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seccion monografica
1. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 18 > Issue: 3
Jesús P. Zamora Bonilla Presentation: Darwinism and Social Science: Is there Any Hope for the Reductionist?
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2. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 18 > Issue: 3
Peter T. Saunders Bricks Without Straw: Darwinism in the Social Sciences
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The so-called evolutionary social scienccs are based on the belief that Darwinism can explain the living world and that it therefore should be able to explain other complex systems such as minds and societies. In fact, Darwinism cannot explain biological evolution. It does make an important contribution, but this is towards understanding adaptation, which is a major problem in biology but not in the social sciences. Darwinism has much less to offer to the social sciences than to biology and the shortcomings it brings with it are much greater.
3. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 18 > Issue: 3
Ulrich Witt Generic Features of Evolution and Its Continuity: A Transdisciplinary Perspective
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Because of the intellectual attraction of the neo-Darwinian theory of evolution, its conccpts are often borrowed to conceptualized evolutionary change also in non-biological domains. However, a heuristic strategy like that is problematic. An attempt is therefore made to identify generic features of evolution which transcend domain-specific characteristics. Epistemological, conccptual, and methodological implications are discussed, and the ontological question is raised how non-biological evolutionary theories can be accommodated within the Darwinian world view of modern sciences.
4. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 18 > Issue: 3
Pablo Sebastían García Knowledge in Economics: An Evolutionary Viewpoint
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Since Sidney Winter published his paper on “Knowledge and competence as Strategic assets”, the number of publications on the role of knowledge in economics has immensely grown. l-Iere we shall analyze that role from an evolutionary point of view, and try to show that the discussion about concepts like “evolution” is not closed, and that the Darwinian framework of evolutionary economics is in debate.
5. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 18 > Issue: 3
Jack Vromen Why the Economic Conception of Human Behaviour Might Lack a Biological Basis
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In several recent papers Arthur Robson sketches evolutionary scenarios in order to explain why we humans evolved hard-wired utility functions and the capacity to choose flexibly on the basis of them. Thesescenarios are scrutinized minutely in the paper. It is pointed out that Robson ignores several relevant insightful ideas and distinctions that have surfaced in other contemporary evolutionary theorizing. A somewhat different picture of human behavior emerges once these ideas and distinctions are taken seriously.
articulos
6. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 18 > Issue: 3
Enrique Alonso, Hubert Marraud La Iógica que aprendimos
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Este trabajo constituye una revisión de los contenidos, orientación y objetivos de una parte significativa de los manuales de lógica elemental de las décadas de 1960 y 1970 redactados por autores españoles. En concreto, analizamos los prólogos, los rudimentos prerios, y la presentación de los distintos cálculos gue aparecen en tales obras. EI estudio de la semántica, los contenidos metatcóricos o las extensiones de Ia lógica elemental quedan para una segunda etapa de esta investigacion.This work is a critical examination of contents, orientation, and goals of a significative portion of elementary spanish logic textbooks in the 60’s and 70’s. It is centered on an analysis ofprefaces, preliminaries and the different kinds of calculi appearing in these books. Topics, like semantics, metatheory or extensiones of elementary logic, are left for futrher analysis.
7. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 18 > Issue: 3
David Pineda Synchronous Events in By-Sentences
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It has been suggested in the literature about actions that one can honour the philosophical intuition lying behind Davidson’s argument for the Anscombe Thesis (the claim that by-sentences --sentcnccs used to report actions of the general form: ‘A X-ed by V-ing’-- involve two descriptions of the same action) without accepting the argument’s conclusion. The suggestion in question is to interpret by-sentences as referring to two synchronous but different actions of the same agent. I argue that this suggestion, together with two plausible semantic principles about the naming of events and a reasonable metaphysical principle about the constitution of events, leads to certain ontological commitments which are hardly acccptable. My conclusion is then that in order to deny the Anscambe Thesis what must be done is to show that Davidson’s intuition is wrong.
libros recibidos
8. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 18 > Issue: 3
LIBROS RECIBIDOS / BOOKS RECElVED
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sumario
9. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 18 > Issue: 3
SUMARIO ANALITICO / SUMMARY
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10. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 18 > Issue: 3
SUMARIO DEL VOL. 18/ CONTENTS OF VOL 18
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articulos
11. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 18 > Issue: 2
Mario Gómez-Torrente Logical Consequence and Logical Expressions
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The pretheoretical notions of logical consequence and of a logical expression are linked in vague and complex ways to modal and pragmatic intuitions. I offer an introduction to the difficulties that these intuitions create when one attempts to give precise characterizations of those notions. Special attention is given to Tarski’s theories of logical consequence and logical constancy. I note that the Tarskian theory of logical consequence has fared better in the face of the difficulties than the Tarskian theory of logical constancy. Other theories of these notions are explained and criticized.
12. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 18 > Issue: 2
John P. Burgess Which Modal Models are the Right Ones (for Logical Necessity)?
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Recently it has become almost the received wisdom in certain quarters that Kripke models are appropriate only for something like metaphysical modalities, and not for logical modalities. Here the line of thought leading to Kripke models, and reasons why they are no less appropriate for logical than for other modalities, are explained. It is also indicated where the fallacy in the argument leading to the contrary conclusion lies. The lessons learned are then applied to the question of the status of the formula.
13. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 18 > Issue: 2
Manuel García-Carpintero Gómez-Torrente on Modality and Tarskian Logical Consequence
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Gómez-Torrente’s papers have made important contributions to vindicate Tarski’s model-theoretic account of the logical properties in the face of Etchemendy’s criticisms. However, at some points his vindication depends on interpreting the Tarskian account as purportedly modally deflationary, i.e., as not intended to capture the intuitive modal element in the logical properties, that logical consequence is (epistemic or alethic) necessary truth-preservation. Here it is argued that the views expressed in Tarski’s seminal work do not support this modally deflationary interpretation, even if Tarski himself was sceptical about modalities.
14. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 18 > Issue: 2
William H. Hanson Logic, the A Priori, and the Empirical
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The time-honored view that logic is a non-empirical enterprise is still widely accepted, but it is not always recognized that there are (at least) two distinct ways in which this view can be made precise. One way focuses on the knowledge we can have of logical matters, the other on the nature of the logical consequence relation itself. More specifically; the first way embodies the claim that knowledge of whether the logical consequence relation holds in a particular case is knowledge that can be had a priori (if at all). The second way presupposes a distinction between structural and non-structural properties and relations, and it holds that logical consequence is to be defined exdusively in terms of the former. It is shown that the two ways are not coextensive by giving an example of a logic that is non-empirical in the second way but not in the first.
15. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 18 > Issue: 2
Ignacio Jané Remarks on Second-Order Consequence
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Tarski’s definition of logical consequence can take different forms when implemented in second order languages, depending on what counts as a model. In the canonical, or standard, version, a model is just an ordinary structure and the (monadic) second-order variables are meant to range over all subsets of its domain. We discuss the dependence of canonical second-order consequence on set theory and raise doubts on the assumption that canonical consequence is a definite relation.
16. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 18 > Issue: 2
Gila Sher A Characterization of Logical Constants Is Possible
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The paper argues that a philosophically informative and mathematically precise characterization is possible by (i) describing a particular proposal for such a characterization, (ii) showing that certain criticisms of this proposal are incorrect, and (iii) discussing the general issue of what a characterization of logical constants aims at achieving.
17. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 18 > Issue: 2
Mario Gómez-Torrente The ‘Must’ and the ‘Heptahedron’: Remarks on Remarks
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I offer some brief remarks in reply to comments and criticisms of my earlier work on logical consequence and logical constants. I concentrate on criticisms, especially García-Carpintero’s charge that myviews make no room for modal intuitions about logical consequence, and Sher’s attempted rebuttal of my critique of her theory of logical constants. I show that García-Carpintero’s charge is based on misunderstandings, and that Sher’s attempted rebuttal actually reveals new problems for her theory.
18. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 18 > Issue: 2
Julia Barragán The Perverse Normative Power of Self-Exceptions
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One of the most disturbing problems of social decision making and indeed quite difficult to resolve is the need to reconcile individual rationality with that of society. While individual rationalizing rules indicateways to maximize benefits without any restriction, the collective point of view tilts toward the limitation of individual maximization. This is the very core of the so-called Prisoner’s Dilemma which is but a formalway of saying that there is good reason for every individual to defect on a bargain; the ‘good reason’, that generally takes the gentler form of a self-exception, is that if a player defects and his opponent does not, then the former profits. The purpose of this study is to show the highly erosive character of this self-exceptions and also to make evident its perverse normative power.
in memoriam
19. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 18 > Issue: 2
Josep E. Corbí Josep Lluís Blasco y la libertad de pensar (1940-2003)
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recensiones
20. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 18 > Issue: 2
Luis Fernandez Moreno Tractatus logico-philosophicus
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