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Displaying: 1-20 of 43 documents


seccion monografica
1. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 19 > Issue: 3
Mauricio Suárez Introduction
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2. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 19 > Issue: 3
Alexander Bird Antidotes all the way down?
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This paper concerns the relationship between dispositions and ceteris paribus laws. Dispositions are related to conditionals. Typically a fragile glass will break if struck with force. But possession of the disposition does not entail the corresponding simple (subjunctive or counterfactual) conditional. The phenomena of finks and antidotes show that an object may possess the disposition without the conditional being true. Finks and antidotes may be thought of as exceptions to the straightforward relation between disposition and conditional. The existence of these phenomena is easy to demonstrate at the macro-Ievel. But do they exist at the fundamental level also? While fundamental finkish dispositions may be excluded fairly straightforwardly, the existence of fundamental antidotes is more open. Nonetheless I conclude that the phenomenon is likely to be less widespread than at the macro level and that fundamental antidotes may be eliminable. According to the dispositional essentialist, the laws of nature can be explained by taking natural properties to be essentially dispositional. This account can be extended to show that the existence of finks and antidotes explains ceteris paribus laws. Consequently the existence or otherwise of fundamental finks and antidotes sheds some light on the question of whether fundamental laws may also be ceteris paribus laws.
3. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 19 > Issue: 3
Mauricio Suárez Causal processes and propensities in quantum mechanics
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In an influential article published in 1982, Bas Van Fraassen developed an argument against causal realism on the basis of an analysis of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen correlations of quantum mechanics. Several philosophers of science and experts in causal inference -including some causal realists like Wesley Salmon- have accepted Van Fraassen’s argument, interpreting it as a proof that the quantum correlations cannot be given any causal model. In this paper I argue that Van Fraassen’s article can also be interpreted as a good guide to the different causal models available for the EPR correlations, and their relative virtues. These models in turn give us insight into some of the unusual features that quantum propensicies might have.
4. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 19 > Issue: 3
Agustín Vicente The role of dispositions in explanations
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According to a model defended by some authors, dispositional predicates, or concepts, can be legitimately used in causal explanations, but such a use is not necessary. For every explanation couched in dispositional terms, there is always a better, and complete, explanation that makes use of a different vocabulary, that of categorial bases. In what follows, I will develop this view, and then argue that there is a kind of use of dispositions in explanations that does not fall within this model. That is, I will argue that we would miss some explanations if we were to forsake dispositional concepts and dispositional explanations.
5. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 19 > Issue: 3
Alice Drewery A note on science and essentialism
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This paper discusses recent attempts to use essentialist arguments based on the work of Kripke and Putnam to ground causal necessity in the world. I argue in particular that arecent argument by Alexander Bird relies on controversial intuitions about the natures of substances which no Humean would accept. While a case can be made that essentialism reflects some assumptions within scientific practice, the same can be said of Humeanism; ultimately neither Bird’s arguments, nor any empirical facts, can decide the question for or against Humeanism.
6. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 19 > Issue: 3
Nicholas Maxwell Does probabilism solve the great quantum mystery?
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What sort of entities are electrons, photons and atoms given their wave-like and particle-like properties? Is nature fundamentally deterministic or probabilistic? Orthodox quantum theory (OQT) evades answering these two basic questions by being a theory about the results of performing measurements on quantum systems. But this evasion results in OQT being a seriously defective theory. A rival, somewhat ignored strategy is to conjecture that the quantum domain is fundamentally probabilistic. This means quantum entities, interacting with one another probabilistically, must differ radically from the entities of deterministic classical physics, the classical wave or particle. It becomes possible to conceive of quantum entities as a new kind of fundamentally probabilistic entity, the “propensiton”, neither wave nor particle. A fully micro realistic, testable rival to OQT results.
articulos
7. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 19 > Issue: 3
Jose E. Chaves El contextualismo y P. Grice (The Contextualism and P. Grice)
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En el debate entre contextualistas y anticontextualistas, señala Recanati, los últimos aventajan a los primeros por un argumento atribuible a Grice. Este argumento tiene corno premisa el Principio del Paralelismo que, según Recanati, convierte al argumento en circular y a la posición anticontextualista en injustificada. Si bien considero este argumento anticontextualista inadecuado, demostraré que no es atribuible a Grice. Grice no puede admitir el Principio del Paralelismo si se tiene en cuenta la explicación que elabora para ciertos ejemplos y su teoria de las implicaturas. Grice, según esa explicación y algunas de sus propuestas, se muestra como un contextualista.
