. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 1
Julie Kuhlken Confessions of a Recovering Philosopher: Introduction to Panel on Philosophy and Wine
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2. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 1
Michelle Williams Spirituality and the Wine’s Soul
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presidential address
3. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 1
Scott Aikin The Owl of Minerva Problem
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articles
4. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 1
Dan Larkin Inconsistency in Socratic Consistency: The Curious Case of Socrates’ δαιμόνιον
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5. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 1
Zak A. Kopeikin A Separability Principle, Contrast Cases, and Contributory Dispositions
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The aim of this paper is to clarify the use of contrast cases—which are pairs of cases in which the feature under examination is varied and all else is held fixed—in ethical methodology. In another paper, I argue that we must reject a separability principle which is thought to allow one to use contrast cases to infer truths about intrinsic value (Kopeikin, 2019). Here I offer a different criticism that has a positive upshot about what we are licensed to infer from contrast cases. This provides clarification about the epistemic use of contrast cases in value theory and insight into what we can glean from contrast cases.
6. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 1
Jonah Goldwater Six Arguments Against ‘Ought Implies Can’
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7. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 1
Chris King Hypothetical Consent and Political Obligation
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Hypothetical Consent Situations are widely employed in normative argument as if they help to justify normative claims or to explain normative facts. Historically, however, there is plenty of suspicion about them. In this light, there is a tendency to prefer theories of political obligation that do not depend upon hypothetical consent to explain political obligations – those that appeal, for instance, a general moral principle (like a natural duty) or to actual consent. This paper makes no full-throated defense of hypothetical consent. But it does try to identify more carefully than is usually done what sorts of cases they represent and to show that at least two concerns about them are unwarranted.
8. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 1
Bryan Smyth De-Moralizing Heroism: Ethical Expertise and the Object of Heroic Approbation
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Agents’ self-reports in cases of reactive heroism often deny the optionality, and hence the supererogatory status, of their actions, while conversely supporting a view of these actions in terms of nonselfsacrificial existential necessity. Taking such claims seriously thus makes it puzzling as to why such cases elicit strong approbation. To resolve this puzzle, I show how this necessity can be understood in the predispositional embodied terms of unreflective ethical expertise, such that the agent may be said literally to incarnate generally accepted norms of a shared ethical environment. On this basis I argue that the object of the relevant approbation is the agent’s embodied predispositionality itself—expressing a deep continuity with her social context, it is in virtue of this alone that her action can be both spontaneous and ethically outstanding. By way of conclusion I briefly discuss how this suggests an important categorial distinction between heroism and saintism.
9. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 1
Joseph Spino The Broader Threat of Situationism to Virtue Ethics
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10. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 1
Timothy C. Lord Eliminative Materialism, Historical Consciousness, and R. G. Collingwood’s Philosophy of Mind
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11. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 1
Deborah K. Heikes Epistemic Ignorance and Moral Responsibility
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12. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 1
Peter Marton Truth, Meaning, and Yablo’s Paradox – A Moderate Anti-Realist Approach
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Yablo’s Paradox, an infinite-sentence version of the Liar Paradox, aims to show that semantic paradox can emerge even without circularity. I will argue that the lack of meaning/content of the sentences involved is the source of the paradoxical outcome.I will introduce and argue for a Moderate Antirealist (MAR) approach to truth and meaning, built around the twin principles that neither truth nor meaning can outstrip knowability. Accordingly, I will introduce a MAR truth operator that both forges an explicit connection between truth and knowability and distinguishes between truth and factuality. I will also argue that the meaning/content of propositions should be identified not with the set of possible worlds in which the propositions are true/factual, but rather in which they are known.I will show that our MAR framework dissolves Yablo’s Paradox and also confirms our intuition that these sentences are all devoid of content/meaning.
13. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 1
Samuel Kahn Positive Duties, Kant’s Universalizability Tests, and Contradictions
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In this paper I am going to raise a problem for recent attempts to derive positive duties from Kant’s universalizability tests. In particular, I argue that these recent attempts are subject to reductio and that the most obvious way of patching them renders them impracticable. I begin by explaining the motivation for these attempts. Then I describe how they work and begin my attack. I conclude by considering some patches.
14. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 1
Emily McGill Relational Autonomy and Ameliorative Inquiry
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This paper suggests that the contemporary feminist debate on relational autonomy is best understood as an attempt at ameliorative inquiry—the concept of autonomy is defined in order to secure political and theoretical advantages. Most theorists adopt some sort of constructionist, or relational, account precisely because of the political and theoretical advantages relational accounts are meant to offer. But there are also significant drawbacks to this approach. I argue that there are reasons to be skeptical of ameliorative inquiries into the concept of autonomy: first, the goals of inquiry have not been made explicit and may not be shared; second, because ameliorative inquiries are guided by unclear and unshared goals, the debate will continue to pull feminists in conflicting directions; and finally, the normative and aspirational nature of ameliorative inquiry unacceptably threatens the exclusion of some women from the category of autonomous agents.
15. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 1
Shannon Fyfe, Elizabeth Lanphier Why Ethical Sex Demands [the category of] Nonconsensual Sex
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16. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 1
Matthew G. Eckel Contextualism and the Politics of Sophrosyne in Plato’s Charmides
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17. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 1
J.P. Andrew The Insignificance of Taste: Why Gustatory Pleasure Is Never a Morally Sufficient Reason to Cause Harm
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18. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 1
Alastair Norcross The Impotence of the Causal Impotence Objection
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Many significant harms, such as the mass suffering of animals on factory farms, can only be prevented, or at least lessened, by the collective action of thousands, or in some cases millions, of individual agents. In the face of this, it can seem as if individuals are powerless to make a difference, and thus that they lack reasons, at least from the consequentialist perspective, to refrain from eating meat. This has become known as the “causal impotence” problem. The standard response is to appeal to expected utility calculations. Recently, this response has been attacked, mostly on the grounds that the relevant causal mechanisms are more complex than its proponents are said to assume. In this paper, I argue that the attacks are unsuccessful, both at undermining specific expected utility calculations urged by me and Kagan, or even at showing that significantly different expected utility calculations wouldn’t justify the relevant behavior.
19. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 1
Caroline Paddock Is Art a Virtue?
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In several articles, Peter Goldie argues that artistic production and appreciation should enjoy the status of full-fledged virtues. In this paper, I draw on the Summa Theologiae of Thomas Aquinas to provide a more nuanced account of artistic or aesthetic virtue. First, I raise some objections to Goldie’s account. Next, I show that, unlike Goldie, Aquinas distinguishes between virtue “properly so called” and virtue in a more restricted sense, and he calls art a virtue only in the restricted sense. In other words, art is a true human excellence, but is not (as Goldie claims) intimately connected to human flourishing in the way that the moral virtues are. Next, I show that there is room in Aquinas’s account for Goldie’s claims that art is done not as a means to another end but rather “under the guise of the good.” Finally, I consider some other ways to understand Goldie’s intuition and affirm that there might be an intimate connection between artistic practice and some kinds of moral virtue.
20. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 1
James Mock American Ruins, Aesthetic Responses, and Speculations
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