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1. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 22 > Issue: 1
Josep E. Corbí The Mud of Experience and Kinds of Awareness
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In Authority and Estrangement Richard Moran takes some rather illuminating steps towards getting rid of the Cartesian picture of self-knowledge. I argue, however, that Moran’s crucial distinction between deliberative and theoretical attitude is seriously contaminated by that traditional picture. More specifically, I will point out why some crucial aspects of the phenomena that Moran describes in terms of the interplay between the theoretical and the deliberative attitude, should rather be interpreted as a process that takes place within the deliberative attitude itself. The theoretical attitude will, as a result, constitute a rather marginal attitude towards one’s own psychological dispositions and experiences, the adoption of which only makes sense in rather peculiar, often pathological, situations.
2. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 22 > Issue: 1
Komarine Romdenh-Romluc Suppressed Belief
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Moran conceives of conscious belief as a conscious activity, rather than awareness of a mental state. Once conscious belief is understood in this way, the notion of suppressed belief becomes problematic. In this paper, I draw on the work of Merleau-Ponty to sketch an account of suppressed belief. I suggest that suppressed beliefs should not be understood as attitudes towards propositions. Instead, they should be conceived as ways of perceiving and interacting with the world that are out of keeping with how one repre-sents it as being.
3. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 22 > Issue: 1
Josep L. Prades Endorsement, Reasons and Intentional Action
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In my opinion, Richard Moran’s account of the connections between self-knowledge and intentional ac-tion presents a certain unresolved tension. On the one hand, the epistemic privilege of the first person derives from the fact that forming an intention is a matter of the subject endorsing a course of action. An en-dorsing subject is not a mere observer of her intentions. On the other hand, the transparency of endorsement is assimilated to the putative fact that an agent forms her intentions by reflecting on the reasons to make up her mind. The resulting picture is an extremely rationalistic account of intentional action. I will try to defend that this form of practical rationalism can be avoided without renouncing the basic intuitions behind Moran’s use of the notion of endorsement.
4. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 22 > Issue: 1
Hilan Bensusan, Manuel de Pinedo When my Own Beliefs are not First-Personal Enough
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Richard Moran has argued, convincingly, in favour of the idea that there must be more than one path to access our own mental contents. The existence of those routes, one first-personal —through avowal— the other third-personal —no different to the one used to ascribe mental states to other people and to interpret their actions— is intimately connected to our capacity to respond to norms. Moran’s account allows for conflicts between first personal and third personal authorities over my own beliefs; this enable some instances of Moore-paradoxical cases to be meaningful. In this paper we reflect on the consequences of this view for the acquisition of beliefs, and argue that, as in the moral case, excessive concentration on a third-personal understanding of thought undermines the very idea of being directed to the world and of being capable to fully own our own beliefs. We suggest that maybe too much attention to epistemic virtues or to justification is misdirected and could produce beliefs that are themselves not first-personal enough.
5. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 22 > Issue: 1
Carla Bagnoli The Authority of Reflection
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This paper examines Moran’s argument for the special authority of the first-person, which revolves around the Self/Other asymmetry and grounds dichotomies such as the practical vs. theoretical, activity vs. passivity, and justificatory vs. explanatory reasons. These dichotomies qualify the self-reflective person as an agent, interested in justifying her actions from a deliberative stance. The Other is pictured as a spectator interested in explaining action from a theoretical stance. The self-reflective knower has authority over her own mental states, while the Spectator does not. I highlight the implications of this construal for a theory of action, and call attention onto some other interesting normative relations between the self-reflective agent and the Other that escape both the first-person and the third-person approach. My contention is that the authority of self-reflection (and of reason) is best understood as a relation of mutual recognition between self and others, hence from a second-person stance.
6. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 22 > Issue: 1
Richard Moran Replies to Critics
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In this article, I respond to the comments of six philosophers on my book Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-knowledge. My reply to Josep Corbí mostly concerns the relation between the two modes of self-knowledge I call ‘avowal’ and ‘attribution’, and the sense of activity involved in self-knoweldge; in responding to Josep Prades I try to clarify my picture of deliberation and show that it is not ‘intellectualist’ in an objectionable sense; Komarine Romdenh-Romluc’s paper enables me to say some things about the idea of unconscious beliefs, specifically in relation to the phenomenological tradition; the paper by Hilan Bensusan and Manuel de Pinedo helps me to clarify my sense of the relation of the first-person perspective to the specifically normative relation to one’s beliefs and other attitudes; and Carla Bagnoli’s paper provides an opportunity to explore some connections between the deliberative stance and the notion of recognition in Hegel and in contemporary philosophy.
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7. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 22 > Issue: 1
José M. Méndez, Francisco Salto, Gemma Robles El sistema Bp+ : una lógica positiva mínima para la negación mínima (The system Bp+: a minimal positive logic for minimal negation)
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Entendemos el concepto de “negación mínima” en el sentido clásico definido por Johansson. El propósito de este artículo es definir la lógica positiva mínima Bp+, y probar que la negación mínima puede introducirse en ella. Además, comentaremos algunas de las múltiples extensiones negativas de Bp+.“Minimal negation” is classically understood in a Johansson sense. The aim of this paper is to define the minimal positive logic Bp+ and prove that a minimal negation can be inroduced in it. In addition, some of the many possible negation extensions of Bp+ are commented.
8. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 22 > Issue: 1
Ángel García Rodríguez The Nonconceptual in Concept Acquisition
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The objective of this paper is to discuss the nature of nonconceptual, as opposed to conceptual, states and their content, by exploring the suggestion that the distinction between the conceptual and the nonconceptual be mapped onto the distinction between the linguistic and the nonlinguistic. This approach gives special relevance to our intuitions about the cognitive relationship between small children and adults, especially regarding the acquisition of concepts, in the course of normal cognitive development. Assuming that there is a developmental challenge to be met, the paper considers both the conceptualist and nonconceptualist strategies used to meet it; and concludes that conceptualism is a more satisfying option.
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9. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 22 > Issue: 1
Agustín Arrieta Urtizberea Esbozo de la Filosofía de Kripke
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10. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 22 > Issue: 1
Javier Echeverría La Philosophie des sciences: l’invention d’une discipline (fin XIXème – début XXIème siècle)
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11. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 22 > Issue: 1
José Penalva Science, Technology and Society: A Philosophical Perspective
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presentacion
12. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 22 > Issue: 1
Lucía Lewowicz En el cielo sólo las estrellas: Conversaciones con Roberto Torretti
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libros recibidos
13. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 22 > Issue: 1
LIBROS RECIBIDOS / BOOKS RECEIVED
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sumario
14. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 22 > Issue: 1
SUMARIO ANALITICO / SUMMARY
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