recensiones
8. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 19 > Issue: 3
Carlos J. Moya La nau del coneixement
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9. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 19 > Issue: 3
Igor Aristegi Urkia Ernst Cassirer: Stationen einer philosophischen Biographie
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10. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 19 > Issue: 3
María Albisu Mente y Conocimiento
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sumario
11. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 19 > Issue: 3
SUMARIO ANALITICO / SUMMARY
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sumario analicto / summary
12. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 19 > Issue: 3
Sumario Analicto / Summary
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13. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 19 > Issue: 3
Sumario Analicto / Summary
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sumario
14. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 19 > Issue: 3
SUMARIO DEL VOL. 19 / CONTENTS OF VOL 19
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seccion monografica
15. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 19 > Issue: 2
Concha Martínez Vidal Introducción
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16. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 19 > Issue: 2
Manuel de Pinedo Truth matters: Normativity in thought and knowledge
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If language and thought are to be taken as objective, they must respond to how the world is. I propose to explain this responsiveness in terms of conditions of correction, more precisely, by taking thoughts and linguistic utterances to be assessible as true or false. Furthermore, the paper is committed to a form of quietism according to which the very same thing that can be (truly) thought or expressed is the case: ‘soft facts’ as opposed to hard, free-standing facts, independent of any possible rational activity of grasping them.
17. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 19 > Issue: 2
Josep Corbí Normativity, moral realism, and unmasking explanations
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Moral Projectivism must be able to specify under what conditions a certain inner response counts as a moral response. I argue, however, that moral projectivists cannot coherently do so because they must assume that there are moral properties in the world in order to fix the content of our moral judgements. To show this, I develop a number of arguments against moral dispositionalism, which is, nowadays, the most promising version of moral projectivism. In this context, I call into question both David Lewis’ dispositionalist account of colour and Chistine Korsgaard’s procedural realism.
18. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 19 > Issue: 2
Francisca Javier Rodríguez Alcázar Normatividad en filosofia de la ciencia: el caso de la ciencia reguladora (Normativity in the philosophy of science: the case of regulatory science)
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En este articulo se examina la tradicional caracterización de la filosofía de la ciencia como una disciplina normativa. Se discuten varias concepciones de esta disciplina, cada una de las cuales ofrece una respuesta diferente a la pregunta de si es posible, y cómo, una filosofía de la ciencia genuinamente normativa. De entre esas concepciones, se opta por una forma de naturalismo que se diferencia de otras en la exigeneia de que la normatividad de la filosofía de la ciencia inc!uya la discusión de los objetivos y valores, epistémicos o no, de la ciencia. La necesidad de esta inc!usión se ilustra, finalmente, con el ejemplo de la aetividad conocida como “cicncia reguladora”.This article examines the traditional characterization of the philosophy of science as a normative discipline. Several understandings of this discipline are discussed; each of them offering a different answer to the question whether, and how, a genuinely normative philosophy of science might be possible. Among these views, I choose one variety of naturalism that differs from others in its commitment with the discussion of science’s aims and values, either epistemic or non-epistemic. Finally, the need for this inclusion is illustrated with the example of the so-called “regulatory science”.
19. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 19 > Issue: 2
Concha Martínez Vidal Normativity and its vindication: The case of Logic
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Physical laws are irresistible. Logical rules are not. That is why logic is said to be normative. Given a system of logic we have a Norma, a standard of correctness. The problem is that we need another Norma to establish when the standard of correctness is to be applied. Subsequently we start by clarifying the senses in which the term ‘Iogic’ and the term ‘normativity’ are being used. Then we explore two different epistemologies for logic to see the sort of defence of the normativity of logic they allow for; if any. The analysis concentrates on the case of classical logic. In particular the issue will be appraised from the perspective put forward by the epistemology based on the methodology of wide reflective equilibrium and the scientific one underlying the view of logic as model.
articulos
20. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 19 > Issue: 2
Arantza Etxeberria Agiriano, Tomás Garcia Azkonobieta Sobre la noción de información genética: seméntica y excepcionalidad (On the notion of genetic information: semantics and exceptionality)
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EI objetivo de este artículo es analizar ciertas críticas a la aplicación de la nocion de informacíon en biología, teniendo en cuenta tanto la historia del concepto como las diferentes posiciones actuales. Creemos que la motivacíon principal de las críticas es negar que los genes sean un factor causal excepcional en el desarrollo, y favorecer la imagen de la vida como un sistema organizado que requiere diferentes recursos. Aunque compartimos el rechazo deI reduccionismo genetico, argumentamos que éste no es atribuible a la analogía informacional y que, por tanto, no es necesario abandonarla completamente.The goal of this article is to analize certain criticisms to the notion of information in biology, taking into account both the history of the concept and some recent positions. We think that the main motivation behind the criticisms is to deny that genes are an exceptional cause in development, and to favor an image of life as an organized system that requires diffirent resources. While we share the rejection of genetic reductionism, we argue that it is not entirely due to the informational analogy and that, therefore, it is not necessary to abandon this analogy.