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Displaying: 1-7 of 7 documents


1. Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Thomas W. Staley The Coding of Technical Images of Nanospace: Analogy, Disanalogy, and the Asymmetry of Worlds
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This paper argues that intrinsically metaphorical leaps are required to interpret and utilize information acquired at the atomic scale. Accordingly, what we ‘see’ with our instruments in nanospace is both fundamentally like, and fundamentally unlike, nanospace itself; it involves both direct translation and also what Goodman termed “calculated category mistakes.” Similarly, and again necessarily, what we ‘do’ in nanospace can be treated as only metaphorically akin to what we do in our comfortable mesoworld. These conclusions indicate that future developments in nanotechnology will rely, in part, on the creation of more sophisticated metaphorical codes linking our world to nanospace, and I propose some initial possibilities along these lines.
2. Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Marc J. De Vries Gilbert Simondon and the Dual Nature of Technical Artifacts
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3. Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
David Bzdak On Amnesia and Knowing-How
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In this paper, I argue that Stanley and Williamson’s 2001 account of knowledge-how as a species of knowledge-that is wrong. They argue that a claim such as “Hannah knows how to ride a bicycle” is true if and only if Hannah has some relevant knowledge-that. I challenge their claim by considering the case of a famous amnesic patient named Henry M. who is capable of acquiring and retaining new knowledge-how but who is incapable of acquiring and retaining new knowledge-that. In the first two sections of the paper, I introduce the topic of knowledge-how and give a brief overview of Stanley and Williamson’s position. In the third and fourth sections, I discuss the case of Henry M. and explain why it is plausible to describe him as someone who can retain new knowledge-how but not new knowledge-that. In the final sections of the paper, I argue that Henry M.’s case does indeed provide a counterexample to Stanley and Williamson’s analysis of knowing-how as a species of knowing-that, and I consider and respond to possible objections to my argument.
4. Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Clive Lawson An Ontology of Technology: Artefacts, Relations and Functions
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Ontology tends to be held in deep suspicion by many currently engaged in the study of technology. The aim of this paper is to suggest an ontology of technology that will be both acceptable to ontology’s critics and useful for those engaged with technology. By drawing upon recent developments in social ontology and extending these into the technological realm it is possible to sustain a conception of technology that is not only irreducibly social but able to give due weight to those features that distinguish technical objects from other artefacts. These distinctions, however, require talk of different kinds of causal powers and different types of activity aimed at harnessing such powers. Such discussions are largely absent in recent technological debates, but turn out to be significant both for ongoing technology research and for the recasting of some more traditional debates within the philosophy of technology
5. Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Robert McGrail Working with Substance: Actor-Network Theory and the Modal Weight of the Material
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6. Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Peter-Paul Verbeek Disclosing Visions of Technology
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7. Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Robert Rosenberger Seeing the World through Technology and Art
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